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THE PROBLEMS 

OF THE 

COMING PEACE 



By 
FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D. 

Delegate of the Polish Supreme National Committee to America 



New York 
POLISH BOOK IMPORTING CO., Inc. 

1916 



J\6 IQ 

MS 



Copyright, 1916 
By FELIX MLYNARSKI 



P 



7 



MAY 27 1916 
©CU431248 

"7^ / 



THE PROBLEMS 

OF THE 

COMING PEACE 



Some of the other works of the Author: 

Sociology and Epistemology" 

Jaroslav, 1910, 312 pp. 



c t 



l i 



The Problem of the Policy of State 
Independence" 
(A Study in the Theory of Politics) 

Lemberg, 1911, 211 pp. 



The Principles of Social Philosophy" 

Vol. I (in print) 



CONTENTS 

Page 

I. — Introduction 9 

II. — The Turkish Question 19 

III. — The Part of Austria-Hungary 57 

IV. — The Future of Warsaw . 91 

V. — The Causes of the War 14 1 

VI.— The Peace Tribunal 162 



Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 



Chapter I. — Introduction 

There are two examples in history which could be 
compared with the present European war. They are: the 
struggle between Rome and Carthago and the war of Eng- 
land against Napoleon. The ancient Carthago is the England 
of our day; Rome of yore is the present Germany. These 
were the wars of the greatest power on land with the great- 
est power on the seas. Only the conflagration of Carthago, 
when its walls crumbled under the pressure of the Roman 
legions and centuries later the burning down of Moscow, 
the smoking ruins of which broke Napoleon's sword, can 
be compared with the political importance of the present 
war. This war has deep reasons, employs frightful means, 
and it is bound to yield most important results. 

No comparison in history can be found for the way in 
which the present war is conducted. No longer armies 
are facing each other as was the case in former years, but 
entire nations are lined up against each other in battle array. 
No longer thousands are fighting, but millions. There is 
no longer such a thing as a decisive battle in which one 
attack is able to crush the enemy. The present efforts pre- 
sent something rather superhuman ; the individual becomes 
drowned in the mass of armies of millions of men, having no 
possibility of overlooking battles fought over hundreds of 
miles and lasting for months. The soldier becomes an ant 
rather than an eagle. His consciousness does not seem to 
exceed the consciousness of a cell in the midst of an organ- 
ism. The heroism of the individual decreases while the 



— 10 — 

heroism of a nation grows proportionately; the individual 
character plays only a secondary part, while the weight of 
the national character increases in importance. Not armies 
but entire nations have entrenched for the last year and 
deluge each other with fire. Above them all the aeroplane 
has spread its wings and has been pressed into regular army 
service. On the seas the submarine has come to the front 
and changed the technique of naval warfare. Thus, the two 
supreme triumphs of human ingenuity, the conquest of the 
air and the conquest of the deep seas, were first enlisted 
as weapons of wholesale murder before they could serve 
purposes of human happiness. 

The sacrifices caused by the present war are enormous. 
The first nine months have cost the warring nations five 
millions in killed and wounded, not including those who were 
taken prisoners.* During the same period the expenditures 
of the principal warring nations amounted to $12,000,000,- 
OOO.f Thousands of villages and cities were reduced to 
ruins; all that were spared by the artillery fire were de- 
stroyed by trench digging; these were the traces which 
the hurricane of war left behind when it swept the country- 
side. Famine, misery, contagious diseases followed the 
warring armies as jackals follow a caravan. The prosperity 
of nations which were leaders in civilizatory work has been 
ruined ; ruined was also the happiness of millions of families 
from whom the war tore away father, husband and brother. 
Who will tell how many tears have been shed? Who will 
describe the suffering and the agony? 

The world is horror stricken. 



* According to the estimates of Senator Henri La Fontaine of 
Brussels, Chairman of the International Peace Union. 

t According to the estimates of the British Prime Minister, 
Asquith. 



— 11 — 

The consciousness of responsibility for the present war 
grows every day. Slogans of the liberty of nations and per- 
manent peace appeared on the banners of the warring armies. 
According to the general opinion, this is perhaps the last 
act of the human tragedy — to some extent, a "war against 
war itself."* The idea of peace, but of permanent peace, be- 
comes slowly something positive. It ceases to be an idea 
and begins to acquire the form of an actual political goal. 
The world begins to feel the weight of its own guilt; the 
majesty of humanity requires some kind of satisfaction. 
Human society begins to look for a guarantee that this 
frightful orgy of blood shall not again be repeated. Should 
war always remain the supreme manifestation of the life of 
nations just as the death of an individual is the supreme 
manifestation of his life? Is the heroism of labor going to 
outweigh, on the scale of history, the heroism of war? 

The present war is immense, but the coming peace must 
exceed it in its immensity. 

The condition of the coming peace must be the principle 
of justice. This principle, however, is denied by those, who 
by their actions prove that according to their opinion the 
coming peace has to be based on the fact of physical victory. 
The shadow of every victory is a defeat of the vanquished 
party, and the resonance of defeat is the thirst for revenge. 
Justice alone can mitigate this danger and, therefore, the 
idea of justice can be the only permanent basis for a future 
peace treaty. The defeat of Austria at Sadowa in 1866 did 
not sow the seed for a desire for revenge because Bismarck 
did not take advantage in a brutal way of the physical victory 
of Prussia, but he limited himself to negotiating a just 
peace. Austria lost at that time Venice to Italy, and this was 



* E. Vanderwelde. 



— 12 — 

in conformity with the theory of nationality which was the 
tendency of the history of these days. Austria, however, 
did not lose an inch of her territory to Prussia. The result 
of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 was different. 
Prince Bismarck basing himself on the fact of physical 
victory exploited peace to the disadvantage of France. Ger- 
many has occupied not only the portion of Lorraine which 
was nearest Germany in spirit, but has also occupied Alsace, 
which showed a marked political inclination towards France. 
A huge contribution of war did not fail to increase the spirit 
of animosity ; all these elements were the seeds of the com- 
ing war of revenge. The entire policy of France and the 
education of the young generation was conceived and de- 
veloped from this ultimate point of view of revenge against 
Germany. The fruits that grew from these seeds are ripen- 
ing in the present conflagration. This example is frightful 
enough to prove the correctness of the contention that only 
just peace can be a permanent peace. No permanent peace 
can be based on blind hatred, on the brutal fact of physical 
superiority; and, thus, the saving of humanity from the 
disaster of war can, just as permanent peace, be brought 
about only by the principle of justice. 

An army can be defeated, but a nation which consciously 
and bravely goes to war cannot be defeated. A soldier dies 
on the field of glory, the sword breaks, the rifle in the dying 
hand does not send out any longer the deadly lead, but the 
elements of heroism as far as they manifest themselves in 
heroic acts cannot perish, because they are immortal. They 
cannot disappear in the conflagration, nor can they be 
drowned in the deluge of shrapnel. They must outlive the 
defeat and become the songs of hatred for the future gen- 
erations, and the flags of future war for revenge. Both 
parties in the present war are guilty of wholesale murder, 



— 13 — 

but on the other hand, both parties, and not only one of them, 
have to be credited with boundless heroism ; both sides can 
claim for themselves a capital of heroism and national en- 
thusiasm. The Germans have astonished the entire world 
with their smashing march through Belgium and northern 
France, but France also will have a source of eternal national 
pride in the battle of the Marne. Amazing are the victories 
of the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies over 
Russia, in the eastern theatre of war, but still Russia too 
can boast of a series of successes in the beginning of the 
war. All nations which hitherto led Europe in civilization 
are ablaze with war-like spirit. The heroism that these 
nations displayed in a sufficient number of cases insures 
these nations against eventual downfall and decay ; national 
honor is safe since it covered itself with new laurel of 
glory. No Joffre and no Hindenburg shall ever be able to 
destroy it ; this national honor is a weapon which shall sur- 
vive even the ultimate defeat, and it shall continue to be 
sharpened in the arsenal of national life for the future 
war of revenge in case one of the warring parties should 
brutally take advantage of her physical victory and thus 
create in the other nation the feeling of injury. Let us 
beware of all illusions. The Germans will never be able to 
destroy France, the beautiful; nor Britain, the proud; nor 
Russia, the resourceful. It would be, furthermore, rather 
naive to think that Germany can be smashed and annihilated 
as one of the leading powers of the world. Not even Na- 
poleon was able to destroy Germany, and Joffre certainly 
is not a Napoleon ; in the same way, Hindenburg shall never 
be able to crush any of the nations which are fighting to- 
day against Germany. The armies of the one or the other 
of the warring sides may and undoubtedly will be defeated, 
but the nations are not going to suffer defeat. The fighting 



— 14 — 

power of the army may burst, but the force of the national 
consciousness shall never break, particularly after going 
through the hardening process of this gigantic struggle. 
The defeated armies will take the honor, the tradition of 
accomplished feats of heroism home with them, and this will 
give them the possibility of a speedy regeneration after 
defeat. This is a fact of most decisive importance, because 
it determines the ability of preparing for revenge should the 
future treaty of peace be a treaty of brutality and injury to 
any of the two sides. 

The problem of permanent peace requires that the idea of 
physical victory should yield before the idea of justice. 
Therefore, neither the hatred against England nor the hatred 
against Germany can form the basis for mutual concessions 
and demands. Hatred is nothing else but a form of moral 
blindness, and blindness can never lead political wisdom. 
Blindness bears errors, and an error can never be a substitute 
for truth. Hatred, moreover, is a powerful breeder of lies, 
and nothing undermines national health as much as an orgy 
of lies. This is a weapon which is no less deadly to the in- 
terests of civilization than the firearms, and the barbarism 
of lying is one of the greater, if not the greatest barbarism. 
The program of future peace must be free from this method 
of fighting. Truth and actualities must be the slogans of 
just peace; this is the only way to be taken in order that the 
interests of humanity could dominate over the selfishness of 
states and nations. 

Over the window in the large meeting room of the Peace 
Palace at The Hague, the following inscription can be read : 

"Si vis pacem, para iustitiam" 

Let us hope that the victory in this frightful war will be 
the victory of the idea of justice. It is possible that the 



— 15 — 

future peace congress, which will sit as a tribunal over the 
sufferings of nations and which will construct the founda- 
tion for the history of the twentieth century, will meet in 
this very room of the Peace Palace at The Hague. Let us 
hope that when the peace congress disbands the world will 
be able to exclaim: 

"Glory be to the humanity and peace to the nations of 
good will." 



Chapter II 
THE TURKISH QUESTION 



— 19 — 
Chapter II. — The Turkish Question 

The present European war was started for the sake of the 
freedom of nations. The permanence of future peace must 
also be based on the same principle. This, however, is a 
difficult and tangled question with regard to its just solution. 

In the beginning of October of last year, the British Prime 
Minister Asquith proclaimed the principle that ''the weak 
have rights and that the strong have duties."* This, how- 
ever, did not prevent England from joining hands a month 
later, in November, with France and Russia for the purpose 
of destroying the independence of Turkey, in spite of the 
fact that Turkey was and still is "weak." The present 
European war is conducted in the name of the liberty of na- 
tions, nevertheless, the partition of Turkey for the purpose of 
destroying its liberty has been decided upon. There must 
be, therefore, some tragic misunderstanding in the entire 
matter. 

As a matter of fact, the world fails to understand Turkey 
as a nation. Turkey is not a European nation ; different 
historical elements were active in making up Turkey. Tur- 
key is the last wave which the Islam has thrown on the 
shore of Europe. Turks were the same element in the 
Balkans as the Arabs were in Spain ; the Turks have se- 
lected the shorter road to Europe which was in vain tried 
by the Arabs; this road led through Constantinople, which 
was the capital of the Eastern Roman empire and which 
survived, while the migration of nations destroyed Rome it- 
self. The idea of the Roman empire, the "Holy Empire," 
was since so much more identified in the eyes of the Asiatic 
nations with the throne of the Sultans of Constantinople. 
The day when Constantinople fell was an epoch in the 

* Speech of October 3, 1914. 



— 20 — 

history of the Islam, which thus conquered the crown of 
Constantine the Great. The traditions of Rome and those 
of Mecca became thus united and the conceptions of the 
Khali f and of Csesar amalgamated themselves in the political 
consciousness of the Asiatic masses and began to form a 
close historical relationship. A racial relationship, however, 
was close enough not to hamper these processes. 

The Turks were very well aware of the charm which this 
imperial crown had for the people of Asia. Soliman the 
Magnificent assumed the title of Emperor and denied the 
right of this title to Charles V, although in the latter's do- 
mains the sun was never setting. "His successors were once 
preceded through the streets of Constantinople by twelve of- 
ficers bearing straws aloft, a faint semblance of the consular 
fasces that had escorted Quintius or Fabius through the 
Roman forum."* This was in the middle of the sixteenth 
century, or, in other words, almost a thousand years after 
the downfall of Rome in the West, and fifteen hundred years 
after the victory of Caesar over Pompeius at Pharsalia. Asia 
has recognized the new condition of things ; in her eyes this 
incident meant nothing else but a change of the dynasty 
on the throne of the emperors. There was even triumph and 
rejoicing over the fact that the Islam, the child of Asia, was 
able to get a hold of the imperial purple. From then on 
Constantinople became still more holy, because it became the 
''garden of the Khalif." The importance of Turkey as a 
state grew immensely; the Sultan was, prior to the con- 
quest of Constantinople, only the "shadow of the Prophet." 
In Constantinople the glory of the imperial crown fell on 
the Sultan's head and in this new character of its majesty, 



* James Bryce : "The Holy Roman Empire," page 421, New York, 
the Macmillan Company, 191 1. 



— 21 — 

Turkey, situated on the shore of Europe, survived the en- 
tire period of modern history. 

Needless to say, this did not fail to have influence and 
deep effect on the political consciousness of the Asiatic 
masses. All those who are familiar with the conditions on 
the Asiatic continent are well aware of the fact that the 
Sultan even in our day is not only the Khalif, but also the 
"shadow of Rome" for the people of Western Asia.* When, 
during the Balkan war, a rumor reached Asia that the Bul- 
garians had entered Constantinople, it seemed for a while 
that complete anarchy and ruin would sweep Turkey from 
the surface of the globe. The victorious battle on the 
Tjataldja lines which was won by the Turks saved not only 
Constantinople as a strategical point, but also saved the 
Turkish state in Asia and insured its. existence as the con- 
tinuation of the empire of Rome. Soon another triumph 
came to the Turks, the retaking of Adrianople, which con- 
tained the tombstones of the first European Sultans. Thus, 
the prestige of Turkey was saved from destruction and once 
more the "shadow of Rome'' was victorious. The peace 
treaty of Bucharest did not kill Turkey as a state, but healed 
it, because it solved the problem of nationalities in the Bal- 
kans. Since this problem of nationalities in the Balkan penin- 
sula became exclusively a Bulgaro-Serbo-Greek problem, 
Turkey has to some extent ceased to be a European country 
notwithstanding the fact that Constantinople still lies on 
the European side of the Bosporus. Turkey can be wounded 
mortally only by losing Constantinople, because this would 
be at the same time a blow to the political consciousness of 
Asiatic Turkey, and because it would destroy the synthesis 
of the Khalifat and of the Caesarian purple of the Sultan. 
The Turkish state was based on this very synthesis and can- 

* "Turkey in Europe and Asia," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 11 



— 22 — 

not do without it; it is, therefore, necessary to kill first the 
''shadow of Rome" before killing Turkey. 

Previous to the Turks' entering Constantinople, the latter 
had been the seat of eastern Asiatic — Christian separatism 
and thus became the seat of the schism, and the forming 
place of the Oriental Church. At the head of this Church 
was the patriarch of Constantinople, and just as there were 
two Roman emperors for a while, there were now two popes ; 
one of them was the legal successor of St. Peter, while the 
other one resided closer to Palestine, the cradle of Chris- 
tianity. One of them prevailed in the West, while the other 
held sway over the East. It was in itself the same historical 
process, the combination of the cosmopolitan Christianity, 
with a universal Roman empire. The idea of the "world- 
church" and the idea of a "world-state" completed each 
other, both in the West and in the East. The division which 
sprang from this was only a division of territory in the con- 
ception of the "Holy empire," and not a division of the idea 
itself. In theory this process was the same, but as far as its 
results are concerned, the break proved to be a deeper one. 
The Orient has never questioned the priority of the imperial 
crown before the mitre of the patriarch. In the West the 
papal tiara struggled against the imperial crown for priority 
of the "spiritual sword" before the "lay sword." The east- 
ern patriarch was the shadow of the emperor."* In the 
West the Roman emperor had to make pilgrimages from 
time to time to the papal Canossa. When Rome fell, yielding 
to the flood of the migration of nations, the papacy was able 
to substitute the glory of the papal tiara for that of the 
imperial crown; Odoaker succeeded in liquidating the ma- 
terial side of the western Roman empire, but the charm 



* James Bryce, 1. c, page 338. 



— 23 — 

exercised by the idea of this empire was stronger than all 
the invasions of the barbarian nations. This charm was so 
strong that even Bonifatious VIII, in 1300, when thousands 
of pilgrims assembled in Rome for the famous jubilee year, 
appeared before the people wearing a crown on his head, 
a sword attached to his side, and a sceptre in hand, and 
publicly spoke from the height of the papal throne, "I am 
Caesar — I am Emperor."* Under these conditions a peace 
between the tiara of the popes and the crown of the re- 
established Roman Empire could never be a permanent one, 
and, therefore, the struggle between the empire and the 
papacy was the main characteristic feature of the Middle 
Ages in Europe. On different occasions the pope in the 
name of obedience to God publicly demanded the people 
to disobey emperors and kings. The result of this was the 
defeat of the papacy, and the political expression of it was 
the creation of a modern state, which gave birth to all the 
European nations. All these elements, however, which were 
the source of the emancipation of European states and na- 
tions, did not exist in the East and, hence, the European 
nations are so different from the states and nations of the 
Orient. 

This is to a certain extent a paradox, but it still contains 
a lot of truth — that the Islam in its political psychology was 
closer to Constantinople than western or central Europe. 
The Islam was primarily a religious movement, from which 
emanated subsequently political configurations such as 
Arabia, at first, then Turkey, until finally all of them united 
under the sceptre of the Sultans of Constantinople. The 
emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire was not only a sov- 
ereign of the state, but was at the same time the head of the 



* James Bryce, 1. c, page 109. 



— 24 — 

Orthodox Church. The Sultan, on the other hand, was not 
only the head of the Moslem Church but also of the Moslem 
state. In the first case the state was older than the Orthodox 
Church, in the second case again the militant Moslem Church 
was older than the Turkish state. This was, however, only 
a difference of age and not a difference in structure. In 
both cases the church organization was a component part of 
the state and remained so. The Church was the state, or 
the state was the Church. The Orient did not go through 
the experience of the struggle between the Church and the 
state, and this fact is the basic feature of the political history 
of the Orient. 

The traditions of Constantinople were preserved until our 
day by Turkey in Asia and by Russia in Eastern Europe. 
Russia has taken from Constantinople its religion and the 
form of state organization. Until our day, the Czar ap- 
points the Oberprokurator of the Holy Synod, who is the 
chief of the religious life of Russia ; the Sultan appoints the 
Sheik-Ul-Islam, who is the chief of the religious life of 
Turkey. The Turkish Church and the Orthodox Church 
have essentially the same political character, because they 
both were influenced by Constantinople. The lay power 
regulates from the height of the throne the religious life of 
the country, and the Church is the spine of the state. "The 
Russians who are as much a religious as a political com- 
munity, carry with them over the vast space of Northern 
and Central Asia the traditions of an Empire conterminous 
with the Church, an Empire which is at once the offspring 
and the guardian of the Orthodox faith."* This is the 
characteristic feature which differentiates Russia from Eu- 
rope and brings the former closer to Asia.f Europe was 



* James Bryce, 1. c, page 351. 

f "The Eastern Question," page 4, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 



— 25 — 

brought up in the traditions of Rome, while Russia, the 
Balkan Peninsula and Asia were brought up in the traditions 
of Constantinople. If the Russian nation already is so much 
different from the rest of Europe, there is hardly any rea- 
son why one should wonder that the Turks are so much 
more different. No one can say that Russia is not a na- 
tion, although her civilization is so much different from the 
civilization of Europe, its origin being exclusively Con- 
stantinople and not Rome. In the same way nobody can 
say that Turkey is not a nation, although Turkey was the 
result of historical conditions entirely different from ours. 
Another fact is to be credited to Turkey, and this is that 
the Islam has brought a portion of the creative elements into 
the civilization of the world in spite of the fact that the 
activity of the Islam traveled over the deserts of Asia and 
Africa, and not over the fertile grounds of Europe. The 
Arabian schools in Spain have enabled Europe to absorb the 
teaching of Aristotle. The Islam has not only burned down 
the library of Alexandria, but it also made public the philos- 
ophy of Averroes. St. Thomas of Aquinas based his 
philosophy on the system of Aristotle, and he is the one who 
represents the acme of the scholastical philosophy. Tur- 
key absorbed and digested the entire spiritual products of 
the Islam. It is erroneous to judge Turkey by our standards. 
It cannot be concealed that Turkey never learned how to do 
civilizatory work on a larger, world-embracing scale, but 
this does not mean that Turkey has ceased to develop as 
a nation. Nowadays the Turkish nation stands armed to 
the teeth and fights for the maintenance oi its independence. 
Under the walls of Constantinople the Turks fight better 
to-day than at Kumanovo, or Lule Burgas in the last Balkan 
war. The soldiers of France, of England and of Russia 
are certainly not inferior to the Serbian, Bulgarian and 



— 26 — 

Greek soldiers, but the Turks nowadays fight for the defence 
of the principle of nationality and not against it, as they did 
in the Balkan war, because they fight for their own inde- 
pendence. This is the reason why Turkey proved to be so 
weak from the point of view of imperialistic policy, and still 
shows to-day enough strength, health, enthusiasm, sacrifice, 
and heroism from the point of view of nationality. The 
Turkey of to-day is young, progressive, constitutional, eager 
to be regenerated, and triumphant over the internal des- 
potism. During the short breathing spells in this frightful 
war, when the roar of guns subsides for a while, the con- 
science of the world must be confronted by the question 
whether the present European war is in fact a war for 
freedom and equal rights for all nations ? 

The main adversary of Turkish independence is Russia. 
It has been an old dream of Peter the Great to gain for 
Russia an estuary on the Mediterranean. Catherine the 
Second strained all the resources of her country in order 
to bring Russia closer to the realization of this dream. This 
was the so-called "Greek Project," Russia being the incarna- 
tion of the "Greek Church," and as such considering herself 
a lawful heir to the inheritance that could be left by the 
Turks at Constantinople. "Professing the creed of Con- 
stantinople, Russia claims the crown of the Eastern 
Caesars."* This is a statement of a historian and politician 
of the importance of James Bryce, the former Ambassador 
of Great Britain to the United States. The Orthodox faith 
has anteceded the Turks in Constantinople, and Russia is 
bent at present dn wresting the sceptre of the Caesars out 
of the hands of the Islam. This is the struggle between the 
Islam and the Orthodox faith for the inheritance of Rome 



James Bryce, 1. c., page 421. 



— 27 — 

in Asia. Islam is in the defensive, the Orthodox faith is 
the attacking party. As a program, this is only a variation 
of imperialism and not of nationality. The idea of religion 
is the determining factor of Russian ambition. Russia does 
not have any other points of attack, neither from the histori- 
cal nor the legal point of view. Constantinople was never 
a part of Russia and the Turk ruled on the Bosporus for 
nearly five hundred years. The conquest of Constantinople 
was once upon a time the triumph of Turkish imperialism ; 
the conquest of Constantinople by Russia would mean the 
triumph of Russian imperialism. No illusion of any kind 
should be entertained as to the terms of permanent peace 
when considering conscientiously, justly and with a spirit 
of responsibility. 

The general belief of the world is that Russia is prompted 
mainly by economical reasons. In case of war Russian 
commerce suffers undoubtedly through the closing of the 
Straits of Constantinople. The Dardanelles is the only route 
of export from the Black Sea and the south of Russia, where 
the latter country's agricultural life is concentrated, and 
where she keeps her huge stores of corn grown in Podolia 
and Ukraina. The exportation of oil mined in the enormous 
wells of Caucasus, particularly the exportation from Batum 
and Noworossiysk, is made over the same route through the 
Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Four and a half thousand 
ships of a combined tonnage of 7,000,000 tons carry the 
merchandise over the Black Sea within one year. Owing 
to this fact the harbor of Constantinople is one of the largest 
ports of the globe, and can be compared with London, Ant- 
werp and Hamburg. It is sufficient to state that the tonnage 
of ships which, during 1913, entered and cleared at Constan- 
tinople exceeded the gross tonnage of 17,000,000 tons.* 

* "The Statesman's Year-book," Macmillan & Co., London, 191 5. 



— 28 — 

This, however, does not alter the facts. In times of peace 
the Straits are open to Russian merchant ships ; the question 
of passage in times of war, to which Russia is not a party, is 
a question of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral 
vessels, and is by no means the question of tearing away by 
force a right, resting with somebody else. The closing of 
the Straits not only harms Russian commerce, but it also 
harms American commerce. But does this constitute a title 
for the United States to take Constantinople away from the 
Turks ? This would be a reductio ad absardiim. The dam- 
ages suffered by the Russian commerce are by far greater 
and by far more harmful, but this only gives more right to 
Russia to try to obtain regulation by treaty of the question 
of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral vessels in 
times of war. The program that Russia chose was a differ- 
ent one; it was the program of imperialism. Russia does 
not care about safeguarding by treaties the principle of free- 
dom of the seas and of the Straits to neutral vessels, but it 
tries to occupy Constantinople in order to close it up still 
more tightly and fortify it for her own benefit and to the 
detriment of other countries. This endeavor Russia calls 
her "historical mission" — the religious mission of the tsarate. 
This, however, cannot conceal the fact that this is a program 
of conquest and expansion, a program of imperialism, and it 
is, therefore, in contradiction with the program of the 
present war. 

The Russian imperialism manifested itself as soon as an 
Anglo-French fleet approached Constantinople. Elated over 
the first triumphs of the Russian arms in Armenia, Goremy- 
kin, the prime minister of Russia, publicly declared in the 
Duma that the "historical future of Russia acquires more 
distinct outlines over there on the shores of the Black Sea, 
and at the walls of Constantinople." This happened on July 



— 29 — 

9, 1915.* Members of the Duma of all political parties joined 
in supporting the prime minister. The leader of the Opposi- 
tion, MilukofT, a member of the Kadet Party, expressed his 
positive conviction that the "reaching of the main goal, viz., 
the Straits and Constantinople, shall in proper time be se- 
cured by diplomatic means as well as military action." 
Savienko was applauded for the phrase that — "this great 
and brilliant achievement is worth living, fighting, and dy- 
ing for." Their reactionary member, Levaszoff, did not 
betray any doubt that "the shield of Russia should be at- 
tached to the gates of Constantinople and that the Orthodox 
cross should once more shine over the St. Sophia." The 
utterances of the press and at public meetings were no less 
bold and explicit than the speeches of the members of the 
Duma. According to the "statement of the program," which 
was read off by F. Aristoff, at a Slav reunion in Moscow,f 
the consequences of the present war "should be the extend- 
ing of the Russian territory to its natural geographical and 
strategical boundary, including annexation of Armenia with 
an estuary to the Mediterranean opposite the Island of 
Cyprus, the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, to- 
gether with Constantinople." Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy 
expressed himself without any "strategical" circumlocutions 
that the "idea of St. Sophia is the idea of a Christian Uni- 
versal Empire."| Is there any need for more proofs that 
the question of Constantinople is the question of imperialism 
with Russia? Kinglake very justly estimated the political 
psychology of Russia, when he stated years ago that "the 
statesmen of St. Petersburg have always understood the 



* Reports of the Russian press of the meetings of the Duma. 

t "Gazeta Warszawska," January, 191 5. 

X "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 3, 1915. 



— 30 — 

deep import of the change which the throne of Constantine 
would bring with it."* 

Prior to the outbreak of the Crimean war, when the 
Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Czar Nicholas I issued a 
manifesto in which he stated that, "It is known to all our 
faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox religion 
was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious fore- 
fathers.'^ In reply to the intervention of England and 
France, when the Crimean war had already become a fact, 
Czar Nicholas I proclaimed in a second manifesto that "Rus- 
sia fights not for the things of this world, but for the Faith 
— for the Orthodox faith. But Russia will not alter her 
divine mission. "J Both manifestoes were read in the churches 
all over the empire. This mission, understood in that way, 
has created the conception of the "Holy Russia" as a coun- 
terpart of the idea of the "Holy Empire." The imperialism 
obtained the sanction of the religion ; Constantinople as "the 
capital of the Orthodox Church" shall become the capital 
of the holy and great Russia. The limits of the "Holy" 
imperialism must of necessity be monstrous. Domination 
over the Straits, as Kinglake says, "leads through the heart 
of an empire into the midst of that world of which men 
kindle thoughts when they speak of the TEgean and of 
Greece, and the Jonian shores and of Palestine and Egypt 
and of Italy and of France, and of Spain and the land of the 
Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and the path of ships 
on the ocean. "§ This scope of feverish dreams is a very 
good description, because the limits of Rome reached in fact 



• * A. W. Kinglake : "The Invasion of the Crimea," 1863, Vol. I, 
page 62. 

t A. W. Kinglake, Vol. I, page 208. 

t A. W. Kinglake, ibidem, Vol. I, page 298. 

§ A. W. Kinglake, ibidem, Vol. I, page 57. 



— 31 — 

as far as the frontiers of India. As a scope of immediate 
endeavors of Russian policy, it is obviously an exaggeration. 
But there remains, however, the reality of the enormous 
extent of the inheritance of old Rome. Constantinople as a 
point of departure for this inheritance opens up the road 
even as far as Palestine. The emperors of Rome had among 
others the title of "Protector of Palestine," and there is a 
deep reason for the attempt of the Russians to effect an 
insignificant landing during the present war in Jaffa. Sug- 
gestions with regard to the occupation of Palestine can be 
seen everywhere in the Russian press; these perspectives 
although distant are unavoidable, because they are the direct 
result of the inheritance from the Oriental Roman Empire. 
The question of Jerusalem is a question of historical neces- 
sity for Russia, at the very moment when Russia succeeds 
in planting the double cross on the dome of St. Sophia. 

In order to reach this goal, Russia did not hesitate to en- 
list the services of a legend. The Russian people believe 
that an Orthodox monk, who was praying in the church of 
St. Sophia while the Turks entered Constantinople, is still 
alive in the interior of the walls of this famous church which 
opened miraculously to receive him. On the day when Chris- 
tianity regains the church of St. Sophia, its walls will open 
again and the enchanted monk will be released in order to 
bless the victorious Czar and "Holy Russia." This is cer- 
tainly a very clever imperialistic propaganda, because poli- 
tics joins hands with prayer and the cross closes an alliance 
with the sword. It is difficult to have a grudge against 
Russia for this ambition of hers. It is sure on the other 
hand, however, that the ambitions of Russia, no matter how 
much hallowed by the aspergill of the Orthodox religion, 
can't decide the development of the world. The goal of a 
healthy and just endeavor should be : the lasting peace, the 



— 32 — 

destruction of imperialism, and supporting the freedom of 
countries and nations. Russia, unfortunately, does not be- 
lieve in that ; the entire Russia believes at the bottom of her 
heart that the conquest of Constantinople and the making 
of the latter the capital of great and holy Russia is a goal 
which must be reached "regardless of the results for Europe, 
humanity, liberty, and civilization."* Still there is no need 
to become indignant over this ambition; it does not bring 
any dishonor to Russia, although it menaces the peace of 
the world. The "divine mission" of Russia must rather be 
understood than condemned. All the worldly ambitions can 
be subordinated to the interests of humanity and even aban- 
doned for the same reason, but "divine mission" cannot be 
abandoned under the penalty of a sin and eternal condemna- 
tion after death. The poor Russian Muzhik! Imbued for 
centuries with the idea of imperialism, he is told to wait 
eagerly under the penalty of hell for the downfall of Turkey. 
When the Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Emperor Nich- 
olas I spoke of this as the "divine mission of Russia." If 
Nicholas II ever crosses the Straits, he certainly shall not 
fail to remember the words of his great-grandfather and un- 
doubtedly will repeat that "Russia will not alter her divine 
mission." And why shouldn't he repeat these words, since 
this mission is Russia's tendency for the last three centuries ? 
Nobody ever changes a victorious policy, and only silly 
people believe in such a possibility. Russia must, whether 
she wants or not, when victorious, to begin to revive the tra- 
ditions of the Eastern Roman Empire. The weight of the 
inheritance of Rome will undoubtedly push Russia in this 
direction, even against the will of the present or any other 
Czar. The double cross on the dome of St. Sophia will be- 



*N. Danilewskij : "Russia and Europe" (St. Petersburg, 1871). 
(In Russian.) 



— 33 — 

come the sign pointing toward Jerusalem. Over the roads 
traveled by the Roman legions Russian imperialism shall 
make its way to the frontiers of India. The question of 
Constantinople is not only the question of the Straits, it is 
something more than the question of simply driving the 
Turks across the Bosporus. 

The question at issue is the domination over Western 
Asia. 

In Poland, Russia is busy "annexing purely Russian ter- 
ritory.'' Under this pretext Russia russified the district of 
Kholm before the war and Eastern Galicia during this war. 
In the Balkans Russia conducts a Pan-Slavic propaganda 
which is nothing else but Pan-Russianism,* because it tends 
to incorporate all Slavic states and nations into one organism 
of "Greater Russia." In such a case Roumania would have 
to fall, in order not to block the "natural" continuity of Slav 
territory, and Greece would be thrown out of Saloniki, which 
once upon a time was for a brief period in the hands of the 
Slavs. In Asia, after occupying Constantinople, Russia will 
begin at once to "annex Orthodox territory." Nicholas I 
left an example for Nicholas II, and both have inherited the 
program from Catherine II. The interests of the Orthodox 
Church which just happen to originate in the shade of the 
Basilica of St. Sophia shall play the same aggressive part 
which they did on the eve of the Crimean war. Historical, 
racial, and religious claims form a threefold source of Rus- 
sian appetite and political expedience. All these elements are 
the tools of an imperialistic policy, which is used according 
to the needs of the moment; this is by no means degrading 
to Russia, but it imposes the necessity of caution because the 
seeds of imperialism were never the seeds of peace. 



* Prof. Masaryk : "Zur russischen Geschichte und Religions Phi- 
losophic" 



— 34 — 

The defense of the independence of Turkey, and particu- 
larly the defense of the Straits and of Constantinople, from 
the attacks of Russia, was once a dogma of English policy. 
The treaty of Paris which terminated the Crimean war, pro- 
claimed this officially because it guaranteed the integrity of 
Turkey. This was also the reason of the danger of the war 
between England and Russia in the years 1876-1878, when 
the Russian army stood under the walls of Constantinople 
and the English fleet demonstratively entered the Straits, in 
order to halt the triumphant progress of the Muscovites. 
Since that time many things have apparently changed. In 
Paris, Lord Palmerston defended not only the Straits but 
even the Black Sea and the estuary of the Danube from the 
appetite of Russia. Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin 
defended only the Straits and Constantinople. Sir Edward 
Grey in the present European war discarded not only the 
treaty of Paris but even that of Berlin. The British army 
and the British navy attacked Constantinople in order to turn 
it over to Russia. The policy of Great Britain changed 
its front and works diametrically against the program of 
Palmerston. Those times are gone forever, when Beacons- 
field, going to the Congress of Berlin, was greeted at every 
railroad station in Germany by crowds of people and his 
car was literally deluged with flowers. The "Times" was 
elated, together with all England, that "Lord Beaconsfield's 
journey from the German frontier to Berlin was a veritable 
triumph. Nothing of the kind, however, for Prince Gortcha- 
kofL"* To-day the English press speaks of the mistakes of 
Palmerston and Beaconsfield and suggests that the govern- 
ment of Great Britain make a present of Constantinople to 
Russia. The enthusiasm running in this direction, or may be 
blindness, has gone so far that the "Times" of London, an 

* The "Times," London, 1878, June 14. 



— 35 — 

organ of the Tories, representing the good old English tra- 
ditions of policy with regard to the Oriental question has the 
courage of printing articles in which the turning over of 
Constantinople to Russia is considered as extremely advan- 
tageous for England, because then Russia is going to be 
"far more vulnerable."* The English army, and particularly 
the English fleet, have learned by their own dire experience 
to what extent the possession of Constantinople makes Tur- 
key "vulnerable." Does Antwerp, occupied by Germany, 
make the latter also "far more vulnerable" because it brings 
Germany closer to London? It is still an open question 
whether the program of Lord Palmerston was a "mistake." 
This question will be settled at the outcome of the present 
war ; but at any rate it is an astounding fact that nowadays 
Germany is defending the program of Palmerston while 
England seems to betray her own traditions. 

England is animated by the fear for the future of the 
Suez Canal. England occupied Egypt "for the defense of 
the canal," when the internal troubles in the land of the 
Nile in 1881-1882 seemed to jeopardize the safety of navi- 
gation, f At present England seems to be under the illusion 
that "the elimination of Turkey relieves Egypt and secures 
communication with India."$ The idea of the defense of 
the Suez Canal has always been a national idea of Great 
Britain. At the time of the Congress of Berlin, the leader of 
the Opposition, the Duke of Argyll, did not hesitate to sup- 
port Beaconsfield in so far as the latter's policy involved the 
principle that "England will never permit at any cost that 
any power in Europe shall interfere with her direct access 



* Sunday "Times," London, 1915, March 14. 

f John Morley: "The Life of W. E. Gladstone," Book VIII, 
page 82. 

iThe "Westminster Gazette," 1915, April 16. 



— 36 — 

to India."* Egypt protects the Suez Canal and the Suez 
Canal forms the communication with India and Australia. 
Deep silence reigned in the House of Lords on April 9, 1878, 
when on the eve of the Congress of Berlin, Beaconsfield put 
up the question to England : "Why not march armies in 
the same way and hold Egypt and the Suez Canal in the 
same state of trepidation as Constantinople and the Bos- 
porus were held at that time?"f This was a hint at the 
Russian armies, which began to descend the southern slopes 
of Armenia. 

Armenia and Egypt? 

At the first glance this fear seems to be far fetched, but 
it is real when viewed by those who are familiar with the 
conditions. The possession of Armenia gives the control 
over Western Asia; Erzerum and Erzingan dominate the 
northern part of Asia Minor, and Charput and Malatia 
control her central and southern portion. Through Bitlis 
and along the upper part of Tiger a road leads from Armenia 
as far as Mosul ; Mosul in turn is the gate to Mezopotamia. 
Another road leads from Charput through Djarbekir as far 
as Aleppo, which again is the gate to Syria. Domination 
over Armenia and Khurdistan means the strategical domina- 
tion over the main roads leading to Asia Minor, Mezopo- 
tamia, and Syria. Russia is perfectly well aware of the 
meaning of this fact ; having conquered Kars, she tries now 
to conquer Erzerum and from there through the Khurdistan, 
and Khilikia tries to open a window to the Mediterranean. 
The estuary of the Russian plans in Armenia is Alexan- 
dretta on the Bay of Iskanderun opposite the Island of Cy- 
prus. The occupation of Cyprus by England had precisely 
the purpose of putting the hand on the approach to Alexan- 

* The "Times," London, 1878, Speech of March 17. 
f The "Times," London, 1878. 



— 37 — 

dretta and thus barring the Russian access to the Suez Canal. 
Beaconsfield made the occupation of Cyprus dependent on 
the occupation of Kars in Armenia by Russia. Without 
excluding the sovereignty of the Sultan, England pledged 
herself to occupy Cyprus as long as Kars shall be occupied by 
Russia. This fact is an excellent illustration of England's 
fear that the occupation of the roads of Armenia by Russia 
would bring the latter, through Mosul, closer to Mezopotamia 
and through Aleppo and Alexandretta closer to Syria and 
Egypt. The Russian advance through Armenia against Tur- 
key, is equal to the formation of a basis for a future advance 
against Syria and from there, there is but one step to Egypt. 
The future of Armenia and of Khurdistan is closely identi- 
fied with the future of the Suez Canal. Egypt will be suffi- 
cient for protecting the Suez Canal from Turkey, but it will 
be inadequate to protect the latter from Russia, the moment 
the latter enters Constantinople and breaks through the 
natural barrier of the Armenian highlands. 

England goes at present through a period of her history 
in which she transforms her colonies into states within a 
state. India, Canada, and Australia have already reached this 
stage of evolution. It is now Africa's turn ; Egypt in the 
north and Cape Town in the south form the new political 
center on the African continent. The railroad connection 
from Cape Town to Cairo requires an additional railroad 
connection between Cairo and Calcutta. This plan, however, 
requires the conquest of Mezopotamia and Arabia in order to 
gain an immediate connection between Egypt and southern 
Persia where, by virtue of an agreement of 1907, Russia 
abandoned all her claims for the benefit of England, and for 
the price of northern Persia has foregone temporarily her 
railroad plans in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Under 
these conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta could 



— 38 — 

run exclusively through territories subjected to English con- 
trol. In order to increase the fertility of the countryside, 
through which the railroad line from Egypt to India was to 
run, English ingenuity has long before the war elaborated 
plans of irrigation and improvements through colonization 
of the neglected, but once upon a time exceedingly fertile 
stretches of the country alongside of the Euphrates and the 
Tiger.* The main prompting motives are of commercial and 
civilizatory nature, but have above all a strategical meaning 
of facilitating and increasing the ability of self-defense of 
England's colonial dominions in Asia and in Africa. This is 
the purpose which is supposed to console England for her 
abandoning the policy of Lord Palmerston and Lord 
Beaconsfield. For the price of Mezopotamia, Arabia and of 
the Cairo-Calcutta railroad, England tries to think actually 
of the dismemberment of Turkey in partnership with Russia 
and France. In such a case Russia would fulfill the first part 
of her "divine mission," and would enter not only Constan- 
tinople, but through Armenia, Khurdistan, and Khilikia into 
the gulf of Iskanderun. The remaining portion of Asia 
Minor could easily be distributed among Italy, Greece, and — 
Turkey, because even the latter's enemies cannot conceal the 
fact that Anatolia is "essentially"! Turkish and the popula- 
tion is "good and peaceful. "J Syria is intended for France 
when the contemplated partition of Turkey shall materialize. 
The Jesuits conducted for a number of years a civilizatory 
work in Syria for the benefit of France, for which even the 
socialist, Herve, calls them very reverently "The Fathers." 
Compared with the shares of Russia and England, Syria is 



* Schemes of Willcock. 

t "Turkey in Europe and Asia," page 19, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
$New York "Times," May 9, 1915 — Gustave Herve: "What is 
To Be Done with Turkey?" Reprint from "La Guerra Sociale." 



— 39 — 

rather a small gain for France, which is menaced by enor- 
mous financial losses in case of Turkey's dismemberment, 
because 60 per cent, of the Ottoman debt represents Tur- 
key's indebtedness to France. The settlement of the bill, 
however, is intended to be made at the expense of Germany. 
France hopes to get back Alsace and Lorraine and German 
colonies in Western Africa. German East Africa is in- 
cluded, however, in the sphere of English interests, because 
it borders on the Lake of Tanjanjika and strategically 
menaces the railroad line from Cape Town to Cairo and the 
continuation of this line from Cairo to Calcutta. In case of 
trouble, in the Moslem world, because of the dismemberment 
of Turkey, the public opinion of England contemplates the 
transfer of the seat of the Khalifat to Egypt.* Cairo is 
nearer to Mecca than Constantinople. That means to a cer- 
tain extent the completion of the entire plan, which seems 
to tally in the eyes of England with the end of the "Oriental 
Question," while, as a matter of fact, such a solution would 
mean nothing else but the end of the first act of this drama. 
The transferring of the Khalifat to Egypt is an undertak- 
ing of a very doubtful nature. The old time fanaticism has 
died out nowadays in the Islamic world. The importance of 
the Sultan is not based as much upon his purely spiritual 
dignity, but on the connection of this spiritual dignity with 
the splendor of the imperial crown. The transferring of 
the Khalifat to Egypt would in the eyes of the Asiatic na- 
tions mean the dethronization of the Islam. Such a promo- 
tion of the Sultan of Egypt at such a price would be nothing 
else but purely an ornament and political fiction, which is 
not worth even as much as the bones of one English soldier. 
The question of the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta pre- 

* "Manchester Guardian," Article on the "Future of Turkey," by 
Sir W. Ramsay, April, 1915. 



— 40 — 

sents a materially different aspect. Arabia and Mezopo- 
tamia would shield Egypt as soon as England would settle 
in both countries, and it would mean at the same time a uni- 
form stretch of territory for a connection between India and 
South Africa through Egypt and the Sudan. The whole 
transaction is very tempting at first sight, although the value 
of such a railroad is rather doubtful when we consider the 
lower cost of sea transportation through the Suez Canal. 
England is confronted by enormous possibilities of colonial 
expansion and civilizatory work. The only question is 
whether the entire deal is not a little too expensive. 

The railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is not a very safe 
enterprise in the long run. This railroad can be carried out 
only at the price of admitting Russia to a partition of Tur- 
key. This means ipso facto the admission of Russia to the 
shores of the Mediterranean, both through the Dardanelles 
and the Gulf of Iskanderun. The internal necessity of the 
Russian imperialism will then raise the question of the 
domination of Western Asia on account of the inheritance 
of the Eastern Roman empire. The holy pilgrimages of 
Russia to Christ's grave in Jerusalem and the rolling rouble 
will at once start to prepare the ground. Owing to the pos- 
session of Armenia, Russia will take strategical advantages 
of the roads to Mezopotamia and Syria. Erzingan, Charput 
and Malatia will become the key of the situation. Under 
such conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta shall 
not have great strategical importance. Russia will be able to 
destroy at any time the road along the northern boundary of 
Persia and interrupt the overland communication of India 
with Egypt. Through northern Persia the attack is very easy 
because of a long front line. It is so easy in fact that a band 
of desperadoes can at any time destroy the track or blow up 
the bridges and tunnels. Money can always be found in 



— 41 — 

Russia for such a purpose. The defense of the railroad 
line from Egypt is equally difficult because both in Mezo- 
potamia and in Syria there will always be the danger of a 
flank attack of the Russian armies through Armenia. After 
ten years of Russian domination in Armenia, Khurdistan, 
and Khilikia, the Russian general staff will undoubtedly 
build a military railroad through the main mountain passes 
and valleys. An attack on Russia from the side of Syria 
and Mezopotamia will always be very difficult and very risky 
owing to the mountain fortifications, while Russian offensive 
movement down the valley of the Euphrates and the Tiger, 
or through Aleppo towards Palestine and Egypt, will be 
easy. Lord Beaconsfield was not mistaken when he feared 
that the Russian armies might threaten the Suez Canal 
through Armenia, because they threatened along the same 
road the entire Asiatic Turkey. The price for which Eng- 
land wants to build the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is 
positively too high. It is a very risky undertaking, still more 
so because Lord Palmerston's political formula of "peaceful 
penetration" with the maintenance of the integrality of 
Turkey does not exclude the plan of the railroad Cairo- 
Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, after occupying Ar- 
menia and Constantinople will at once begin to pray to her 
Orthodox God to permit her to finish her "holy mission," 
and plant the double cross on the grave of the Saviour in 
Jerusalem. The Russian legend shall again place in the 
walls of the Holy Grave Church some Russian monk anx- 
iously waiting for the day of the Russian troops entering 
Jerusalem. 

There was a deep reason for the Russian attempt to land 
in Jaffa during this present war. 

Turkey is not able to conduct a policy of imperialism. On 
the east it borders with Persia where the Anglo-Russian 



— 42 — 

treaty set up the boundaries of their respective interests, ex- 
cluding Turkey from all participation. Turkey will not ven- 
ture without absolute necessity and alone a war with Russia 
and England, on account of Persia, which does not present 
for Turkey any such benefit that would make it worth while 
for Turkey to risk her own independence. To the south 
there is the Persian Gulf, the Arabic Sea, the Red Sea and 
the Mediterranean. Turkey does not have sufficient tradi- 
tion on the seas and she has nothing to gain there. In the 
West, Constantinople only, together with the fortified line 
of Tjatalja and Adrianople was left to Turkey. The Balkan 
war has removed Turkey from the national struggles in the 
Balkans. Nobody can nowadays conduct a policy against 
the principle of nationalism for any length of time, and this 
is still more true of Turkey in regard to Greece, Bulgaria, 
Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro. A guarantee thereof 
is given by the strategical character of the Turkish boun- 
daries in Europe. No offensive movement on a large scale 
can be started from the line running through Adrianople, 
Tjatalja and Gallipoli. The strategical character of the fron- 
tiers of European Turkey is purely defensive since the treaty 
of Bucharest. There still remains the Egyptian frontier 
on the line of contact between Asia and Africa. The geo- 
graphical conditions of Sinai make the defence of Egypt 
from the East very easy, and attack very difficult. The 
conditions of Turkish offensive in the direction of the Suez 
Canal require enormous sacrifices, particularly if the defense 
of the Suez Canal rests with a strong and well supplied 
power. These facts decide the problem of Western Asia in 
favor of maintaining the independence of Turkey. The 
domination of the Turks in Constantinople neutralizes to 
some extent Western Asia with reference to European 
powers. Turkey does not need and cannot embark on a 



— 43 — 

policy of imperialism from the shores of the Bosporus. 
The conditions are different with Russia. Even a rejuve- 
nated Turkey and with a constitutional form of government 
cannot become a menace to Egypt. The renaissance of Tur- 
key is at the same time an emancipation of her national 
strength. Any step in this direction will weaken the tutelage 
of Germany by rendering it superfluous. The rejuvenation 
of Turkey means a loss in the first place to Russia and in 
the second place to Germany, while for England there re- 
mains a status quo, because the neighborhood of Turkey will 
never be as dangerous to the Suez Canal as the proximity 
of Russia would be after the latter has crossed the Straits 
and the Armenian mountains. It is impossible to transport 
the Suez Canal to the moon and, therefore, the one who is 
less dangerous is the better neighbor, and for this reason 
the formula of Lord Palmerston does not cease to be bind- 
ing for England in spite of the fact that Sir Edward Grey 
apparently has ridden himself of this axiom. For the prize 
of immediate gain nobody with a sound mind will expose 
his nation to bankruptcy in the future. So much less Eng- 
land can be directed over this road — England, which gave a 
decided political character to many centuries and filled half 
the world with the work of her genius. 

The danger in case of a victory of Russia is a very real 
one. A new, terrible weapon of naval warfare came into 
prominence in this war. This weapon is the submarine 
which caused a new era in the technique of naval warfare. 
Within the next few years the improvement of submarines 
will become a fact which will make the conditions of com- 
petition on the sea equal to all the powers. Never since the 
battle at Trafalgar had Europe such a chance against the 
English supremacy on the sea. It is impossible to be blind 
any longer and not to see the results of this fact for England 



— 44 — 

the very moment that Russia enters Constantinople and 
opens a window to the Mediterranean, somewhere opposite 
the Island of Cyprus. The Dardanelles and the Gulf of 
Iskanderun shall become the basis of operation for the Rus- 
sian Mediterranean fleet. Then Russia will become "a great 
naval power," and even "from the Mediterranean she might 
be expected to expand her operations to the ocean." These 
are not empty apprehensions, because they were expressed 
by a professional man, who many times was minister of the 
Italian navy, Admiral Bettolo.* In case of a war with 
England, Russian submarines could attack the shores of 
Egypt, and the blockade of the Suez Canal would be by far a 
greater achievement than the present blockade of the Eng- 
lish coast line by Germany. Germany gave the example and 
Russia will not forget it, since she has some experience in 
making speedy armaments. The budget of the Russian navy 
has increased in the years from 1909 to 1913 by 302 million 
roubles or by 154 per cent. At the same time the expenses 
of England increased only 29.6 per cent, and those of Ger- 
many 13.8 per cent. The Russian imperialism, after pene- 
trating the Dardanelles and the Armenian Mountains, cer- 
tainly will not spare sacrifices, and submarines are compara- 
tively inexpensive. 

A word to the wise is sufficient. 

Russia, however, has still another weapon which is not 
less dangerous for England. "This is Russia's frontier line 
in Asia. Pamir is the gate to India, and the Persian agree- 
ment made neighbors of England and Russia in the Iran. 
The neutrality of Persia is nothing but fiction, even in this 
war, and so much less could Persia separate Russia from 
England in case of a war between these two countries. For 
England, which is not a military power, these conditions pre- 

*The "Evening Post," New York, April to. 1915. 



— 45 — 

sent a very serious menace. England can blockade ( ier- 
many, it can cut of! her military transports and stop them 
with her guns at Gibraltar, even if Germany succeeds in 
breaking through the blockade in the North Sea. Germany 
and England have no frontier line, neither in Europe nor in 
Asia. On the other hand England cannot cut off Russia, 
and on the second day of the war Russian armies can start 
on their march toward Afghanistan, India, Persia and 
through Armenia over Mosul and Aleppo towards Mezo- 
potamia and Syria. The isolation of Germany permits Eng- 
land to raise an army and postpone the decisive struggle 
until a favorable date; Russia on the other hand can force 
England to accept a fight because it is England's neigh- 
bor in Asia, and in a war with Russia England has no time 
for the raising of an army and cannot procrastinate the 
struggle. On the second day of the war, English troops 
must bar the road to the Russians in order to defend 
India, which is the most precious gem in the British 
crown. In this light, the safety of the Suez Canal becomes 
more imperative to-day for England than it was at the time 
of the Congress of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey has greater 
obligations in this direction than Lord Beaconsfield ever had. 
Beaconsfield had to defend the Suez Canal from the Russian 
fleet, while Sir Edward Grey must nowadays defend the 
Suez Canal from the piracy of Russian submarines, which 
will not fail to make a lightning-like appearance in the Medi- 
terranean the very moment Russia is able to penetrate into 
Constantinople and force the entrance into the Gulf of 
Iskanderun. 

It looks like a paradox, but it is a truth at the same time 
that for England to-day a defeat jointly with Russia is less 
dangerous than a joint victory with Russia for the prize 
of Constantinople and Alexandretta. Hence the conclusion 



— 46 — 

that the purpose of English policy and strategy in the pres- 
ent war seems to be a double game: To defeat Russia 
through Germany and to beat exhausted Germany with her 
own army. This is for England the only way of victory and 
the only way which can secure England's future. The vic- 
tory of England for the prize of the victory of Russia would 
be a Pyrrhus victory. Constantinople is entirely too great a 
price to be sold to Russia by England for the price of a tem- 
porary military advantage in the war with Germany. Eng- 
land goes jointly with Russia as far as the military end is 
concerned against Germany, but politically England cannot 
afford to go jointly with Russia against Turkey. The ques- 
tion of Constantinople can by no means be a question of 
compromise but only a question of victory — of England or 
of Russia, should the liquidation of Turkey become the 
inevitable outcome. A deep reason prompted the attack of 
the Anglo-French fleet on the Dardanelles before Russia 
could menace Turkey from the land side. The attack of 
England and France on the Dardanelles began simultane- 
ously with the defeats of Russia in Poland. England pre- 
ferred to attack the Dardanelles than to accelerate the of- 
fensive move in France for the purpose of saving Russia. 
The Dardanelles could not be transferred to the moon for 
reasons of safety, and all arguments of diplomatic or finan- 
cial nature cannot possibly conceal the fact that the attack on 
the Dardanelles after a victory in France would have much 
greater chances of success. From the point of view of the 
military situation in France and in Poland, the attack on the 
Dardanelles was wasting of human life and ammunition. 
The throwing of the same amount of troops and ammunition 
on the battle front near Arras, when the majority of the 
German army was busy attacking Lemberg, could have suc- 
ceeded in piercing the German front and saving Russia from 



— 47 — 

an enormous disaster. This is perfectly easy to understand. 
The interest of England demanded consciously or uncon- 
sciously to leave Russia's army to its fate and to attack the 
Dardanelles in the meantime in order to outdistance the 
Russians in the race for Constantinople. England has at- 
tacked Dardanelles in order to cut the way to Suez Canal 
for Germans, and not with the view of giving out Constan- 
tinople to Russia. Russia has filed artificial and far-reaching 
claims to Constantinople, while England threw the first blood 
on the scales in the same question. It is a well-known fact 
that blood weighs heavier than claims. The program of 
Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield was certainly of 
some influence in this complicated game, although it worked 
unnoticed by the masses. 

The arguments for the dismemberment of Turkey are 
very flimsy indeed. The argument that the national con- 
sciousness in Western Asia is very indistinct, does not give 
any right for the dismemberment of Turkey. Doing this, 
Europe would destroy what Turkey did not have time to ac- 
complish. Under the domination of England, France, and 
Russia the national consciousness of the Asiatic masses must 
necessarily go back because slavery is never constructive. 
Why should not the masses be left in the hands of Turkey 
that dominated over them for centuries, and has already 
elaborated her traditions ? Why take for the benefit of Euro- 
pean countries the liberty from the Asiatic masses and de- 
prive them of the hope of ever growing into a nation? In 
order to sweeten the pill, the Allies are promising to the 
masses of Asia a better administration. Turkey always had 
and still has many shortcomings as far as administration 
is concerned, but the same shortcomings are in existence in 
Portugal and in the South American republics. Is this, 
however, a reason for their dismemberment and the destruc- 



— 48 — 

tion of their independence? The lack of understanding for 
the autonomous aspirations is not exclusively a specialty of 
Turkey. Russia has still less of that understanding and a 
more reactionary form of government than Young Turkey. 
It should, furthermore, not be forgotten that on the thresh- 
old of the twentieth century England found herself on 
the eve of a civil war for home rule in Ireland. The 
sin of a centralized government is not an exclusively 
Turkish sin. Europe has permitted Russia to regenerate 
and rehabilitate herself in the eyes of the world. Why 
shouldn't Turkey be given the same chance? Isn't it true 
that the slogans of the present war are the two principles : 
"The equality of states," and "the equality of rights."* 
While the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the English 
fleet was going on, Sir Edward Grey declared from the 
speaker's chair that England champions in the present war 
the freedom of the nations, regardless "whether they be great 
states or small states. "f All this seems to be some tragic 
misunderstanding, because at this particular moment nobody 
has a right to say lies. 

There still remains the main argument. The Turks repre- 
sent the Islam while Russia, France and England represent 
Christianity. Because of an antagonism against the Islam 
the entire world is silent, when in the name of freedom of 
nations a partition of Turkey is contemplated. The question 
of nationalities ceased long ago to be the question of God ; 
the Middle Ages as well as the period of religious wars has 
passed forever. The calamity of Europe was in times gone 
by the maxim: "Cuius regio, eius religio" ; the maxim: 
"Cuius religio, eius regio" will by no means be a lesser evil. 
This is properly the basis on which Russia is founding her 

* L. Cecil Jane : "The Nations At War," London, 1914. 
t Bechstein Hall, March 22, 1915. 



— 49 — 

claims to Constantinople and Jerusalem, because the state 
religion of Russia happened to originate on the Bosporus. 
The domination of Russia never reached these regions, and 
the population inhabitating Constantinople and Jerusalem 
has no racial community with Russia. Russia's appetite is 
nothing else but an imperialistic fever, highly dangerous to 
the peace of Europe. Imperialism never was a basis for 
the permanent peace and it never shall be. So much less 
Russian imperialism because it has donned the vestment of 
the Orthodox Church, and religious imperialism has always 
been the worst form. The entrance of Russia to Constan- 
tinople would be the crowning feat of the principle — "Cuius 
religio, eius regio," and the ground for future aggressive 
wars. 

The twentieth century cannot afford to propagate the 
idea of "Cuius religio, eius regio." It can do it much less 
because in Russia the political reaction and the Orthodox 
Church form the two sides of one and the same matter. 
The Orthodox Church supports the despotism of the Czar 
and the latter protects the Orthodox Church from the in- 
fluences of constitutionalism and the progress of Western 
Europe. The Russian Duma is but a fiction of the consti- 
tution, a fig leaf which conceals the rotten condition of 
things. The Duma does not participate in government and 
is, properly speaking, only a consultant body for the gov- 
ernment, which without any reservation whatsoever is ex- 
clusively subordinated to the will of the despotic Czar. 
The democratic strata of society have a very limited repre- 
sentation, because the reactionary system of elections bars 
them from the Duma. These are the facts which war time 
sentiments should not obscure to the eyes of our conscience. 
The current of freedom foundered and still founders in Rus- 
sia — on the rocks of the Orthodox Church. The victory of 



— 50 — 

Orthodoxy can under these conditions never accelerate the 
victory of the principle of civic freedom in Russia, because 
only the defeat of Orthodoxy can facilitate the defeat of 
the reaction and despotism in Eastern Europe. The day of 
Russia's entering Constantinople would constitute a triumph 
for the Orthodox Church and would delay, not accelerate, 
the day of liberty for Russia's people. Russia is by no 
means a peevish child that can stop bothering his entour- 
age for the price of a piece of candy. Therefore, is there 
any sense in expecting that Russia, after having accom- 
plished the dream of Peter the Great, Catherine II and 
Nicholas I, should change the character of the state? No- 
body changes and nobody can afford to change a victorious 
policy. Peter the Great, Catherine II and Nicholas I not 
only suffered from the fever of imperialism, but they were at 
the same time the pillars of reaction and despotism. The 
entering of Constantinople will mean a triumph for Russian 
reaction and not the beginning of a change; Orthodoxy in 
Russia is still strong enough and too strong that the day 
of its triumph should mean the day of its future suicide. 
The partition of Turkey prompted by antagonism toward 
Islam is from this point of view politically absurd. 

The participation in the war of England and France 
against Germany has raised the importance of Russia in the 
public opinion of Western Europe and of America. Unfor- 
tunately Russia has been put on the same level as England 
and France. Hatred against Germany helped to develop 
an apotheosis for Russia. This is quite plausible from the 
point of view of pure hatred towards Germany, but never 
from the point of view of justice and truth. 

I — The program of Western Europe is nationalism ; the 
program of Russia is imperialism. 



— 51 — 

II — The program of Western Europe is the expansion 
of the freedom of nations ; the program of Russia 
is the expansion in the name of the idea : "Cuius 
religio, cius regio." 

Ill — The program of Western Europe is the evolution of 
the individuality of nations ; the program of Rus- 
sia is the obliterating of the individuality for the 
benefit of a race or rather of the Slavic Pan- 
Russianism. 

IV — The program of Western Europe tends towards 
making constitutionalism and progress permanent ; 
the program of Russia is to make political reaction 
permanent through the triumph of Orthodoxy. 

Russia participates in this war in order to gain enough 
power for destroying what Western Europe promises to 
bring about at the expense of the blood spilled in this war. 
For England and France the participation of Russia in the 
war against Germany is only a matter of passing military 
alliance. The respective governments are perfectly well 
aware of this fact and only the interested nations fail to 
comprehend it. Blind hatred against Germany takes advan- 
tage of this situation and drives average public opinion to 
an apotheosis of Russia on the basis of equality with Eng- 
land and France. In fact, there is no equality of merits, be- 
cause there is no equality of programs. On the battlefields 
of the present war not only the question of German imperial- 
ism is fought, but also the question of Russian imperialism. 
Whoever, in order to hurt Germany, wants to turn Con- 
stantinople over to Russia, is blinded by hatred and uncon- 
sciously plays into the hands of Germany, because he se- 
cures for the latter a revenge ally when England succeeds to 
win the war at the highest price to be paid, which means at 



— 52 — 

the price of a victory of Russia. It is a political mistake 
to form political ideas so as to fit the temporary military 
interests of England and France, and credit Russia in return 
for her participation against Germany with virtues, which 
she never possessed and does not possess at present. 

Falsehood can never be a torch of progress. 

The parallelism of the Russian defeats in Poland and of 
the wasting of human life and ammunition in the Dar- 
danelles, together with the complete absence of any offensive 
movement in France, was explained by lack of ammunition 
and sufficient superiority in numbers. This is, however, a 
very interesting document. The battle at Arras in the spring 
was fought at the same time as the battle at Lemberg, where 
Russia suffered a heavy blow, because the loss of Lemberg 
undermined the popularity of the war among the Russian 
masses. It is an exaggeration but it is true to a certain ex- 
tent that behind the scenes of the war of England against 
Germany there is an unofficial war going on between Eng- 
land and Russia for Constantinople. The program of Lord 
Palmerston still molds the future of England just as it used 
to mold her past. There is no question that the policy of Sir 
Edward Grey uses at present different ways and different 
means. It is even hard to suppose that the English govern- 
ment should put the question in this form. The logic of 
facts, however, is stronger than the logic of Sir Edward 
Grey. England must defeat Russia through Germany and 
must herself in turn defeat Germany if she wants to win at 
all and forever. Whether this materializes under the con- 
scious leadership of Grey or without his being aware of the 
fact, is of but secondary importance. England has no choice, 
and must either win or lose in accordance with her entire 
tradition of Oriental policy. In both cases England will 
come out of the war with honors. In case of victory it shall 



— 53 — 

shed new glory on the Union Jack, and in case of defeat it 
shall appease the English conscience with conviction that 
duty has been done. The duty of England, however, has 
two fronts. Its first and official front is the front against 
Germany. Its second and unofficial one, is the front against 
Russia. 

"Alea iacta est!' 

The world has grown accustomed to consider Turkey as 
the "sick man of Europe.'' It has been overlooked, however, 
that in Turkey revolution has swept away civic slavery and 
the peace of Bucharest has abolished the slavery of nations. 
This fact cannot be obliterated by old journalistic yarns 
which do not shrink from saying a lie when it comes to fa- 
cilitate the progress of Russian imperialism. The very 
moment when the work of regeneration of Turkey was be- 
gun, the present war broke out ; Russia has decided to finish 
Turkey instead of curing her. This is certainly a fine exam- 
ple of political therapeutics. 

Turkey, however, has passed successfully the examination 
of her maturity. Not everything in Turkey can be explained 
by Germany's aid. It is true that Turkey derives a great 
advantage, as far as armaments, money and professional 
advice is concerned, from her alliance with Germany, but 
there is a still greater portion of truth in the fact that Tur- 
key wants to and knows how to derive these benefits. No- 
body will derive any benefit from arms supplied by some- 
body else in case the soldier, who has to use these arms is not 
fond of them for the sake of the idea that he has to defend 
with these weapons. Turkey fights consciously and wil- 
lingly for the defense of her independence and it is a ques- 
tion of luck, rather than of anything else, that she is able to 
avail herself of Germany's help. 

In the face of these facts, the conscience of the world 



— 54 — 

must pronounce itself in favor of Turkey. It is high time to 
begin to be honest with regard to the slogans of the present 
war, which is supposed to be a war conducted in the name of 
liberty. The permanence and justice of coming peace treaty 
requires imperatively that : 

I — The independence of Turkey be maintained, and 
Russia not admitted to Constantinople ; 
II — That guarantees of autonomy be given to Armenia, 
Syria, and Arabia within the structure of the 
Turkish Empire and within the frames of the 
general Turkish constitution. 

There have been and there are unjust wars and unjust 
peace treaties. History, however, is just in the perspective 
of the ages. The Nemesis avenges mistakes and faults. The 
partition of Turkey, in so far as Russia can force it upon 
Europe, will be one of the acts which will not bring honor to 
humanity. Following the flag of the liberty of nations one 
cannot afford to destroy the liberty of the Turkish nation. It 
would mean throwing the seed of hurricane which may be 
delayed but which would be bound to come some day and 
bring revenge for the crime against nationalism. 

History is just in the perspective of ages, although at 
times it is unjust in the perspective of the moment. 



Chapter III 
THE PART of AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 



— 57 — 



Chapter III. — The Part of Austria-Hungary 

The fact that Austria-Hungary co-operates in the military 
operations with Germany obscures in Western Europe, and 
particularly in America, the political background of Austria- 
Hungary's participation in the present war. The entire 
world looks at Austria-Hungary's part through the specta- 
cles of hatred against Germany. This is the reason Russian 
diplomacy was able to make the idea of a partition of 
Austria-Hungary generally popular. Despotic Russia taught 
Western Europe and America to condemn a constitutional 
state such as Austria-Hungary. Russia, which even during 
the present war did not cease to oppress the conquered 
nations, began to persuade the world that this oppression 
is done by Austria-Hungary which, for the last half century, 
has made the principle of the freedom of the nations the 
basis of her constitution. Russia was able to gain sympathy, 
while Austria-Hungary lost much although it has granted 
long ago what Russia is now promising. The latter has, 
immediately after the temporary conquest of Eastern Galicia, 
abolished the Polish autonomy although Galicia never be- 
longed to Russia. Almost at the same time, on October 3, 
1914, the Russian cabinet decided to suspend the rest of the 
autonomy of Finland.* Austria-Hungary, on the other 
hand, spreads the Polish language and the autonomous free- 
dom of Galicia wherever her victorious army dislodges Rus- 
sian domination. These are facts acknowledged by the press 
of the entire world. This, however, does not prevent the 



* "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 1915. 



— 58 — 

average opinion from demanding the partition of Austria- 
Hungary and from making Russia the pioneer of the liberty 
of nations. 

This is far from being just. 

The history of Austria-Hungary is the history of the 
middle Danube. Austria-Hungary is a huge space, formed 
by the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathian Mountains, com- 
bined into a natural wall. Over this road went at ah times 
the migrations of nations. Traces of passages of Celts can 
be found as well as traditions of the migrations of the Goths 
and of countless numbers of German tribes. Through there 
went the expansion of Slavic tribes as far as the shores of 
the Adriatic Sea. There also went the invasion of the Mon- 
gols. In the territory of the middle Danube there is to be 
found also the grave of Attila, who was a "scourge of God" 
for Europe. Here are the graves of the Avares. Finally 
the Hungarians came from the Far East and by embracing 
the Christian religion acquired the right of citizenship in 
Central Europe. The ethnical elements became mixed and 
the frontier lines of territories became entwined. Nobody 
was strong enough to dominate the entire valley over the 
middle Danube and impress its character upon the latter. 
The Bavarians attempted it and so did the Moravians in 
the times of Swatopluk; so did the Bohemians under the 
Premyslides and finally the Hungarians who made several 
attempts to attack Vienna. These were only temporary his- 
torical experiments. Uniform ethnical states came into 
existence and fell apart, but a combined ethnical state sur- 
vived and developed for the last thousand years. Uniform 
ethnical kingdoms fell apart and a combined ethnical empire 
survived. This empire is the monarchy of the Hapsbourgs. 
The character of Austria-Hungary corresponds with the 
character of the historical conditions on the middle Danube, 



— 59 — 

where nobody was strong enough in order to dominate per- 
manently the valleys of the Alps, the Carpathians and the 
Sudets and to mold the multicolor ethnical material into one 
national body. The territory of Austria-Hungary was for 
centuries a country through which the nations of the world 
marched; it is a mixed ground, and every wave sweeping 
through it has left a certain amount of sediment. 

The seed of Austria-Hungary was planted by Charles the 
Great during his expeditions into the valley of the Thais. The 
road he followed from West to East was cut later by German 
armies when Otto I, the Great, crossed the Alps to go to 
Rome for the imperial crown. Through there crossed the 
papal messengers going to the imperial court far back in 
Germany, or to the banks of the Vistula, where the kingdom 
of Poland was in the course of construction. Through the 
valley of the Danube, the echo of the struggle between the 
empire and the papacy, between the spiritual and the lay 
sword, penetrated into Northern Europe. This was in 
the Middle Ages. At the threshold of modern history the 
Turks appeared on the bank of the Danube and through old 
Buda tried to make their way to Vienna. Christianity had 
to confront the Islam in the valley of the Alps, the Carpath- 
ians and the Sudets ; for two centuries, until the peace treaty 
of Carlowitz, the valley of the middle Danube was the bat- 
tlefield of a bloody struggle. As late as 1683 at Vienna, 
when the king of Poland, John III, Sobieski, combining his 
army with that of the Hapsbourgs, secured victory for Chris- 
tianity in Europe. Since then the Orient had to recede to 
its native heath. 

The traditions of Rome founded Austria on the Danube. 
The period of struggle with Turkey has established Hungary 
of to-day. The imperial crown of the Hapsbourgs, an in- 
heritance from Charlemagne and the Ottons, combined both 



— 60 — 

epochs and both of their political offsprings. The idea of 
Austria-Hungary as a state materialized into historical real- 
ity. Both elements, the traditions of Rome, and the tradi- 
tions of the struggles with Turkey, impressed their stigma 
on the character of Austria-Hungary and made of the latter 
a complete, natural state, although apparently the ethnical 
differences would seem to contradict the above contention. 
This ethnical variety is a natural, historical element in the 
valley of the middle Danube, and, therefore, Austria-Hun- 
gary is for these territories a natural form of political exist- 
ence. Austria is a child of Rome, while Hungary originally 
came from the Orient, but she matured on the field of glory 
of centuries-old battles with the Turks. Under the walls of 
Vienna was enacted the history of both elements and here 
it is where the synthesis in the form of the imperial crown 
of the Hapsbourgs was established. The first act of this 
synthesis was the dowry of the daughter of the Jagellons, 
when, after the battle of Mohacs she brought the crown of 
Bohemia and Hungary into the house of the Hapsbourgs. 
The battle with the Turks under the walls of Vienna was 
the day of common glory. The covenant between Austria 
and Hungary in 1867 was the act of their'political maturity. 
To dismember nowadays Austria-Hungary and to destroy 
this historical synthesis would mean to create a bloody chaos 
in the valley of the middle Danube. 

History would have to go back for a thousand years in 
order to dismember Austria-Hungary. 

From the political point of view, Austria-Hungary has 
solved on the continent of Europe the same problem which 
England has analogously solved in her colonial policy. This 
problem is a problem of co-existence of various national 
elements within one state. Thus, Austria-Hungary forms to 
some extent the united states in the valley of the middle 






— 61 — 

Danube. Section XIX of the constitution of Austria-Hun- 
gary of the year 1867 provides that "all the nationalities in 
the state have equal rights and every nationality has an in- 
tangible right to defend and develop its own nationality and 
language. Equal rights of all languages in school, office, and 
public life is acknowledged by the government."* Any cy- 
clopedia can tell that for half a century all the provinces of 
Austria-Hungary have their own parliaments, or in other 
words, an autonomy not only as far as administration but 
also as far as legislation is concerned. In spite of that, 
English publications have the effrontery of writing about 
''military slavery" in Austria-Hungary or to predict that 
after the partition of Austria-Hungary her "domination will 
cease; racial equalities will be established."! It is hard to 
say what to wonder at? at the injustice or at the ignorance? 
The fact that in Austria-Hungary national strife is in exist- 
ence does not alter the truth that Austria-Hungary consti- 
tutes an asset of the principle of nationalism in Central Eu- 
rope, and not a liability. In Austria-Hungary there are 
dissensions among individual nationalities, but there is no 
oppression of nationalities by the government. No logic of 
any kind permits to deduct the conclusion that nationalities 
are oppressed by the government from the fact that strife 
among nationalities exists in Austria. In Austria-Hungary 
the government is the arbiter in national dissensions and not 
an organ of oppression. The nationalism of Austria-Hun- 
gary is in a process of evolution which of course has its de- 
fects and shortcomings, but this does not alter the fact that 
Austria-Hungary is a state in which every nationality has its 
autonomy and the possibility of development. 

* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die Oesterreichischen Verf assungs- 
gesetze," Leipzig, 1906. 

f "New York Times," April 23, Report on the Lecture of G. L. 
Travelyan, "Grand-nephew" of Macaulay. 



— 62 — 

On the eve of the present war England found herself on 
the brink of a civil war for the home rule for Ireland. Eng- 
lishmen armed themselves against their fellow countrymen 
in order to prevent the granting of autonomy to Ireland. 
Can we conclude from that, that England should be dismem- 
bered, or that Ireland represents a centrifugal element in the 
British Empire? The proof was given by the attitude of 
Ireland after the war against Germany broke out ; it has been 
shown that the movement in Ireland is only a movement for 
internal reform and not a movement of treason. Austria- 
Hungary showed the same symptoms in her internal life, 
except for the fact that in Austria-Hungary there is nowa- 
days no more to be found any Ireland, because not one 
province of Austria-Hungary is without its autonomous par- 
liament, nor is there any nationality within the state which 
would not have its own national schools. The tendency of 
increasing the autonomous liberties proves the vitality of the 
nationalism in Austria-Hungary and not its lack. The Poles 
were striving before the outbreak of the war for an increase 
of the autonomy of Galicia; the Tchechs tried to increase 
the scope of the competency of their parliament in Prague. 
The Croatians are struggling for an emancipation of their 
parliament from the tutelage of Hungary; the Hungarians 
in turn tried to secure for themselves greater freedom of 
elbows in their relations to Vienna. The basis, however, 
for all these aspirations always has been, and always is the 
existing constitution. The whole movement is the movement 
of reform and not a movement of disruption. It is a purely 
internal struggle between the principle of centralization and 
the principle of federalism, on the background of the already 
existing autonomy, both political and cultural, of all the 
nationalities in Austria-Hungary. The discontentment in 
Austria-Hungary has the same character as the discontent- 



— 63 — 

ment of the Irish nation in England. It is a movement of re- 
form and not a movement of treason. The present war has 
proved this contention not only as far as England is con- 
cerned, but also with regard to Austria-Hungary. The 
old monarchy of the Hapsbourgs has demonstrated the 
strength, vitality and loyalty of its nationalities. There 
never was nor is there any rebellion. The Russian 
rouble which demoralized the Ruthenians in Eastern 
Galicia and the Serbs on the south was unable to in- 
fluence the masses. It is easy to influence individuals in 
order to provoke artificial symptoms of discontentment for 
the use of a mendacious press, in case masses of the people 
participate in the political life, and there is no difficulty at 
any time to find corrupt individuals. In spite of the endeav- 
ors of Russia and its agitation in the name of "brotherhood 
of Slavic nations," the Poles, the Tchechs, the Croatians, 
Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Moravians, Silesians, right 
along with Hungarians, Germans and even Roumanians, 
came forward loyally to the defence of their national free- 
dom against Russia. It is still an unknown fact what the 
definite physical result of the war will be, but nothing will 
change the importance of the fact that the nationalism of 
Austria-Hungary demonstrated in the present war a much 
greater political power than the Pan-Slavism of Russia. 
There is nothing astounding in this fact. Nationalism is a 
program of the liberty of nations, while Pan-Slavism is a 
program of imperialism. Nationalism is the wave sweeping 
through the twentieth century, while imperialism is the cur- 
rent running against this wave. 

Austria-Hungary has solved the problem of autonomous 
co-existence of many nationalities under the sceptre of one 
monarch. Germany failed to solve this problem and became 
guilty of oppressing the Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians. 



— 64 — 

although this oppression was superfluous, to say the least, 
for the power of Germany. Russia never even attempted to 
solve this problem and exterminated mercilessly the rem- 
nants of autonomous life in Poland, in Finland, and in the 
Caucasus, England was unable in the twentieth century to 
introduce home rule in Ireland without a civil war. France 
and Italy have a clear conscience — but they do not have other 
nationalities under their sway in Europe. Looking impar- 
tially and justly one must come to the conclusion that the idea 
of the partition of Austria-Hungary is in contradiction with 
the idea of nationalism and with the idea of permanent peace. 
There are, however, opinions which, in the name of the 
liberty of nations, would like to destroy precisely what the 
idea of this liberty of nations succeeded in building up in the 
valley of the middle Danube. 

The program of Russia is Pan-Slavic, or, in other words, 
the uniting of all Slave nations under the sceptre of the 
Czar. The capital of Russia thus conceived of shall be Con- 
stantinople ; it is an idea of a great and holy Russia, and a 
materializing of this idea requires both the partition of 
Turkey and the partition of Austria-Hungary. "The road to 
Constantinople leads through Vienna," said General Ignatieff 
after the Congress of Berlin. 

Pan-Slavism is a program of race. The conception of 
race, however, is not synonymous witn the conception of 
national consciousness, because a race is nothing but crude 
material on which history works. A nation is determined 
by the community of language, but above all other things by 
the history of common existence as a state. The community 
of language is a tool of economic and civilizatory activity. 
The community of political tradition is a tool of a collective 
will directed toward the development of national independ- 
ence. The community of language admits exceptions but the 



— 65 — 

history of common existence as a state is an absolutely 
necessary feature. In Switzerland there is no community 
of language but there is a tradition of common independence, 
and this tradition decides the fate of Swiss nationality. A 
nation is formed by the existence of a state of its own, and 
vice versa a nation must perish through lack of the common 
political existence as a state. Such a lack permits for a while 
to preserve the ethnographical features of a nation but does 
not permit the preserving of political features ; it denational- 
izes politically, although it permits for a while to oppose 
ethnographical denationalization. Religion, language, art 
culture, customs can subsist, but the ability for political in- 
dependence is bound to be exterminated. It is a law of 
sociological evolution and no phrases about "racial brother- 
hood" can extenuate the results of this law. Pan-Slavism 
and Pan-Russianism must consciously or unconsciously form 
the two sides of the same matter. Pan-Slavism must neces- 
sarily be anti-national because it is imperialistic. The public 
opinion in Russia certainly regrets nowadays that Russia 
has agreed to establish an independent Bulgaria. To Poland 
Russia has promised only autonomy, but she refuses to 
recognize Poland's right to an independent existence. "Slav 
banquets" which during the present war busied themselves 
with the question of the partition of Austria-Hungary, pro- 
nounced themselves against the independence of Croatia and 
even against the independence of Bohemia. This was the 
cause for a scandal because the Bohemians protested against 
being denied the right to aspire to political independence. 
The Russian agitator Saveloff declared that the "Russian 
nation shall not spill its blood for the formation of a new 
Bulgaria." This happened in Moscow in the first days of 
March, 1915, at the meeting of Tchechs and Slovac organi- 
zations of Russia. The details of the discussions were pub- 



— 66 — 

lished by the Utro Rossii and the majority of Russian and 
Polish newspapers reprinted them. Pan-Slavism is an im- 
perialistic allegation that "even though there are other Slavic 
princes, kings, and even czars, yet there is only one and only 
ruler of Slavdom, Russian Lord and Emperor/'* Pan- 
Slavism attempts to destroy national individualities in order 
to help the race. No wonder, therefore, that even the 
Tchechs, in contradiction to all the press stories about revo- 
lutions in Prague faithfully perform the duties in the ranks 
of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The natural instinct of 
the masses cannot be deceived as easily as eccentrical individ- 
uals which are not lacking in any nation. The actuality of 
the nations, however, is manifested by the attitude of the 
masses and not by the attitude of such eccentric individuals. 
The means which Russia can throw on the scales are 
enormous. The population of Russia amounted in 1912 to 
166,000,000. During the years 1897 to 1912, Russia's popu- 
lation increased 47,000,000, while at the same time the popu- 
lation of Germany increased only 12,000,000. Professor 
Masaryk, a noted Tchechs scientist, has figured out that at 
the end of the current century the population of European 
Russia will reach the 400,000,000 mark and, together with 
Asiatic Russia, the 500,000,000 mark.f Growing at the same 
rate of increase, the population of Russia will already in 
1930 reach the figure of 220,000,000. These are calculations 
based on facts as they were before the war. Let us suppose 
now that Russia will win and impose upon Europe the par- 
tition of Austria-Hungary, and even of Turkey. The num- 
ber of Slavs in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary amounts 



* "Russian Orthodox American Messenger," second issue, Vol. 
XVII, page 29. 

t Masaryk : "Zur russichen Geschichte und Religions Philosophic," 
I, page 275. 



— 67 — 

to almost 30,000,000. In spite of the losses suffered during 
the present war, Russia will be able to become, within fifteen 
years, a reservoir of 250,000,000 of people, not counting 
Constantinople and Armenia as far as Khilikia and the Gulf 
of Iskanderun. Russia was and is a military country. As 
far as armaments are concerned, she was by no means second 
to Germany and in certain respect has even outdone the 
latter. The peace footing of the German army, according 
to the last military law which frightened the entire world, 
amounted to about 800,000 officers and enlisted men. The 
peace footing of the Russian army in the summer of 1914, 
that means at the moment of the outbreak of the war, 
amounted to 1,415,000 men. In the winter 1915-1916 the 
peace footing was expected to reach the enormous figure of 
1,900,000 rifles and sabres. The amount of reserves in 
Russia is, of course, inexhaustible. The Russian budget 
was able to stand such enormous burdens only owing to 
French loans, because the financial strength of Russia, 
particularly after the Japanese war, was infinitely inferior 
to the financial resources of the western powers. France has 
invested in Russia something like $4,000,000,000. Another 
advantage of the Russian treasury consisted of two years of 
exceedingly rich crops. In the future, on the other hand, 
there will loom brightly the results of an agragrian reform 
and of the colonization of Siberia.* Since the times of 
Stolypin and until the end of 1912 almost 1,000,000 inde- 
pendent peasant farms were established in Russia, and the 
municipal ownership of ground which kept Russian agricul- 
ture back and made of the Russian peasant an illiterate in- 
dividual was abolished. The agrarian productivity was in- 
creased. In Siberia almost two and a half million colonies 
were settled in the years 1907 to 1912. Siberia, according 
* F. Nansen : "Siberien ein Zukunftsland." 



— 68 — 

to the explorer of Polar regions, the Norwegian geographer, 
Nansen, is the country of the future. The colonization of 
Siberia increases the wealth of Russia and makes of Siberia 
a reservoir for military conscription, which eventually will 
facilitate the Russian offensive in Asia. This is, however, 
only the beginning. Let us suppose now that Russia should 
dictate peace to Europe. After destroying Turkey and 
Austria-Hungary, the power of Russian expansion will 
become the ramrod against the entire west of Europe. The 
opening of a window on the Atlantic will then become only 
a question of time. The distance from the Russian frontier 
to Narwik, the nearest port on the Atlantic in the Gulf of 
Vest-Fjord, amounts only to 150 kilometers. A railroad 
line for- purposes of Russian offensive is all ready and ter- 
minates in Tornea. A second line going through the Lakes 
of Finland, is also completed. The Russian imperialism 
having won in the south will strike northward, in order to 
accomplish, after having entered trie Mediterranean, the 
second part of its mission and gain access to the Atlantic 
Ocean. The second part "of the testament of Peter the 
Great" will be easy to execute. Russia will base herself 
on her 250,000,000 population and economic evolution will 
permit her to make armaments without the help of France. 
The Russian imperialism will dominate its military needs 
and will confront Europe sure of its strength and inexhaust- 
ible as to the number of its armies, free to shift its armies 
from place to place as well as its ships and ammunition. 
Nobody thinks of changing a victorious policy. Vic- 
torious Russia will not change also her imperialism. Bryce 
anticipated this in his clever saying that "the doctrine of Pan- 
Slavism under an imperial head of the Orthodox Eastern 
Church has become a formidable engine of aggression in the 
hands of mighty despotism and a growing race, naturally 



— ey — 

drawn to expand its frontiers toward the south."* The 
power of Germany of to-day shrinks in comparison with 
the power which a victorious Pan-Slavism might be able to 
develop some day. Russia will certainly not hesitate to make 
sacrifices, and the Czar does not need to care about losses 
of human material. Homer Lea figured out that in the 
eighteenth century Russia had sent on the field of battle 
4,910,000 men.f Only 1,380,000 returned home from this 
orgy of blood. In the nineteenth century another 4,900,000 
marched out and only 1,410,000 came back to their homes. 
Russia will not suffer any lack of new millions in the twen- 
tieth century. Only Pan-Germanism, under the leadership 
of Berlin, would then be able to combat successfully Russia's 
preponderance. In this case Europe will have to change 
the structure of its power in contradiction of the principle 
of nationalism and on the basis of the principle of the race. 
The Czar of the Slavs would have to be opposed by the Czar 
of Teutons. The example of Russia, however, is liable to 
become contagious and the tolerance of Pan-Slavism gives 
right of existence to Pan-Germanism. In such a case Eu- 
rope would have to take a step backward. Such a step 
backward, however, is neither of interest to European na- 
tions nor to the interest of progress and peace. The world 
is not swept to-day by the hurricane of this terrific war in 
order to pave the road for Pan-Slavism. 

Gladstone mentioned in his memoirs that after the defeat 
of Napoleon III at Sedan, "Europe has lost a mistress and 
got a master."J After a "Sedan" of William II, Europe may 
get back "a mistress," but no more France, only Russia, 
should Russia succeed in dictating the peace. In such a case, 



* J. Bryce, 1. c, page 421. 

f Homer Lea: "The Day of the Saxon," pages 130-131. 

t John Morley : "The Life of W. E. Gladstone," Book VI, page 357. 



— ?0 — 

not only continental Europe but also England shall find her 
"mistress." 

Victorious Pan-Slavism will avenge the Germans. 

The imperialism of Russia is the continuation of the 
struggle between the Orient and the Occident, between the 
traditions of Rome and the traditions of Constantinople. 
After the downfall of Poland, Russia aims at Turkey and 
Austria-Hungary ; after the fall of Warsaw she "is press- 
ing on to Vienna."* Pan-Slavism is the ideology of the 
Russian attack against Austria-Hungary, just as the inter- 
ests of the Orthodox religion form the ideology of the 
attack against Turkey. In this light, the question of Servia 
shines brightly. 

Servia belongs to the Orthodox Church and is a tool in 
the hands of Russia. Russian diplomacy has supported the 
ambitions of Servia in order to use them against Austria- 
Hungary ; the agitation of the press and the promises of 
Russia arouse the passions. Bosnia and Herzegovina became 
the trump in the hands of Russia; Servia has filed her 
claims to this territory and Russian diplomacy succeeded 
in persuading public opinion that the claims of Servia are 
just. 

There are facts, however, that contradict this contention. 

• I. Bosnia and Herzegovina never belonged to Servia, 
not even in the times of Czar Dushan, when Servia reached 
the pinnacle of her development.! 

II. Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a part of Hungary 
before the invasion of the Turks, and at all times were in 
closer relation with the kingdom of Croatia than with 
Servia. 



* The "Century Magazine," May, 191 5. 

f "The southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 



— 71 — 

III. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
mixed. The Serbs are Orthodox, while the Croatians are 
Roman Catholics and form a more cultured element.* A 
considerable portion of the population is formed by the 
Moslems of Slav origin. The Croatians and the Moslems 
form the majority of the population in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina to the disadvantage of Servian imperialism. 

IV. The Servians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 
Southern Hungary, are immigrants. They were driven into 
these countries by Turkish oppression from which they tried 
to escape by going north. This is rather a reason for 
gratefulness for shelter than a point of departure for 
imperialism. 

V. The Servians in Austria-Hungary have full national 
rights on the same level as the Poles, the Tchechs, the 
Croatians, or in other words, freedom of speech, of religion 
and autonomy. In the Parliament of Bosnia the Serb 
language has the same rights as the Croatian language, 
although the Serbs do not have absolute majority in the 
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of late, Minister 
Bilinski supported the Serbs against the Croatians and the 
Moslems in order to satisfy Servia and avoid war. 

Ill-will ignores the facts. The center of ill-will was 
Petrograd from where Servia was incited. Servian im- 
perialism was a reflection of the imperialism of Russia 
and the idea of Greater Servia was but a shadow of the 
idea of Greater Russia. The question of rights became a 
question of secondary nature. Imperialism is the ideology 
of conquest and, therefore, ignores both the facts and his- 
torical truths. The decisive factor is selfishness, which is 
the arm swinging the sword. Servia fell for the illusion 



* "The Southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 



that with the help of Russia she wpuld be able to conquer 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she formed her entire policy 
to suit this purpose. In order to further this policy the 
arm of a Serb threw the bomb in Sarajevo. For the sake 
of this idea, Archduke Francis Ferdinand had to give his 
life, although he was an opponent of the Hungarians and 
a friend of the southern Slavs. This is admitted even by 
the war-like and inspired English press.* It is also pos- 
sible that Francis Ferdinand was killed because every step 
that Austria-Hungary was taking in the interest of Slav 
nations brought them nearer to Western Europe and drew 
them away from Russia. 

Somebody in England said after the outbreak of the pres- 
ent war, "it would be absurd to say that Servia is the cause of 
the war."f It is sufficient to recall the revelations published 
by the "Matin," of Paris, in 1913, about the federation of the 
Balkan states in order to become convinced of the fact 
that this war was planned by Russia long ago. The "Matin" 
is a friend of Russia and its testimony, therefore, is 
much more important for the interests of Austria-Hungary. 
The federation of the Balkan states was directed against 
Austria-Hungary and not against Turkey. The intrigue 
of Russian diplomacy had already then planned an attack 
upon Vienna, but the logic of the internal conditions in 
the Balkans first prompted the war with Turkey, and then 
a fratricidal war against each other. Nowadays, when Rus- 
sia has finally publicly stated that Constantinople is her 
ultimate goal, one must be naive to think that Russia 
was prompted by the desire to defend Servia and that 
she had attacked Austria-Hungary from sheer Pan-Slavic 
sentiment. The question of Servia was only a clever pre 

* "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 18. 
f "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 5. 



— 73 — 

text which permitted Russia to pose as a protector of the 
oppressed. At the bottom of the thing, however, there 
were deeper reasons in the background of the scenes for 
many years. A proof for this contention was the attitude of 
Russia towards Servia, when the offensive movement of the 
combined Austria-Hungarian and German armies pushed 
back the Russians from Galicia. In order to draw Italy into 
the conflict against Austria-Hungary, Russia has agreed to 
an eventual occupation of Dalmatia and Albania by Italy, 
which dealt a painful blow to the aspirations of Servia 
to get an estuary on the Adriatic. Servia was quick to 
understand the meaning of this movement. A Servian dele- 
gation in Petrograd began to threaten to conclude separate 
peace with Austria-Hungary. At the same time a Servian 
army invaded Albania in order to save at least Durazzo 
from the imperialism of Italy. It is, furthermore, an inter- 
esting fact that the imperialism of Italy began to be con- 
sidered in Petrograd as more Slavic than Servian. It is, 
furthermore, a known fact that at the Conference at Lon- 
don, in 1913, Italy was chiefly instrumental in throwing 
back Servia from the Adriatic Sea, more so than Austria- 
Hungary. Italy has also prevented Greece from getting 
the southern portion of the Epirus. Italy is stronger than 
Servia and, therefore, Russian sympathies move toward 
Rome, while Servia was brutally left to her misery, dis- 
ease, famine, and devastation of the war into which Servia 
was driven by nobody else but Russia. 

The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not so much 
united with the question of Servia, as with the question of 
the reorganization of the Kingdom of Croatia within the 
Hungarian state. In the covenant between Hungary and 
Croatia, of 1868, there is a provision by virtue of which 
"Hungary recognizes the inviolability of the territory of 



— 74 — 

Croatia and promises to concentrate her endeavor upon 
completing this territory."* In the first covenant this pro- 
vision related to Dalmatia, which, from a historical point 
of view, is a part of the Croatian realm. Bosnia and Herze- 
govina still belonged in 1868 to Turkey ; at present, how- 
ever, they can be included in Section 65 of the Croato- 
Hungarian covenant and on this basis enter, together with 
Dalmatia, into the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, to 
be reorganized after the present war. Until the outbreak 
of the present war, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong 
either to Austria or to Hungary, but were subordinate 
directly to the common Ministry of Finances of Austria- 
Hungary. This was only a temporary arrangement which 
left the door open for the imperialism of Servia because 
the claims of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
temporarily suspended. The reorganization of the kingdom 
of Croatia- Slavonia permits the solving of the question, in 
accordance with the requirements of the principle of nation- 
alism, because: 

1. The Croatians form together with the anti-Servian 
Moslems the majority of the population of Bosnfa and 
Herzegovina. 

2. Bosnia and Herzogovina were situated in the sphere 
of Croatian influence at the time of Croatia's independence. 

The claims of Servia to Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
contradicted not only by statistics but also by the historical 
fact that these territories never belonged to Servia. Thus, 
the claims of Servia are contradicted by statistics and his- 
tory which are the two criterions of nationalism. The im- 
migrant Servian population possess in Austria-Hungary 
the recognition of their national rights for a half century. 



* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die oesterreichischen Verfassungs- 
gesetze," Leipzic, 1906, page 586. 



— 75 — 

and do not run the risk of losing these national rights 
after the war. In Russia, on the contrary, even the Poles 
did not have such national rights as do the Servians in 
Austria-Hungary. 

As far as constitutional liberty is concerned, the auton- 
omy of Croatia is greater in extent than the autonomy of 
other provinces in Austria-Hungary. After Vienna and 
Budapest comes the Croatian capital of Zagrab (Agram) 
and not Prague or Lemberg. The Banus (governor) of 
Croatia is responsible to the Croatian parliament which 
privilege neither Galicia nor Bohemia possess. As far as 
the legal side is concerned, there is a former point of attach- 
ment for a reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia. Dal- 
matia does not as yet form a part of Croatia "de facto," 
although she forms a part of the country "de nomine." The 
question of Dalmatia forms a temporary arrangement which 
is called in legal parlance of Austria-Hungary a "provisor- 
ium."* The renewing of the question of Dalmatia and its 
regulation, together with the question of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina is, from the legal point of view, perfectly admis- 
sible and bears on territories which, historically speaking, 
are closely related with each other. This would mean the 
solving of the problem of southern Slavdom. Servian 
traditions have in former times gone farther south, towards 
Saloniki, and not towards the Danube. The maintenance 
of the independence of Servia and the regulation of the 
frontier line of Albania and Macedonia decide the ques- 
tion in the Balkans. The reorganization of the kingdom 
of Croatia and Slavonia is liable to create a new and vital 
political unit on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The lib- 
erty of nations would find a just realization without any 

* Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die oesterreichischen Verfassungs- 
gesetze," Leipzig, 1906, page 218. 



— 76 — 

injury to Servia. All the rumors about Austria-Hungary's 
pressing towards Saloniki are an anachronism. The peace 
treaty of Bucharest has solved the question of the Balkans 
for the benefit of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Servia and 
Montenegro. The Balkan question in its old anti-Turkish 
conception disappears and at the same time Austria-Hun- 
gary is losing the occasion for imperialistic attempts. 
Rumors are current that Archduke Francis Ferdinand con- 
templated a "trialism," or a combination of Austria-Hun- 
gary and Croatia on an equal legal basis. It was a very 
just idea but still it did not protect him from a tragic 
death in Sarajevo at the hands of a Serb, whose mind 
had been poisoned by the imperialistic propaganda. It is 
not Servia's guilt, but the guilt of the party that, behind 
the scenes, continued arousing artificial ambitions. Ser- 
vian imperialism, on the other hand, was not directed so 
much against Austria or against Hungary, as against the 
Slavic kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, which has serious 
claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Servia has none. 
To destroy these claims of Croatia would be a downright 
injury ; it is, therefore, nothing strange that under these 
conditions the Croatians are fighting against Russia and 
Servia with so much enthusiasm that they have become 
the heroes of the Austria-Hungarian armies. 

The reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia permits 
at the same time the solving of the problem of the shores 
of the Adriatic Sea in Austria-Hungary. Fiume, Pola, 
and Trieste belong, from the point of view of nationalism, 
to Croatia and Slavonia, and should not belong either to 
Servia or to Italy. Both statistics as well as history favor 
Croatia and Slavonia; the Slavs form the majority of the 
people on the shores of the Adriatic. This is admitted 
even by the English press during the present war, although 



this fact is by no means convenient to the enemies of 
Austria-Hungary.* The claims of Servia to Fiume or 
Trieste are unjust, and the same time is the case with the 
claims of Italy in spite of the fact that the Italian population 
forms a considerable percentage in the towns on this shore. 
The country is essentially Slavic and the village popula- 
tion is always an autochthon population, a stratum which 
is historically original, while the population of the cities 
is mostly an immigrant one. Italians know this and that 
is why in their claims before the outbreak of the war they 
championed the idea of forming a miniature state from 
Trieste and its surrounding territory. They didn't dare to 
claim Trieste for themselves because the slogan of the 
present war is nationalism as well as permanent peace. 
They felt the lack of a legal basis as well as a statistical 
and historical basis. They disguised their imperialism by 
pretext of nationalism — one proclaiming the idea of inde- 
pendence for Trieste and its surrounding territory. The 
Italian population on the Austrian-Hungarian shore of the 
Adriatic Sea has perfect freedom of national life, which 
means liberty of language, religion, municipal home rule 
and a full share in the constitutional life of the entire 
state. The only limitations are the equal rights of the 
Slavic nationalities which form the majority of the popu- 
lation, which is autochthon and native for centuries since 
those days when there was an independent Croatia on the 
shores of the Adriatic. From the historical point of view, 
the domination of Italy reached as far as the shores of 
Dalmatia only in the times of ancient Rome and then 
in the time of the Republic of Venice, and finally once 
more in the times of Napoleon. The frontier lines estab- 
lished by Napoleon were the frontier lines of war, and of 
* "Italian Policy since 1870," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 



— 78 — 

this fact England is perfectly well aware because no other 
state combated Napoleon's imperialism as ardently and as 
persistently as England did. The frontier lines of Venice 
were frontier lines of conquest and not of nationality. Who- 
ever knows the secret bridges in the mysterious palaces 
of Venice will not fail to understand the character of the 
government exercised once upon a time by the Carthago 
of the Adriatic Sea. Rome after all owned not only Trieste 
but also Paris, and the Roman legions extended their tri- 
umphal march even as far as the banks of the Thames. 
Does this fact entitle the Italians to raise any claims to 
France or to England? From the historical point of view 
the claims of Italy to Trieste are not at all better than 
the claims to Tunis. History does not confirm the Italian 
claims, and statistics decide the issue in favor of Croatia 
and Slavonia. Trieste should in fact be the natural harbor 
of Croatia regenerated both as far as her boundaries and 
autonomy are concerned. The Italian attack is directed 
more against Croatia than against Austria or Hungary and 
therefore Italy's attitude is in contradiction with the pro- 
gram of nationalism. Italy may claim at the most some 
strategical advantages on the frontier of the Tyrol which 
advantages necessarily must be of a slight significance, but 
they can never claim with any right either Trieste or 
Dalmatia which are a territory of Slavic settlement as well 
as a sphere of Slavic interest for over a thousand years. 
Austria-Hungary forms a sentinel on the Adriatic; they 
are the gate through which the thirst of several central 
European nations for an estuary on the sea is satisfied. 
These are mostly Slavic nations protected by the wall of 
the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathians from the im- 
perialism of Russia, Germany and Italy. None of these 
nations could independently and without the co-operation 



— 79 — 

of other nations preserve or defend this access to the sea. 
Austria could not do it, nor could Hungary, nor Bohemia, 
nor Croatia, not speaking even of the Slovaks, Mora- 
vians, Silesians, and even Roumanians in Transylvania, who 
are cut off by the natural barrier of the Carpathians from 
the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube. The ques- 
tion of the Adriatic Sea is a question of first-class impor- 
tance and of historical necessity for all these nations. A 
law is nothing else but a form of economic life, and the 
state is nothing else but an organization of the law. Nations 
are formed and developed through their own political exist- 
ence as a state, or, in other words, through the organiza- 
tion of their legal life within which the economical life 
of the nation has the possibility of evolution. The Adriatic 
Sea is the condition of economic life of the nations form- 
ing Austria-Hungary, and as such, must be the problem 
of their legal and political life, or, in other words, a ques- 
tion of existence. The shore of the Adriatic is, therefore, 
a necessity for the nations of Austria-Hungary, which is 
not the case with regard to Italy. The latter can conquer 
the shores of the Adriatic by force, but at the expense of 
the rights and existence of the economical life of the 
nationalities of which Austria-Hungary is composed. The 
annexation of Trieste by Italy would under such condi- 
tions mean a defeat of nationalism and a victory of imperial- 
ism. It can hardly be assumed that Italy should go to 
war in the name of an imperialistic principle while the 
present war is fought for the sake of nationalism. There 
is, furthermore, no doubt as to the fact that the attack 
of Italy is an attack upon the natural boundaries of Austria- 
Hungary. Nothing permanent could be built in this way ; 
it is impossible to uphold the principle of nationalism in one 
place for the price of betraying it somewhere else, because 



— 80 — 

thus only political errors and historical injustice can be 
committed. 

It is hard to find a greater lack of logic as to try to dis- 
member Austria-Hungary because of the war with Germany. 
Germany nowadays is a world power. Should Austria- 
Hungary be dismembered, the German provinces of the 
Hapsbourg empire would naturally fall to Germany, which 
would thus gain upper and lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, 
Carinthia. From the point of view of national evolution it 
would mean a triumph for Germany and national unifica- 
tion would be a balm on the defeat, because Germany as a 
nation is more numerous than Russia, although Russia is a 
giant when compared with Germany as a state. Ninety 
million people under the strong hand government of Berlin 
would constitute a force able to strike soon for revenge. 
German militarism has a great routine which would enable it 
to produce from Greater Germany such a force that Pan- 
Germanism could easily become the real policy of Berlin. 
Is the present war conducted for the purpose of creating 
Pan-Germanism through the partition of Austria-Hungary? 
The road from Berlin to the Adriatic Sea goes through 
Vienna. The German settlements in Carnia and Carniola are 
not far from the Adriatic shore. Berlin is very well aware of 
the fact that it would naturally become the heir of Vienna in 
case Austria-Hungary be dismembered. On this basis the 
government of Berlin would at once begin to seek access to 
the sea. Vienna and Budapest have better claims to Trieste 
or Fiume than Belgrade and Rome have. Germany could 
go to the Adriatic Sea over the body of Austria-Hungary, 
and, upon reaching the Adriatic, would float her flag in the 
Mediterranean. This would again constitute a grave danger 
for England, because Germany could then evade the Straits 
of Gibraltar and transfer the point of gravitation of her 



— 81 — 

armaments to the Mediterranean. The domination of Eng- 
land over the Suez Canal is safe as long as Germany is cut 
off from this route. Germany's crossing the Alps would 
mean the evasion of Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal is the 
road to India and Australia. This fact is sufficient to make 
England a friend of Austria-Hungary during the peace ne- 
gotiations, because Austria-Hungary is a barrier for the 
imperialism of Germany and does not permit the latter to 
evade Gibraltar by the way of the Alps and Trieste. Trieste, 
in the hands of Austria-Hungary, does not constitute any 
danger for England, because Austria-Hungary does not have 
and never will have colonial ambitions on the Mediterranean. 
Austria-Hungary does not have any interest in attacking the 
Suez Canal, but Germany has. Furthermore, Austria- 
Hungary is not a toy in the hands of Berlin and shall never 
become the blind weapon in the hands of Germany. Austria- 
Hungary will never spend her money for excessive naval 
armaments for the sake of somebody else's interest. Fur- 
thermore, Russia and not England is the enemy of Austria- 
Hungary, and the monarchy of the Hapsbourgs armed itself 
before this war not against England but against Russia ; this' 
is one more reason why Austria-Hungary would certainly 
not arm herself against England after this war. Austria- 
Hungary, England and France do not have any conflicting 
interests, and were driven into this war only by the logic of 
alliances and by the force of military considerations. Any 
imperialism which Austria-Hungary could possibly display 
on the Mediterranean would be an abortive movement and 
besides a very costly one. Austria-Hungary's state reason 
coincides with that of England and France, but is in contra- 
diction with the state reason of Russia, or better to say, with 
Russia's imperialism. Austria-Hungary in this war is allied 
with Germany against Russia, and that the alliance is at the 



— 82 — 

same time very active against England and France is a mere 
incident. The note in which Sir Edward Grey declared war 
against Austria-Hungary in the name of Great Britain 
states explicitly that England was "obliged" to declare war ; 
the note in question does not contain anything else. No 
mention is made of any litigious matter at all and only the 
pure logic of military considerations is set forth. Austria- 
Hungary and Germany are fighting shoulder to shoulder 
because the parallelity and not the identity of the interests 
compel them to do so. England and France are fighting 
shoulder to shoulder with Russia for exactly the same rea- 
son. Parallelity is not identity and geometry defines paral- 
lelity as a condition resulting from the lack of points of con- 
tact. The military point of view must be strictly distin- 
guished from the political one. The danger from the part 
of Russia was the main prompting element of the alliance 
between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The political 
genius of Bismarck has taken advantage of the situation, 
although the memories of the battle at Sadowa did not die 
out completely as yet. Precisely for the same reason of 
the danger from the part of Russia, Edward VII did not 
succeed in drawing Austria-Hungary away from Germany. 
The Cabinet of Vienna realized it perfectly well that in case 
of a war with Russia, Austria-Hungary would be isolated 
and deprived of Germany's help, and London was too far 
away to help Austria-Hungary in her frontier conflicts with 
Servia, Italy and Roumania. England, as a rule, always 
came late in the present war and it would be so much more 
late in coming to help Austria-Hungary. This considera- 
tion decided the permanency of the alliance between Austria- 
Hungary and Germany and at the same time insured Aus- 
tria-Hungary's safety from Russia's attacks. Any support 
given to Russia in her threats of a partition of Austria- 



— 83 — 

Hungary is in the last analysis a work "pour le roi de 
Prusse." 

One must be blinded with hatred if he fails to see through 
that. 

The Hapsbourgs did not forget as yet that the crown of 
the Roman Emperors was once upon a time resting on their 
heads. Vienna still resounds with the chimes of the same 
bells which once proclaimed the glory of Charles V, on whose 
possessions the sun was never setting. It was a very just 
remark that was made once that the Austrian empire al- 
though dating only as far back as 1806, "became respected as 
the oldest and most conservative."* The throne of the Haps- 
bourgs is still overshadowed by the imperial purple, by the 
tradition of Rome. The force of these memories was not 
extinguished by the defeat of Austria at Sadowa, nor later 
on by the brilliant development of Berlin, and the emperor 
of Austria did not cease until now to pass as a legal heir of 
the crown of the Roman Emperors. The Roman empire 
became closely intertwined with the Catholic church; the 
"World-State" and the "World-Church" were elements 
which completed each other in the conception of the "Holy- 
Empire." The Catholics in Germany and particularly the 
Catholics in Austria-Hungary understand it well and under 
the penalty of treason to the Church they cannot deviate 
from this conception. On the basis of the fact that the 
dynasty of the Hapsbourgs is Catholic, the Catholic party 
in Germany insisted in 1866 upon Austria being the leader 
of the Germanic World. The Roman Emperor as a universal 
monarch cannot be a Protestant; this is a dogma of an 
ideal and political nature at the same time. William II is 
a Protestant, and this prevents him from filing his claim to 
the supremacy of the world. He may endeavor to impose 

* J. Bryce, 1. c, page 420. 



— 34 — 

this supremacy by sheer force but he has no title to it ; the 
existence itself of Austria-Hungary is in this respect also a 
hindrance to Berlin. The fact that Austria-Hungary is in 
existence means the following: 

I — Division of the German nation into two independent 
states which, however, agrees with the requirements of the 
principle of nationalism. 

II — Does not permit Berlin to file a claim of Germany 
to the inheritance of Rome and to the supremacy over West- 
ern Europe. 

Bryce perceived with a keen eye of the historian and 
statesman of great calibre that "it was the tradition of a 
glorious past when Germany led the world that made the 
Germans again a united people, the central power of Con- 
tinental Europe."*' The traditions of Rome did not die out 
as yet in Central Europe although they died out in France 
and England, without speaking, of course, of America. The 
importance of. this question was well understood by England 
when the latter refused to recognize the abdication of Fran- 
cis II from the dignity of a Roman Emperor. During the 
Congress of Vienna, England attempted to "re-establish 
. . . the Empire," but Prussia, "elated at the glory she 
had won in the war of independence, "f refused to submit to 
the supremacy of Austria and succeeded to arouse the pro- 
test of other German states. It is an almost forgotten fact 
that England to this day refused to recognize the abdication 
of the Hapsbourgs from the dignity of Roman Emperors, 
and the possibility of re-establishing of this dignity did not 
altogether pass away. The existence of the throne of the 
Hapsbourgs neutralizes under these conditions the inheri- 
tance of Rome in Western and in Central Europe. The 

* J. Bryce, 1. c, page 503. 
f J. Bryce, 1. c, page 416. 



— 85 — 

throne of the Hapsbourgs preserves a greater dignity and 
does not gain in material strength. A dynastical gap be- 
tween the Hapsbourgs and the Hohenzollerns furthers the 
interests of peace and equilibrium. The policy of Austria- 
Hungary on the other hand is and shall always remain the 
resulting element of the will of different autonomous nations, 
and, therefore, can never become anti-nationalistic, but must 
always co-operate with other nations for the welfare of 
humanity and peace. 

The Allies try, according to a popular version, to strike 
not as much at the German nation as at Prussia, which is 
reported to have directed the energy of Germany into a path 
which is inconsistent with the interests of peace. At the 
same time, this tendency drives towards the dismemberment 
of Austria-Hungary. This is an attempt of a compromise 
between the sympathy of England and France and the in- 
sinuations of Russian diplomacy which tries to force upon 
the world the partition of Austria-Hungary. Sound reason- 
ing indicates that in order to destroy Prussia and spare the 
German nation, the partition of Austria-Hungary would be 
a nonsense. There is still some truth in the contention that 
"the Southern Germans look to Vienna rather than to Ber- 
lin."* Prussia could be destroyed only by the destruction of 
the German Empire, which was the result of Prussia's vic- 
tory over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1871. Should 
this be done, what could the organization of future Germany 
be based upon? After eliminating the hegemony of Prussia, 
it would be necessary to return to the hegemony which Prus- 
sia eliminated once upon a time. This would mean the 
hegemony of Austria which was crushed on the battlefield 
of Sadowa. The independence and the development of the 
German nation can do without the supremacy of Prussia but 

* L. C. Jane : "The Nations at War," London, 1914, page 192. 



— 86 — 

could not possibly do without the supremacy of somebody 
else. Viewed otherwise, from a different standpoint, the 
entire program of the Allies with regard to Germany is either 
a fiction or a huge lie. The idea of reorganizing Germany 
at the expense of Prussia must naturally go hand in hand 
with the preserving of Austria-Hungary, in order to make 
the throne of the Hapsbourgs once more the throne of the 
German nation. Regardless of the point of view, however, 
it remains a fact that a strong Austria-Hungary is the guar- 
antee of equilibrium in Europe. Austria-Hungary is a bar- 
rier for the imperialism of Russia and to some extent also 
for the imperialism of Germany. Austria-Hungary protects 
the Bosporus from Russia and the Adriatic Sea from 
Germany, and by this fact the throne of the Hapsbourgs 
goes a good deal towards the re-establishing in Europe of 
the Roman peace, of the permanent peace of the Caesars. 
It is impossible any more for the Roman imperialism to be 
renewed in Austria-Hungary, nor can the old Roman form 
of domination over the world be revived, but the mission of 
old Rome in the world has a chance of being regenerated. 

Some day the gates of the temple of Janus will be closed ! 

It was a mistake on the part of England that she did not 
protect Austria in 1866 against an attack by Prussia. It was 
equally a mistake of England not to protect France in 1870, 
and Homer Lea reproaches England from her own point of 
view for having failed to do so.* In the eyes of English 
public opinion, the victory of Prussia was considered even 
as the "triumph of the principle of nationality."! England 
failed to see that on the battlefields of Sadowa and Sedan 
the seed of the present war was sown. Bismarck was not a 
friend of the sea and this to some extent appeased the fears 

* Homer Lea : "The Day of the Saxon." 
t J. Bryce, 1. c, page 505. 



— 87 — 

of England, inasmuch as on land England does not have to 
be an enemy of Germany. It was a mistake of Lord Pal- 
merston and of Lord Beaconsfield that they did not protect 
Austria and France from Prussia, but at least they protected 
Constantinople from Russia's appetite. The mistake they 
made did not lie in the fact that they protected Constan- 
tinople but in their failure to protect Austria and France. 
A purely opportunistic policy has prevented England from 
championing the cause of Austria and France in their wars 
with Prussia ; the same opportunistic policy lowers England 
still more nowadays and makes Great Britain sell to Russia, 
Constantinople and the Slavish provinces of Austria-Hun- 
gary for a temporary military support against Germany. 
Lord Beaconsfield committed the first mistake and his critics 
nowadays endeavor to commit the second one. All this must 
be some tragic misunderstanding, because it is impossible 
to conceive that England should go in such a broken way 
against all of her former traditions. 

The considerations which support the argument of pre- 
serving Austria-Hungary as a first-class power form a por- 
tion of the conditions for : 

I — The permanence of the coming peace; 

II — The victory of the just principle of nationalism; 

III — The defeat of the imperialism of Russia. 
In spite of the aroused passions, there will be a place for 
the following principles among the conditions of the coming 
peace : 

I — The strengthening of Austria-Hungary as a first- 
class power against the imperialism of Russia, be- 
cause Pan-Slavism is the reactionary program of 
a race and not a progressive program of na- 
tionalism ; 



— 88 — 

II — The solving of the question of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina through the reorganization of the Kingdom 
of Croatia and Slavonia in the sense of trialism 
and in accordance with the teachings of history 
and statistics, and without injuring Servia, whose 
claims against Austria-Hungary are dictated by an 
imperialistic policy, it being only a reflection of 
Russian Pan- Slavism and inconsistent with the 
requirements of a just nationalism. 

On the battlefields of the present war, the moral achieve- 
ment of nationalism in Austria-Hungary won a victory. 
The world has convinced itself that a structure erected by a 
thousand years and by a half century of constitutional 
regime is not a house of cards which can be blown to pieces 
by the first blow of the hurricane of war. 



Chapter IV 
THE FUTURE of WARSAW 



91 — 



Chapter IV. — The Future of Warsaw 

The map of Europe contains a great political paradox. 
This paradox is the line of the Vistula, which is one 
of the main rivers of central Europe. Its upper part 
is in the hands of Austria-Hungary; the middle part 
in the hands of Russia and the lower part in those 
of Germany. On the upper part of the Vistula lies 
the town of Cracow where the old Polish Kings 
are buried; in the middle part of the Vistula is Warsaw, 
the capital of Poland, while Danzig, the old Polish harbor 
town, lies at the mouth of the Vistula. It certainly is a 
paradox which shows geographically the political slavery of 
Poland. Cut in three parts, the Vistula is a river of slavery 
and the river of the great Polish suffering. 

The paradox of the Vistula is the strategical and eco- 
nomical expression of what Clemenceau has called "one of 
the biggest crimes in history."* 

The present war has been called a war fought for the 
liberty of nations. Ten millions of troops have been rushed 
into the valley of the Vistula, and from the Baltic Sea to the 
Carpathian Mountains there is one vast struggle going on, a 
struggle for which there is no comparison in history. The 
main issue in this enormous struggle is the fate of Warsaw, 
the capital of Poland. From the strategical point of view it 
is a question of the Vistula — from the political point of view 
it is a question of Poland's future. On the banks of the 
Vistula, justice is meted out for the partition of Poland and 

* "L'Homme Libre," August 16, 19x4. 



— 92 — 

the three powers, which once upon a time dismembered 
Poland, are finally facing each other as enemies, arrayed 
for a final settlement. The Polish question which hitherto 
united them began to be a bone of contention; under the 
pressure of military necessity, both sides were compelled to 
approach the Polish nation, which ages ago settled on the 
banks of the Vistula and occupies the theatre of the present 
war. 

The time came for making promises. 

The proclamation which a year ago the German and the 
Austro-Hungarian armies distributed in Russian-Poland 
stated that the armies of these countries were bringing 
"Liberty and Independence"* to Poland. This was the first 
ray of hope for the Polish nation. A few days later an- 
other promise came, this time from the opposite party. On 
August 15, 1914, the late Russian Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolajevitch, proclaimed that the 
intention of Russia is to unite Poland under the sceptre of 
the Czar. "Poland shall be reborn under this sceptre, free 
in faith, in language, in self-government." The armies of 
the western nations gave the hope of independence — the 
armies of the eastern power have limited the future of 
Poland to autonomy. The aforesaid proclamations, how- 
ever, were proclamations issued only by commanders-in- 
chief, and not by their respective governments. 

Poland knew long ago that the war would practically draw 
closer, and she prepared herself so as not to be surprised and 
to have a plan of action. During the war in the Balkans, 
Poland advanced her preparations considerably. Old and new 
organizations began secretly or openly to work with fewer in 
order to be able, in case of a war between Austria and 



* "Nowa Reforma," Cracow, August, 1914. 



— 93 — 

Russia, to form their own military representation and throw 
it in the game and fight for Poland's independence. Out- 
wardly, Poland made her first political demonstration in 
European politics in the summer of 1913. Polish military 
organizations and independence parties sent a delegation to 
London, where at that time a conference of ambassadors of 
European nations was in session, and it deposited with Sir 
Edward Grey and all the ambassadors assembled in con- 
ference a memorandum on the question of Poland. This 
memorandum was nothing else but a program of Poland's 
attitude in the war which at that time was already antici- 
pated. This memorandum called Europe's attention to the 
fact that in case of a war, Poland would throw her lot with 
Austria-Hungary against Russia because under present po- 
litical conditions such an action means the only real road 
to independence for Poland. The moment when the antici- 
pated war broke out Poland did not need to make her action 
dependent on any of the aforesaid proclamations which the 
armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia distributed 
all over Poland's territory. 

On August 5, 1914, the first Polish patrol composed of 
members of Polish military organizations left Cracow and 
crossed Russia's frontier, headed for Kielce in Russian Po- 
land. This patrol was followed by other detachments num- 
bering several thousand of men. All of them were revolu- 
tionary troops trained in a military organization which for a 
good many years carried on the work openly in Galicia and 
under cover in Prussian and in Russian-Poland ; in these or- 
ganizations young men were trained for military purposes in 
order to be able to form, in case of war between Austria and 
Russia, a military representation of Poland. The plan 
elaborated long ago began to work. The frontier posts 
which for over a hundred years separated Cracow from 



— 94 — 

Warsaw were pulled down ; they were pulled down by the 
Polish revolutionary soldiers who were the first to cross 
the frontier in order to bring liberty to Russian-Poland. 
This happened on August 5th — precisely fifty years after 
the Russian government in Warsaw, through the hangman's 
noose, executed the last five members of the last Polish 
National Government. This date of August 5th was a fes- 
tival and the day of the beginning of a new fight for inde- 
pendence. At the head of the movement stood Joseph 
Pilsudzki, a Russian subject. The road to Kielce was open 
for him because the Russian armies retreated for strategical 
reasons and the armies of Austria-Hungary had not arrived. 
Neither was there any proclamation from any of the warring 
powers. The action of the Poles outran the coming events. 
In Kielce, where for a while no other armies had made their 
appearance and which was occupied only by the Polish 
troops, the independence of Poland was proclaimed. The 
churches resounded with Polish national anthems for which 
hitherto Russian government deported the people to Siberia. 
Polish flags showing the historical White Eagle were once 
more floating over the city showing their white and crim- 
son colors to the eyes of the enthusiastic people. The ranks 
of the Polish revolutionary army began to swell by a large 
number of volunteers who were able to escape the Russian 
orders of mobilization. 

One must have gone through slavery himself in order to 
understand and appreciate the feelings of a nation throwing 
off the shackles of its slavery. 

On August 3, 1914, proclamations of a secret National 
Government were posted in Warsaw which summoned the 
nation to rise against Russia and join hands with the de- 
tachments of the Polish revolutionary army which was com- 
ing up from the Galician frontier. A young Pole, a member 



— 95 — 

of the Polish conspiracy, was caught by a Russian police 
while posting the aforesaid bills, and on the next day a volley 
shot from the rifles of an executionary squad ended his life 
in the citadel of Warsaw. He was the first victim of the 
war. About two weeks later the proclamation of the Rus- 
sian commander-in-chief was issued; in this proclamation, 
from fear of the awakening revolutionary spirit, a promise 
of autonomy was made to Poland. It was not enough for 
a nation that had older political traditions than Russia but, 
above everything else, the promise came too late. The action 
of the Poles not only came ahead of the armies of both 
sides but also of their promises. In Galicia all the political 
parties succeeded in uniting and in getting into communica- 
tion with the secret National Government in Warsaw. Be- 
cause of the freedom of action in Galicia the center of grav- 
ity of the entire movement was shifted from Warsaw to 
Cracow from where the first signal for the war of inde- 
pendence was issued. On the basis of an agreement between 
the secret and open political parties in Galicia and Russian- 
Poland, which form together two-thirds of the organized 
parties in Poland, the Supreme National Committee was 
organized in Cracow on August 16, 1914; this committee 
until now has the supreme sway over the destinies of the 
nation. It is a political representation of Poland in the 
present war and it is a nucleus of the Polish state, should 
the conscience of the world awake and should Poland gain 
her independence. All the detachments of the Polish revolu- 
tionary forces which were in garrison in Kielce, received the 
name of "Polish Legions" from the Supreme National Com- 
mittee. Thus the actual force of the nation, elements 
organized openly or secretly, and based on an entirely demo- 
cratic principle, declared themselves against Russia and 
formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Russian 



— 96 — 

promises did not succeed in halting them nor did so the 
memories of the ill-treatment suffered by the Poles to a 
great extent at the hands of Prussia. 

The policy of every nation must be a real one, that means 
it must be based on facts, on real conditions of work and 
not on fantastic dreams. Nobody has any right to condemn 
republican France for allying herself with despotic Russia, 
although French money subsidized the struggle of Russian 
reaction against the progressive movement. Nobody has 
the right to blame England for going hand in hand with 
Russia, although ten years ago England perfectly consciously 
defeated Russia by the Japanese in Eastern Asia. Nobody 
has the right to condemn Servia for allying herself with 
Turkey against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, although 
grass has not grown as yet on the graves at Kumanowo and 
Lule Burgas. In the same way, nobody can condemn Poland 
for allying herself with Austria-Hungary and throwing her 
forces against Russia. Every nation has a "ratio status" 
of its own, which determines the direction of its policy. 
This "ratio status" is the result of historical traditions and 
of material conditions for action. Positive results can be 
reached only through positive means. The road to Berlin does 
not lead through the moon but along the strategical line of 
the Rhine or the Vistula. The road from Italy to Trentino 
leads through the Alps but not across the ocean. It is useless 
to vociferate against the Germans when the ammunition 
gives out on the road to Berlin. A certain purpose requires 
positive means and the reality of the means is determined 
by the facts and the conditions on the theatre of a war or of 
politics. The alliance of Poland with Austria-Hungary was 
the result of the Polish "ratio status" and of real conditions 
which already beforehand decided that only by an alliance 
with Austria-Hungary and by a war against Russia, Poland 



— 97 — 

can become free and independent. Whoever thinks that the 
decision of Poland was influenced by feelings, sympathies, 
promises or fantastic hope, is mistaken. Poland did not stop 
to compare the injuries she suffered from Prussia with 
those she suffered at Russia's hands. This would have been 
a childish policy or a policy of nervous artists. Not feelings 
but interest decided the issue. Poland does not fight nowa- 
days because of a desire of revenge against Russia nor be- 
cause of a desire of showing her gratitude to Austria-Hun- 
gary. The anti-Polish policy of Russia was real and sincere, 
but the Polish anti-Russian policy was in no degree less sin- 
cere and less real. Poland understands and respects the 
"ratio status" of other states and other nations, even that of 
Russia, but Poland puts on the same basis before the world 
her own "ratio status" and fights for its realization. 

Arms do not terminate war although they decide battles. 
An army with its blood establishes facts but the conclusions 
from these premises are drawn by the diplomats when the 
peace treaties are negotiated. The Polish question is not 
going to be decided on the battlefield, although battles arcs 
decided on Polish grounds. The Polish question shall come 
up together with the whole mass of political questions during 
the coming peace congress regardless of the form which the 
latter shall have. This is the goal for which the Polish 
hopes are aimed, and the work done by the Polish Legions 
paves the way to this goal. 

One hundred years ago the Congress of Vienna was in 
session. The Napoleonic hurricane came to an end and then 
diplomacy started bargaining. The Polish question was one 
of the foremost among the issues confronting the Congress. 
Who did revive the Polish question in Europe? Polish 
troops followed the eagles of Napoleon in his expedition 
against Russia in 1812. The Polish army was headed by 



— 98 — 

Prince Joseph Poniatowski. The Polish army commanded 
by him was the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw es- 
tablished by Napoleon in 1807 at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 
Poland has established right at the very beginning of the 
Napoleonic era a military representation on the side of 
France. Then appeared for the first time the idea of Polish 
Legions. By way of Italy, Egypt and even Santo Domingo 
in America the Polish legions began their march to Warsaw. 
The road was a long one and cost a heavy toll of blood, but 
finally it led the legions to their intended goal. The Polish 
legions were not animated only by hatred when combating 
Russia nor did they help France only because of any feeling 
of sympathy. There were feelings even very keen, strong 
and sacred feelings, but they were far from deciding the 
Polish policy. The decisive factor was the desire of creating 
a Polish military representation on the background of Na- 
poleonic wars in order thus to create a representation for 
the Polish aspirations for freedom and in order to confront 
Europe with the Polish question. Liberty can be gained only 
by blood and iron and therefore the flag carried by the Polish 
legions of a hundred years ago was such a flag of blood and 
iron. The glory which fell upon this flag of the legions 
became the glory of the Polish nation, and it was because of 
the merit of these legions that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
was established at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 

Napoleon was defeated, and his defeat meant at the same 
time the military defeat of the Polish cause. The com- 
mander of the Polish army, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, a 
hero known very well to-day all over Europe and a field- 
marshal of Napoleon's army, was drowned in the River 
Elster while covering the retreat of Napoleon from Leipzig. 
The Polish cause, however, did not perish. In spite of the 
military defeat the Polish legions of the Napoleonic army 



— 99 — 

caused the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland with a 
separate parliament and a Polish army in Warsaw. The fact 
that the Polish army helped Napoleon against Russia and 
thus against England did not obscure the view of the Cabinet 
of London. England did not hesitate to support the Polish 
cause against Russia although Russia was an ally of England 
in the latter's life and death struggle against Napoleon. The 
attack which in the battle of Leipzig Prince Joseph Ponia- 
towski led against the village of Probstheida occupied by 
Russian troops commanded by Emperor Alexander I him- 
self, was therefore something more than a mere incident of 
this "battle of nations." By conquering Probstheida, Prince 
Joseph Poniatowski "was conquering the capital of the 
future Kingdom of Poland under the eyes of this Kingdom's 
future monarch."* Prince Joseph Poniatowski perished 
and only remnants of the Polish regiments were left when 
the Napoleonic epopee came to an end. The blood and iron, 
however, have done their work : Polish regiments have com- 
pelled Europe to look at them as the representatives of the 
Polish state. Czar Alexander I had to yield to the opinion 
of Europe ; and the Poles, although they lost militarily, they 
won, however, a political victory. They won the Kingdom 
of Poland which was supposed to be the nucleus for the 
future full reconstruction of Poland. Unfortunately, several 
years later Russia has broken the treaty of Vienna and 
abolished the constitution of the young state. 

The example set by the Polish legions of a hundred years 
ago serves to-day as a guide for the Polish legions in the 
present war. The example of Prince Joseph Poniatowski 
is nowadays the guide of Pilsudzki in the present war. 
Regardless of the military result the fact will remain on 
the records of history that in the great European war 

* S. Askenazy : "Ksi^ze Jozef Poniatowski," 1913, page 292. 



— 100 — 

Poland created her own military representation to remind 
the world of the fact of her bloody and heroic existence 
to force the world to face the question of Polish inde- 
pendence. The future Congress will decide the issue, but 
the blood of the Polish legions will be the seed of liberty 
when finally the conscience of the world will awake and "one 
of the biggest crimes in history will have an end."* This is 
the basis of the Polish "ratio status" in the period of 
Poland's subjugation. Nobody had the right to demand that 
Poland should act against this "ratio status" of hers nor that 
it should follow the inspiration of the moment or believe in 
and wait for the fulfilment of somebody's promises. Poland 
exists between the hammer and the anvil, and every other na- 
tion would take the same course that Poland did, and the same 
course that the Polish legions took in the present war. This 
road agrees with the Polish traditions against Russia and 
with the Polish alliance with Austria-Hungary. The rea- 
son for this is a very simple and a very real one : the creat- 
ing of a military representation was impossible in any other 
way. The first year of the European war has proved this 
contention by the force of facts. The attempt of Russia 
to organize a Polish legion in Warsaw against Austria- 
Hungary and Germany failed sadly and there is no Polish 
legion siding with Russia. On the other hand, the Polish 
legions against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary 
are developing fast and have reached already the figure of 
many thousands of men. The evacuation of Warsaw in- 
creased the numerical strength of the Polish legions con- 
siderably. So the actual facts proved which side showed 
more possibility and actual opportunity : the decision proved 
to be a practical one against Russia and for an alliance with 
Austria-Hungary. 

* Clemenceau, 1. c. 



— 101 — 

Poland is not a free country. Every male citizen in 
Poland is compelled to serve in either the Russian or the 
German or the Austro-Hungarian army. The outbreak of 
the war came as suddenly as a thunder-bolt from a clear 
sky. The mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria- 
Hungary took about a million men away from Poland within 
twenty-four hours. The rest of able-bodied Polish men 
were confronted by the possibility of being called to the 
colors as the war continued. To-day we can safely say 
that after the first year of the war is over there remained 
in Poland only women, children and old people. How could 
an army be formed under such conditions ? The best judg- 
ment and the greatest sympathies cannot possibly raise an 
army when men are lacking. Recruiting cannot be done on 
the moon nor can officers be made over night and the 
question of an army is not a question of improvising one. 
The mobilization of the Polish Legions therefore on the 
background of the mobilization in Russia, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary could only be conducted on the basis of 
the logic of actual conditions and not on the basis of 
feelings, of sympathies or dispositions. The territory in 
which the recruiting for Polish Legions was possible was 
the left bank of the Vistula in the Kingdom of Poland. 
Galicia and Posen could not furnish an adequate supply of 
recruits because they form together only 20 per cent, of 
the historical territory of Poland, and besides the mobili- 
zation of Austria-Hungary and of Germany goes quicker 
than the mobilization of Russia. This is the first fact of 
great importance, because owing to this fact the Russian 
mobilization was compelled to leave against its very inten- 
tions a large material of men for purpose of Polish policy. 
It was of no less importance that the Russian mobilization 
is less exact, that it proceeds more slowly, and that 



— 102 — 

Russia possesses 80 per cent, of the Polish historical terri- 
tory and the old Polish capital of Warsaw. Those were the 
real conditions which regardless of the sympathies or the 
antipathies decided beforehand that by waging war against 
Russia only on the territory of Russian-Poland could the 
recruiting for the Polish Legions have any chance of suc- 
cess. 

The map will show that the frontiers of Russian-Poland 
are flanked on the north by the Prussian frontier and on 
the south by the frontier of Galicia. In case of war there 
was a danger for the Russian armies in Russian-Poland that 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have a speedier 
mobilization, would by a flank attack from the north and 
from the south, cut them off on the Vistula and destroy 
them before the reserves from the interior of Russia would 
be able to reach the theatre of war. Russia was made 
aware of this danger long ago by «ome of her best generals 
such as Dragomirow, Hurko and even Kuropatkin. Accord- 
ing to their judgment Russia had to evacuate in the first 
few weeks of the war the left bank of the Vistula for 
strategical reasons so that the reserves coming up from the 
interior of Russia would have a shorter road for getting 
to the battle line and thus be able to reach the seat of war 
before the armies of the enemy would be able to move for- 
ward from the north and from the south. This was known 
both in Poland and in Western Europe. France was afraid 
of this possibility as France was compelled to depend on 
a speedy offensive movement of Russia in the direction of 
Berlin and on this plan were based the hopes of France 
to protect Paris from a violent onrush of the German armies. 
This was a decisive fact for Poland. The evacuation of the 
western provinces of Russian-Poland by the Russians meant 
in case of the outbreak of the war the stopping of the 



— 103 — 

Russian mobilization in these districts. The western dis- 
tricts of Russian-Poland are chiefly industrial. Here are 
to be found large coal mines in the valley of Dabrowa and 
of Sosnowiec, and besides there is a number of industrial 
centres such as Cz^stochowa or Nowo-Radomsk. The out- 
break of the war closed the factories and the mines : the 
masses of laboring men were thrown out of employment, 
and as Russia had to retreat there was left for the Polish 
legions ready and very useful material of men. Thus the 
Polish legions recruited the majority of their soldiers from 
these sections of the country. Eighty per cent, of the 
soldiers in the Polish Legions were recruited in Russian- 
Poland and the majority among them came from the indus- 
trial districts which Russia had to evacuate in the begin- 
ning of the war temporarily for strategical reasons. This 
was an anticipated fact but still it played a decisive part 
in the Polish policy. The mobilization of Poland had to be 
necessarily directed against Russia if it was to be of any 
use and if it was to give results. 

The rest of the task of organization rested with Galicia 
which for over half a century enjoyed the benefits of 
autonomy within the general constitution of Austria-Hun- 
gary. "Galicia has not been unhappy."* In Posen there 
are no Polish schools nor Polish university: in Russian- 
Poland there was a university, but a Russian one, and all 
schools were Russian too while private schools suffered from 
exceedingly heavy restrictions on the part of the Russian 
Government. In Posen, the Commission of Colonization 
originated by Bismarck bought up Polish land and settled 
it with Germans. In Russian-Poland the "Bank wfoscianski" 
has done the same for over fifty years and colonizes Polish 



"The Germans," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 12. 



— 104 — 

land with Orthodox Russian peasants. In Lithuania and 
Little Russia the Poles are absolutely forbidden to buy land 
nor to sell to anyone except a Russian. Thus a Pole can- 
not acquire land which actually belongs to the Poles, neither 
in Lithuania or in Little Russia. Czar Nicholas I invented 
the system of destroying the Polish nation and Bismarck 
became his apt pupil. This was done very much to the 
disadvantage of Russia and of Germany and brought great 
harm to Poland. The development of the Polish nation thus 
remained under the most trying conditions, whereby great 
mistakes were committed in Petrograd with regard to 
the Polish question and still greater ones were committed 
by Berlin. The friendship between Germany and Russia 
was the basis for oppressing Poland. The celebration of 
the 500th anniversary of the victory of Grunwald, where 
the combined forces of Poland and Lithuania annihilated 
the power of the Teutonic Knights, could not be celebrated 
in Warsaw but only in Cracow in spite of the fact that 
not Russia but Austria-Hungary was in alliance with Ger- 
many. The monument of the victory over the Germans 
could be erected, and in fact still stands in Cracow but 
could not possibly stand in Warsaw. This is enough said 
to the initiated. It is a basis for understanding the policy 
of Poland in the present war. Owing to her autonomical 
freedom Galicia was able to become the territory on which 
the preparations for the future war of independence could 
be carried on. The best material of men from Russian- 
Poland took refuge in Galicia where these elements could 
be instructed militarily in special Polish military organiza- 
tions. Thus Galicia educated the officers for the present 
Polish legions and only Galicia was able to do it. The 
first detachments of the Polish Legions which crossed the 
Russian frontier north of Cracow were skeleton detach- 



— 105 — 

ments composed only of officers and under-officers. On the 
left bank of the Vistula there were waiting for them the 
Polish recruits who were spared by the Russian mobiliza- 
tion and only too anxious to fight for their own sacred 
cause of independence. 

This, however, was an old program and not a new one 
by any means. 

In the years 1876-1878 when there was a danger of a 
war between Austria-Hungary and Russia on account of 
the Balkan situation all the political parties of Poland united 
in order to prepare a new revolution against Russia in alli- 
ance with Austria-Hungary. For this purpose a "Con- 
federation of the Polish Nation" was formed which played 
the part of a political representation of the nation. The 
movement was headed by Prince Sapieha who was assisted 
by Rev. Albin Dunajewski who subsequently was Bishop 
of Cracow and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. 
In those times England was on terms of friendship with 
Germany and protected Constantinople from the appetite 
of Russia. Thus England worked behind the stage in organ- 
izing a Polish revolution against Russia. The plan of the 
revolution consisted of marching armed and well organ- 
ized detachments of revolutionary armies into Russian- 
Poland from Galicia : these detachments were intended to 
be the nucleus of the future Polish army. Russian-Poland 
was expected to furnish the men and Galicia the officers. 
The English Government was well informed of the entire 
plan and even promised to help quietly by furnishing arms 
and money. Cardinal Manning, who was famous all over 
England took part in a secret meeting of Polish politicians 
in Vienna: at this meeting important decisions were taken 
in case the war should really break out. There was no war, 
however, but the Congress of Berlin completed the diplo- 



— 106 — 

matic defeat of Russia. A tradition was left behind in 
Poland, however, to that effect that England has under- 
stood the Polish "ratio status" which prompted the Poles 
to avail themselves of their liberties in Galicia in order 
to prepare a revolution in Russian-Poland. For forty years 
ever since the Congress of Berlin, Poland did not discon- 
tinue her policy and constantly instructed young men in 
secret and in open organizations of military nature. Poland's 
policy was not altered by the fact that Austria-Hungary 
entered into an alliance with Germany which has lasted 
for over thirty years and furnished ample time to recon- 
sider the matter: Poland's policy was not altered even 
when Prussia began a systematic oppression in Posen and 
England failed to protest against such treatment of the 
Poles. Just at this particular time England ceded Heligo- 
land which became the basis for Germany's naval power. 
Several years later England preferred to threaten France 
with war on account of the Fashoda incident than to inter- 
vene at Berlin for the protection of the Poles although 
the oppression of the Poles in Posen by Prussia violated the 
treaty of Vienna of 1815. Bismarck was not fond of the 
sea and Poland is not Belgium and Warsaw does not face 
London. Poland felt bitterly over being abandoned to her 
fate by Western Europe, but she did not deter her from fol- 
lowing her anti-Russian policy. 

When after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1908 by Austria-Hungary, the danger of war became 
imminent to Poland, new organizations were added to those 
which existed since the time of the Congress of Berlin and 
preparations were going on feverishly. The Polish "ratio 
status" did not change at all since the time when Cardinal 
Manning conferred in Vienna with representatives of Poland 
on the details of a revolution against Russia. To-day Eng- 



— 107 — 

land is militarily allied with Russia: the English tactics 
changed, but the conditions in Poland did not. Cardinal 
Dunajewski is also dead, but another dignitary of the Roman 
Catholic Church, Bishop Bandurski, is a member of the 
Supreme National Committee. The only change that has 
occurred is that Poland's sufferings became greater and 
deepe A ~. Should this be the reason why England no longer 
understands the Polish "ratio status," although England has 
understood it and recognized it forty years ago under 
analogous conditions for Poland? 

Poland has been and is still in a most precarious position. 
She could not do anything else but fight against Russia, 
and in order to do this she had to draw her recruits from 
Russian-Poland and her supply of officers from Galicia. 
This was not prompted by feelings but by actual conditions 
of things. Not because of blind hatred but because of absolute 
necessity was Poland compelled to direct her main attacks 
against Russia. Warsaw the Capital of Poland and besides 
eighty per cent, of Poland's territory was in Russia's hands 
or in other words, Russia held the trunk of Poland's body. 
It is therefore quite natural that the Polish attack had to 
be directed against Russia. 

On October 2, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
drafted a diplomatic note addressed to all neutral coun- 
tries in which the said government officially recognized the 
Polish Legions as combatants. This important document 
ended as follows: 

"Any action on the part of Russia which would imply a 
refusal to recognize the Polish Legions as a combatant 
party would constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions 
of the Convention of The Hague and against which the Gov- 
ernment of Austria-Hungary already now files a most cate- 
gorical protest." 



— 108 — 

This note was published by the "Fremdenblatt" of Vienna, 
which is the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Thus the Polish military representation obtained an official 
sanction. The Polish soldier became a political factor in 
Europe because the note of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment secured for him the protection of international law. 
The future peace congress has therefore a perfect freedom 
of action with regard to the Polish question. When some 
time in the future the hostilities will be suspended this 
moment will find the Polish Legions in the field. Regard- 
less of the military result of the war this is going to be a 
fact which from the former point of view will greatly facili- 
tate the reviving of the Polish question at the time of the 
coming peace congress. According to international law 
Poland is only a combatant party but is not a belligerent 
one because there is only a Polish nation and no Polish 
state. Hitherto only a Polish military representation is rec- 
ognized in the world-war; nevertheless, the Polish Legions 
can constitute a material as well as a formal point of 
departure for the initiative in the Polish question when the 
future peace congress will meet. Poland hopes that the 
conscience of the world will awake and that historical jus- 
tice is going to be done. Poland did everything on her 
part to organize a military representation of her own, and 
it is now Europe's turn to bring about the happiness of 
humanity and the freedom of nations when this awful war 
will come to an end. 

The note of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Polish 
Legions has greatly alarmed Russia. Petrograd decided 
therefore at once upon an attempt of organizing in .Warsaw 
of Polish Legions for the purpose of combating against the 
Germans. It was an intrigue intended for provoking a vol- 
untary fight between the Poles themselves and thus killing 



— 109 — 

the Polish question from the international point of view. 
Organizing two military representations is absurd. The 
danger for Poland was great and because of unemployment, 
famine and particularly because of the mistakes made by 
the policy of Prussia with regard to Poland in the times 
preceding the war it was comparatively easy for Russia to 
mislead individuals. Poland is an oppressed country, with- 
out a government after all, and therefore every individual 
has a free hand to act as he pleases. Oppression has accus- 
tomed the nation to the principle of "liberum censeo," which 
principle permits every individual to consider himself as his 
own governor. The level of political enlightenment of the 
masses is not equal in all parts of Poland, where, by the way, 
the schools are in other hands than those of the Poles 
and where a general oppression prevails. Russia therefore 
determined to destroy what the legions of Cracow have 
accomplished politically. In November, 1914, that means 
about four months after the Polish Legions have crossed 
the Russian frontier, Czar Nicholas II has commissioned 
his Chamberlain, Count Wielopolski, to organize in Warsaw 
a Polish National Committee as a competition to the Supreme 
National Committee of Cracow. The right hand and in 
fact the brain of Count Wielopolski's action was a confi- 
dential man of the Russian Government, a former member 
of the Duma, Roman Dmowski. A portion of the Polish 
nobility and of the moneyed bourgeoisie supported this 
movement. 

During all revolutions there were loyal parties, which dis- 
trusted the sword and were apt to believe in deceitful prom- 
ises. The French Revolution had its loyalists and so had it 
American revolution in times of Washington. 

The first utterance of the Committee of Warsaw was the 
proclamation of November 25, 1914, in which a protest was 



— 110 — 

made against the Supreme National Committee : the authors 
of this proclamation, however, did not have the courage of 
denying the fact that Austria-Hungary was "the only state 
in which our national rights had met with a measure of 
recognition."* The autonomy of Galicia has been in force 
for over half a century, while the autonomy under Russian 
sovereignty was hitherto only a promise of the commander- 
in-chief. Under such conditions and because of a number 
of other practical considerations which were explained above, 
the Committee of Warsaw was necessarily without real 
backing among the Poles. All democratic parties refused 
to support the Committee in question: the latter tried to 
gain in importance by co-operating with the Committee of 
the Polish members of the Russian Duma in Petrograd. 
Russian-Poland used to elect to the Russian Duma 
only fourteen deputies out of a population of 12,000,000. 
Besides, the election law was of the most reactionary nature 
and deprived the masses of the people of any influence what- 
soever. For these reasons the Poles boycotted the Russian 
Duma since the reactionary times of Stolypin and only the 
nobility and certain elements of the moneyed bourgeoisie 
took part in the election. This condition of things was cor- 
rectly estimated by the London "Times," which, after the 
outbreak of the war and after the declaration of loyalty 
on the part of the Polish members of the Duma, has ques- 
tioned the political value of their move because "chosen on 
the franchise and in the conditions which exist," they cannot 
"speak for the whole people."f The London "Times" is a 
newspaper of high standing and therefore had its doubts, 
which by the way were quite justified, whether the Polish 

* "Poland, Russia and the War," by Alma Tadema, London, 1914, 
page 21. 
f The "Times," London, August 17, 1914. 



— 111- 
nation will be able "to forget 1830 and 1863?" Reality has 
soon manifested itself in spite of the artificial propaganda 
made by the press. The Committee of Warsaw supported 
the Russian plan of organizing a Polish Legion on Russia's 
side. A most spirited propaganda was carried on for three 
months and failed completely. The nation did not back up 
the action, and no army can be raised on paper nor by spilling 
streams of ink and making a propaganda. Several hundred 
of misled volunteers were quietly incorporated into the 
Russian army : thus the entire undertaking failed politically. 
The Russian intrigue came to a naught and the moral stand- 
ing as well as the numerical strength of the Polish Legions 
organized in Cracow was increased considerably. 

The reasons for Russia's failure in Warsaw were very 
grave ones. Russia promised autonomy to Poland but she 
did not promise independence. While the war that is waged 
at the present time is conducted for the sake of the liberty 
of nations Russia only offered autonomy which by the way 
was only administrative and not legislative. To the Poles 
it meant only uniting under one yoke instead of under three 
which was far from being a program of independence. All 
illusions were swept away by the Corriere della Sera of 
Milano which stated that the Czar has purposely failed to 
sign the proclamation with regard to the Polish cause.* The 
"Gofos Moskwy" confirmed this by betraying the fact that 
the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas was not backed up 
at all by the Russian Government and that this was merely 
a tactical move which was required from Russia by Gen- 
eral Joffre. The attitude of the Russian Government dur- 
ing the war gave conclusively justified the suspicions of 
Poland since Russia did not cease for one moment to ex- 
terminate all aspirations for Polish independence. The 

* "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 191 5, page 23. 



— 112 — 

Russian Government has forbidden to put the White Eagle, 
which is the national emblem of Poland, on the flags of the 
Legion that Russia attempted to organize in Warsaw, and 
even Polish national anthems were sternly prohibited by 
the police.* While this was going on the Russian Govern- 
ment abolished autonomy in Eastern Galicia which was 
then occupied by the Russian armies and began to proceed 
with the russification of this province. 

Eastern Galicia never formed a part of Russia and 
belonged to Poland ever since 1340. From the ethnograph- 
ical point of view it has a mixed population the majority 
of which is Ruthenian in the eastern district of the said 
province. This, however, does not justify at all Russian 
imperialism. The Ruthenians and the Russians have just 
as much in common as the Belgian Walons have with France 
or the Belgian Flamands with Holland. Does this entitle 
France or Holland to annex Belgium? The imperialism 
of Russia, however, did not possess any nationalistic scru- 
ples in spite of the fact that international law does not 
permit a legal annexation of an occupied territory. Count 
Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of Eastern Galicia, de- 
clared right upon his arrival in Lemberg that he "shall 
introduce here the Russian language, Russian law, the Rus- 
sian state administration," and that "the Polish Diet shall 
not be convoked. "f In consequence thereof the Polish 
university as well as all educational institutions, both Polish 
and Ruthenian, were closed at once. Every possible auton- 
omy has been abolished at once and instead the Russian 
despotic and anti-democratic system of government was 
introduced. Tshichatshef, who advocated the separation of 
the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, in the Russian 

* "Nowa Gazeta," Warsaw, November u, 1914. 
f "For a Lasting Peace," page 23. 



— 113 — 

Duma has with a knowledge of the Russian Government 
outlined a plan for colonizing Galicia with Russian Orth- 
odox peasants.* Only the defeat of the Russian armies 
and the liberation of Lemberg has saved Galicia from the 
activity of the Russian "Bank wfoscianski" which distin- 
guishes itself from the Prussian Commission of Coloniza- 
tion only by the fact of being older. Besides religious tol- 
erance was abolished and the Greek Orthodox religion was 
introduced forcibly. The Greek Catholic Church which for 
centuries was united with the Roman Church was slated as 
a victim. And Russia attempted to introduce religious per- 
secution into Eastern Galicia after having already made a 
bloody debut of a similar action in the province of Kholm, 
in Lithuania and in the Ukraina. History, however, has 
already passed a sentence on this action of Russia by say- 
ing as follows: "In Poland's ancient provinces, inhabited 
by the united Greeks, the government obliged the people to 
sign addresses to the Czar, asking him for the restoration 
of the Orthodox religion. Those who refused to sign were 
put into prison or deported. f The culminating point of 
the Russian method of converting to the Orthodox religion, 
was the year 1875. In Kroze few volleys had been fired 
into praying crowds of Greek Catholic worshipers, and in 
other parts of Russian-Poland thousands of people were 
deported to Siberia, and thus the Greek Catholic Church 
has been destroyed in Eastern Poland. At once after the 
temporary occupation of Lemberg by the Russian armies the 
Russian Bishop Eulogius came on a similar mission to East- 
ern Galicia. His action has soon manifested itself. The 
"Russkij Inwalid" published in January, 1915, the news that 
Bishop Eulogius had submitted to the Holy Synod in Petro- 

* "Nowoje Wremia," Petrograd, April 15, 1915. 

f M. Seignobos : "Contemporary History," 1910, page 422. 



— 114 — 

grad a report in which he insisted upon "abolishing in 
Galicia of the spiritual Greek Catholic hierarchy because 
the Russian law does not recognize the Greek Catholic 
Church."* 

Sapienti sat. 

"Slavic brotherhood and liberating the Poles from Prus- 
sian oppression" proved in practice to be nothing else but 
introducing of Russian oppression into autonomous Galicia 
which was the last refuge of free Polish thought. The zeal 
of Russia in this direction unfortunately proved to be a 
universal one. No voice of protest was raised by anybody 
in Russia and once more voices became loud suggesting the 
exclusion of the Polish question from the questions to be 
decided by the future peace congress. The Russian reac- 
tionary party as well as the progressive party joined 
hands in order to prevent the Polish question to become 
something else than "an internal problem of Slavdom," 
which in practice meant nothing else but an internal problem 
of the Russian Government. It is useless to speak about the 
reactionary party because its feelings toward Poland were 
only too well known. It was more painful that even Briant- 
shaninov, a truly liberal Russian politician agreed with the 
reactionary party that "Europe should under no circum- 
stances take any part in the settlement of the mutual 
relations between Russia and Poland. "f The progressive 
"Utro Rossiji" went still further, and considered the sug- 
gestions of turning over the Polish question for settlement 
to England, France and Russia, even with exclusion of Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Germany, as "illegal and criminal," be- 
cause the organization of future Poland "does not of right 



* "Goniec," Warsaw, January 17, 1915. 

f "Kurjer poranny," Warsaw. March 11, 191 5. 



— 115 — 

rest with any congresses at all."* Anybody, however, who 
would suggest that the fate of Poland should not depend 
upon the mercy of the victor was threatened with deporta- 
tion to Siberia. 

Independence can either be an absolute one or can ac- 
quire the form of a state within a state, as such is the case 
with Hungary or with Bavaria. Russia is opposed to such 
either form of independence as far as Poland is concerned. 
Russia is afraid of an absolute independence of Poland be- 
cause such an independence of Poland would keep Russia 
away from Central Europe and would stop Russia's pressure 
on the road leading through Vienna to Constantinople. 
Russia is furthermore afraid of Poland as a state within the 
state under the domination of Russia because the freedom 
of Poland could turn out to be contagious for Russia herself 
and particularly for Finland and the Caucasus. The free- 
dom of Poland is a danger to reactionary government and to 
despotism. The fear of progress prompted Russia to prom- 
ise Poland in the present war nothing else but autonomy, 
administrative and not legislative at that. 

The Russian plan with regard to Poland created an 
impression in Western Europe and particularly in America, 
because it has promised the uniting of the entire Poland 
under the sceptre of the Czar. The Russian plan has thus 
promised one yoke instead of three and has thus apparently 
simplified matters. All these beautiful phrases, however, 
concealed a truly Byzantinic perfidy. Poland has ethno- 
graphical as well as political boundaries : the first ones are 
boundaries of actual settlement while the other ones are 
boundaries of the Polish State which has ceased to exist. 
Russia decided to apply to the eastern portion of Poland 
the ethnographical principle and to the western portion of 
* "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 7, 191 5. 



— 116 — 

Poland the historical principle. Acting on this basis Russia 
has separated before the war the province of Kholm from 
Russian-Poland, and during the war, Eastern Galicia from 
Austrian-Poland, whereby she assumed the point of view 
that the territory settled by the Ruthenians in Galicia 
reaches as far as the upper course of the Dunajec. In con- 
tradiction with the historical fact that neither the province 
of Kholm nor Eastern Galicia have ever formed a part of 
the Russian State, and in contradiction with the ethno- 
graphical fact that the Ruthenians are not Russians, Russia 
considered the province of Kholm and Galicia as far as the 
course of the upper Dunajec as Russian territory and en- 
deavored to eliminate them from Polish influence. This 
meant nothing else but cutting slices away from Poland 
in the east promising at the same time to extend the boun- 
daries in the west. For Kholm, Lemberg, Przemysl, and 
Nowy Sacz Russia promised to Poland, Cracow, Silesia, 
Posen, Danzig, and Koenigsburg. Cracow used to be the 
crowning place of the Polish Kings, Posen was the cradle of 
Poland, Danzig was Poland's harbor on the Baltic Sea, 
Silesia fell apart from Poland even before the end of the 
Middle Ages and was not a part of Poland at the time of 
Poland's partitions, while Koenigsburg was the capital of a 
feudal principality of Poland and not the capital of a Polish 
province. Koenigsburg was the capital of East Prussia 
which was built up in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic 
Knights during their wars against Slav tribes. The program 
of Russia in the west agreed, therefore, with the historical 
traditions of Poland and not with the ethnographical con- 
siderations. This program apparently flattered the Polish 
national pride but in outlining this program Russia was 
prompted by different and very selfish reasons. The boun- 
daries of historical Poland agree with the boundaries needed 



— 117 — 

by Russian strategical considerations on Russia's western 
frontier. These considerations form the question of the 
Vistula line of defence. The uniting of Polish territories 
under the sceptre of the Czar would solve very advantage- 
ously for Russia the paradox of the Vistula, which before 
the war passed through three different states. By uniting 
Poland the Vistula would become an internal river of the 
Russian Empire and the frontier would move west as far 
as the upper Oder. In the first year of this war the Russian 
press has on different occasions stated quite plainly that 
strategical considerations are pushing Russia as far west as 
Frankfort on the Oder. 

The forcible pushing of the frontier of future Poland 
in the westerly direction, and at the same time cutting off the 
genuine Polish soil in its eastern part, raises the relative per 
cent, of the German element in Poland to the disadvantage 
of the native element. Eastern Prussia is inhabited by 
2,064,175 people, but there are only 16 per cent, of Poles. 
Eastern Prussia never was a Polish province, but only a 
principality held in feudal tenure. In Western Prussia the 
population numbers 1,703,477, but the per cent, of Poles is 
35, especially so on both banks of the Vistula River which 
used to be a road to the sea at the time of the Polish kingdom. 
The Province of Posen, the cradle of the Polish state, has 
2,099,831 people, and in this number there are only 765,000 
Germans. The lower, middle and upper Silesias are in- 
habited by 5,225,962 people. Poles inhabit mostly upper 
Silesia, their number being 1,158,789. All of these provinces 
constitute the so-called Prussian part of former Poland, 
lost by Poland at the time of her partition, or before it, as, 
it was the case with Silesia and Eastern Prussia. The Polish 
population on this entire area numbers 3,646,446. The 
German population in both Eastern and Western Prussia ».s 



— 118 — 

2,922,699; in the Province of Posen, 765,000; in Silesia 
4,067,173, totaling 7,754,822. Consequently there are here 
twice as many Germans as Poles.* The cause of this pre- 
ponderance of German element is the fact that Silesia and 
Eastern Prussia were undergoing a process of Germaniza- 
tion still in the Middle Ages, and they did not belong to 
Poland at the time of her partition. The Russian plans to 
make the Vistula an internal river of the Russian empire en- 
dangers the Polish ethnographical interests, since they in- 
troduce too large a percentage of Germans into the Polish 
organism. 

When the ethnographical data of Russian-Poland, West- 
ern Galicia and of Prussian-Poland, which provinces Russia 
promised to reunite, are compared, the danger becomes very 
evident. The population of Russian-Poland is 12,467,300, 
of which Poles number 9,115,220; Germans, 618,590; Jews, 
1,660,490. The population of Galicia is 8,025,675, Poles 
claim 4,000,000, Ruthenians 3,674,000 and Germans 212,000. 
Russia intends to annex Eastern Galicia up to the line of 
the lower San, lower Wislock, and upper Dunajec. In other 
words, for the "United Poland" there would be left only two 
"governments," that of Cracow and that of Tarnow. In 
doing this Russia separates ethnographically about 2,500,000 
Poles in the middle, and Eastern Galicia and leaves them a 
prey to russification. This plan allows "United Poland" 
only 1,500,000 Poles out of Galicia. The ethnographical 
aspect of Poland thus "United" would be as follows : 

Russian-Poland 9,115,220 Poles 

Western Galicia 1,500,000 " 

Polish provinces retaken from 

Prussia 3,646,446 " 

Total 14,261,666 Poles 

* According to "The New International Yearbook," New York, 
1914, and according to Polish statistics. 



— 119 — 

The number of Germans on the same area would be : 

(1) In the parts retaken from Prussia, 7,754,822 people — 
if Silesia and Eastern Prussia would also be united with 
Poland. 

(2) In Russian-Poland, together with the Jews, 2,279,080. 

(3) In Western Galicia 212,000, and together with those 
Jews who do not claim to be Poles, about 500,000. 

The total number of Germans and Jews in Poland "Re- 
united," according to the Russian prescription, would be 
10,533,902. 

It is plain now that such a plan only furthers German 
interests if the historical frontiers of Poland are extended 
in the westerly direction, while at the same time its eastern 
possessions are separated from it. The Jewish jargon is 
only a corrupted German, and the Jews were always in 
middle Europe, and especially in Poland, the vanguard of 
Teutonism. In denning the boundaries of Poland, and using 
the ethnographical key in the east, and the historical key in 
the west, Russia would create an ethnographical paradox, a 
state with a mixed population, where sooner or later a serious 
internal strife would be bound to arise. That is what Russia 
is aiming at, since then the Russian government would play 
the part of a peacemaker. The national strifes would render 
the normal development of the autonomy impossible, and 
would soon enable Russia to retake the power to Petrograd. 
The life of the promised autonomy would be a short one and 
the triumph of despotism early. 

It is hard to assume that Europe would permit of the 
strategical occupation by Russia of the upper Oder River. 
Practically this is the only plan of occupation of the upper 
Silesia and perhaps of small parts of the middle and lower 
Silesia. Under these circumstances the number of Germans 
within the boundaries of Poland "United" by Russians 



— 120 — 

would be lower, but the ratio would be at any rate that 
of eight Germans and Jews, to fourteen Poles. This 
is entirely too large a ratio to reflect favorably on the in- 
ternal conditions of the future state. The Germans consti- 
tute a rich, capable and aggressive element. The Jews are 
by no means inferior to them as far as aggressiveness is 
concerned, and they represented always, with their culture 
and language, the vanguard of Germanism in middle Europe. 
Both of them possess enormous financial resources, which 
they would throw upon Poland, devastated by war, in order 
to buy out the land and seize the industry with the help of 
foreign money. Russia never hesitated in her internal af- 
fairs to employ the Germans against the Poles, and still less 
would she hesitate to use them for the annihilation of auton- 
omy of Poland "United," under the Czar's sceptre. A terri- 
fying picture for Poland ! It is by no means an empty 
phrase that the Jewish jargon is only corrupted German, 
and that the Jews were and still are, in middle Europe, the 
vanguard of Germanism. Jewish journalists frequently 
stated that the Jewish jargon "belongs to the great family 
of German languages, and that the Jews, despite the 500 
years spent in the Slavic environment, preserved the German 
language, and even to-day belong to the German cultural 
stock."* As a consequence many of the Jewish leaders, who, 
up to the time of expulsion of Russians from Galicia, wooed 
Russia, now look up to the favors of victorious Berlin that 
it may support Jews against Poles, since the Jews form in 
Poland a "German cultural island." 

There was a sly reservation in the manifesto in which 
Nicolai Nikolayevitsh promised Poland reunion and auton- 
omy under the sceptre of the Czar — "There is but one thing 



* Sonntagsblatt der "New Yorker Staatszeitung," 18, 7, 1915. "Die 
osteuropaeische Judenf rage und der Krieg," by Dr. Malamed. 



— 121 — 

that Russia expects from you, that you respect the rights 
of those nationalities with which history has bound you." 
This was an attempt to check-mate the future of Poland 
with the Jewish question. The Jewish press of the whole 
world, basing itself on the above manifesto, started to de- 
mand equal national rights for Jews in Poland. Russia is 
known all over for her antisemitic feelings. Up to the latter 
days of this war, the Jews were not permitted to settle in 
Russia proper. The area permitted for Jewish settlement is 
more or less coincident with the area of the former Kingdom 
of Poland. The center of gravity of the Jewish question was 
by means of terrorism and pogroms transferred toward the 
Vistula. As the result of this partial policy of Petrograd, 
the percentage of Jews on Polish soil rose to a higher degree 
than anywhere else. In Russian-Poland the Jews constitute 
13.71 per cent, of the 12,464,300 total population. In 
Lithuania and Polish-Ruthenia the percentage is somewhat 
higher. It is an artificial result of the antisemitic policy of 
the Russian government which routs the Jews from Russia 
proper and takes "fatherly" care of them in Poland. The 
manifesto of Prince Nikolai struck the same note, although 
it enveloped it discreetly with an appeal to justice. 

The public opinion in Russia saw through it at once. 
Prince E. Trubeckoi, a recognized authority in Russian 
political life, published an address in which he expressed his 
satisfaction and hope that Russia, after the victory, will be 
able to solve two of her most vexing problems, namely, the 
Polish and Jewish question.* And Milukoff, the leader of 
the Liberals in Russia, pointed out very clearly the parallel- 
ism of both questions in his daring statement that "the coun- 
try across the Vistula is not exclusively inhabited by Poles, 
but that there exists another nationality, the Jews, who have 

*"Russkoje Wiedomosti," io, 31, 1914. 



— 122 — 

a right to be considered as a separate people, though being 
in the minority."* The same Russia which could not afford 
to grant equal civic rights to the Jews wants future Poland 
to grant them more, namely, the recognition of separate na- 
tional rights, which Jews do not possess anywhere else in 
Western Europe, and in America. Both the philosemitic 
progressive party and the antisemitic reactionary party joined 
hands in order to sustain the former Russian policy toward 
the Jews, the policy which can only bring detriment to Po- 
land. Instead of abolishing the boundary of Jewish settle- 
ment in the east, and granting the Jews equal civic rights, 
Russia wants to expand the area of their settlement to the 
west in order to create artificially with the aid of Jews and 
Germans national strife on the Vistula, and be able to abolish 
under this pretext the promised autonomy. Russia wants to 
create Judeo-Poland and thus facilitate the final russification 
and destruction of Poland. 

In their attitude toward the Polish question, the Jews 
joined hands with Russia. "The Jewish press in the Polish 
.provinces welcomed the Polish manifesto with almost hys- 
terical enthusiasm." The Jewish dailies in Warsaw said 
editorially that the Jews "are deeply grateful to the Russian 
commander-in-chief because in his manifesto to the Poles 
he did not forget to mention the other nationalities whose 
fate is bound up with that of the Poles," and it is to be ex- 
pected "that, in accordance with the manifesto, the Poles will 
respect the rights of the other nationalities within their pro- 
vinces.'^ Even in America, which was the centre of the 
anti-Russian-Jewish activity, a definite change can be ob- 
served. The same Jewish press, which a few years ago tried 
to influence the government to break off the commercial 



* "The Globe," New York, March I, 1915. 
t "The Day," February 18, 191 5. 



— 123 — 

treaties with Russia, is now elated by "Purishkewitsh, the 
Black Hundred Leader in the Duma, having kissed the scroll 
of Torah."* They started in this war a general white- 
washing of Russia and a simultaneous slandering of Poland, 
intimating that "the pogrom policy abandoned by the Russian 
government was taken up in another form by the Poles !"f 
A whole machinery of slander and impudent lies was set in 
motion so as to finish up the unfortunate nation visited by 
all the calamities of the present war. 

With lies, however, one cannot go far. 

The note of the Jewish Bund proved beyond doubt that 
there were never any pogroms in Poland arranged by Poles. 
In December, 1914, Mr. Herman Bernstein publicly an- 
nounced that "the Poles resolved to methods of barbarism 
in their policy of Jew-hatred — their hands are smeared with 
the blood of the Jews in Poland ; a nation of pogrom-makers 
is unworthy of independence.''^ About a year afterward, 
when the same Mr. Bernstein returned from Europe, he 
ceased to speak about the "Polish pogroms," and at the first 
interview when landing on the continent attested that "for 
their military defeat on the battlefield, the Russian authori- 
ties made military pogroms against their own peaceful Jew- 
ish population. "§ The main argument that Poles instigated 
Russian soldiers to the pogroms is puerile and ludicrous. 
Russia having in her record Kishenieff, Siedlce and Bialy- 
stok does not need any instigation. In spite of that, the 
Jewish press does not stop flirting with Puriskewitsh, al- 
though the latter is a deputy from Kishenieff, and endeavors 
to direct public opinion against the independence of Poland. 



* "New York Sun," and "The Day," 2, 18, 191 5. 

f 1. c, Bernstein Herman. 

X "The Day," December 13, 1914. 

§ "The New York Times " October 18, 191 5. 



— 124 — 

These are the facts which show plainly that the Jews aid the 
Russian project of solving the Polish question and try to 
subdue the independence of Poland. The Jews themselves 
do not believe in any change in Russia, and that is the reason 
why they would gladly welcome the expansion of their settle- 
ment in the westerly direction in Poland, remaining at the 
same time in connection with Russia. In the internal politics 
they would be certain of the German aid, because in Poland 
the Jews are always the vanguard of Germanism. As far as 
commerce is concerned, they calculate on the capture of the 
eastern markets in Asia. In the wake of the Russian sword, 
if the latter were capable of opening the gates of Constan- 
tinople, Jewish money would pour into China and India 
where it would displace the capital of the Western European 
nations and pave the way for the Russian army. Thus the 
Russian imperialism and the Jewish commercial expansion 
were brought close together in the present war. 

Poland was always friendly to Jews, especially the demo- 
cratic, aspiring Poland. In the insurrection of 1863 the 
Jew, Wohl, was the treasurer of the national government, 
and the banker, Kronenberg, was one of the important per- 
sonages. Before the very outbreak of the uprising, when 
the Russian soldiers were shooting at the Polish church 
procession on the streets of Warsaw as it emerged from the 
cathedral of St. John, the cross which fell from the hands 
of a Pole shot dead by a Russian soldier was picked up by 
a Jew and the demonstration was led by a Jew. It was only 
due to Russian influence that the friendly relations between 
Poles and Jews were brought to an end. Russophilism and 
antisemitism in Poland are but two aspects of the same thing. 
Roman Dmowski, who in the present war was the main- 
spring of the Russophilic committee, was, before the war, 
the leader of the antisemitic movement. The attitude of the 



— 125 — 

Jews toward the Polish cause proved to be identical with 
that of the Russophilic antisemites in Warsaw. Democratic 
Poland fighting for her liberty is just as Anti-Russian 
as it is not, and never was, antisemitic. This question has 
been sifted during the present war by Prof. Dr. W. L. 
Jaworski, the president of the Polish Supreme National 
Committee : 

"Antisemitism, no matter in what form it would appear, 
might bring only an injury to our national interests. The 
shortcomings of the Polish commerce and industry can 
neither be removed by antisemitism nor by national dem- 
agogism; they could be removed only by wide reforms that 
would enable them to establish better hygiene of the inner 
social and economic relations in general; that would raise 
the standard of culture among the wide masses, and that 
would offer new openings for new fields in industry and for 
general development. 

"Only f rank and decided declaration that regenerated 
Poland would not maintain the policy of antisemitism, the 
policy of chicanery and persecution, might help to make 
Jews better citizens on one hand, and on the other hand it 
would check the wide anti-Polish crusade carried on now by 
Jews abroad. Leaving Russia and turning to Western 
Europe, Poland must follow the example given by the coun- 
tries of Western Europe in solving the Jewish question, 
namely, Poland must gain sympathy of Jews by granting 
them equal rights of citizens. At the same time, we must 
emphatically demand of Jews that they become the true 
citizens of the country — that they act for the interest of the 
country, and work for her development. This end could be 
secured only by giving the Jews in Poland access to the 
sources of welfare and culture. As in Western Europe, 
Jews have become either good Frenchmen, Englishmen, 



— 126 — 

Italians or Germans, so we have the right, too, to demand of 
our Polish Jews to become good Poles and be real good 
citizens of Poland." 

Poland cannot and will not recognize any hyphenated 
Poles ! 

For the sake of historical accuracy, I take the liberty to 
assert that the attack of the Jewish press on Poland, not only 
here in America, but also all over the world, was made sud- 
denly and without any endeavor on the part of the Jews to 
come to an understanding with the Polish Supreme Na- 
tional Committee regarding the policy of future Poland on 
the Jewish question. The enmity of the Jews against the 
Poles plainly manifested itself in this country of free speech 
and free press, by the failure to insert vindications of the 
Poles against a wave of calumnies thrown at the Polish na- 
tion, the first step being made by George Brandes, who wrote 
an open and most unjust letter. Jewish nationalists were 
very well aware of the fact that Poland, not being anti- 
semitic in general as a nation, must, however, be anti- 
zionistic when the zionism or Jewish nationalism endeavors 
with Russian or German aid to create the Judeo-Poland. 

Those who think that the Jewish question in Poland means 
an antagonism against the Jews are grossly mistaken. It is 
something entirely different, inasmuch as the war made on 
the Polish nation by the Jewish nationalistic party all over 
the world tends to obtain for the Jews in Poland not the 
rights of equal citizenship, but a recognition of a distinct na- 
tional franchise in order to make of Poland a country of 
mixed nationality and thus to create, with the help of Russia, 
a precedent for the revision of the entire Jewish question in 
Europe and possibly also in America in the near future. The 
following quotation may serve as an illustration : "In order 
that Jews may be assured of equality in civil and political 



— 127 — 

life it is essential that they be accorded recognition as a na- 
tional group in Poland," and "it is hardly probable that any 
sensible Jew will object to the Jewish demand for equal 
recognition with the Ruthenians, the Czechs, the Slavs of 
the Austrian Empire."* 

The attitude of the whole world toward the Jewish ques- 
tion can be expressed by the formula of the French revolu- 
tion: 'The Jews as a nation should be deprived of every- 
thing, but the Jews as men should be assured of every- 
thing."! This is the principle of equal civic rights for Jews 
without granting them separate national rights. Contrary to 
this, the Jews demand in future Poland equal recognition for 
their jargon as a national tongue. Even Western Europe 
has not as yet grown up to the national concubinage, and 
Poland is still less ready to outdo the whole world in the 
Jewish question. Jewish nationalism does not lie within the 
practical political demands. Natura non facit saltus. The 
development of democracy in Europe must at first separate 
the idea of national consciousness from the idea of owning 
the soil.. Only then will it be possible for a nation to exist 
within a nation. At present the whole world stands on the 
basis of the principle of the French revolution, and Poland, 
being in the throes of this terrible war, cannot indulge in 
risky experiments. 

Russia understands that in case of her eventual victory 
over the Germans, there will come a time when the Germans 
will start the war of retaliation — no matter what key Russia is 
going to use in making the frontiers of the "United Poland." 
Both the ethnographical and the historical keys bring Russia 
closer to Berlin. The victory of Russia would not weaken 
Germany as much as it would weaken Prussia within the 

* "Dos Yidische Folk," New York, November 12, 1915. 
f Clermon Tonners, 21, 12, 1789, in the National Assembly. 



— 128 — 

German empire. Prussia cannot submit to this weakening 
for any length of time and she will not lack means and 
cleverness to draw the German empire into her plans of 
revenge. Russia must take into account that the German war 
of revenge in the east will have the support of England, 
since England is the enemy of German ambitions on the sea 
and in colonial enterprises, but she is not Germany's rival on 
land, and especially not in Eastern Europe. England, after 
having defeated Germany on the sea, and having ousted the 
Germans from Belgium, will gladly attack the victorious 
Russia with German hands on the first occasion, so as not 
to permit the excessive overgrowth of Russia. These are 
the factors which guide Russia's policy in Poland in the 
present war. Russia must, due to her aggressive traditions, 
gravitate toward the Oder, and the road to the Oder leads 
over the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. This 
tendency is couched in Russian diplomatic language in the 
phrase — "Uniting Poland under the sceptre of the Czar." 
In reality it means the securing of her eventual western 
frontiers, in order to make the best use of her numerical 
superiority in the future inevitable retaliatory war with 
Germany and Austria. Politically the Russian plan tries to. 
poison Poland with an excess of Germans and Jews, which 
process would facilitate the digestion of the occupied terri- 
tories and absolute conquest of the Vistula. 

The game has been going on for a year. 

There was no greater strategical mistake on the part of 
Russia than her victory over Hindenburg at Warsaw. Hin- 
denburg's offensive was merely a strategical provocation to 
draw the centrum of the Russian army to the left bank 
of the Vistula, and then to threaten with flank attacks both 
Russian wings, and not permitting any movement westward 
for fear of losing the lines of communication. The defence 



— 129 — 

of Warsaw was the beginning of the defeat of Russia on the 
Vistula. The paradox of the Vistula, Austria holding the 
upper course, Russia the middle, and Germany the lower, 
proved its inherent danger. The strategical road toward the 
west does not run through Warsaw so long as Cracow and 
Danzig do not belong to the aggressor. Dragomirow, Hurko 
and Kuropatkin were right in advising Russia to follow 
Kutuzow's plan which originated in his combat with Napo- 
leon. With the Mazurian Lakes in the north and the Car- 
pathian passes in the south, endangering both wings of the 
Russian army, Russia cannot attack successfully either 
Vienna or Berlin. The Russian offensive movement through 
Warsaw forces the Russian army to assume an arched posi- 
tion, with the center directed toward the west and both 
flanks running backwards, one along the Mazurian Lakes 
and the other along the Carpathian Mountains. Such a 
strategical position is synonymous with defeat. With Poland 
divided into three parts and the strategical difficulty of the 
Vistula created thereby, the only way for Russia to victory 
is to follow Kutuzow's method and retire beyond the Niemen 
and Bug rivers. Strategically it means the evacuation of 
Russian-Poland in the first period of the war. Politically it 
signifies the superfluity of Russian-Poland for Russia. The 
Russian rule over Poland has no political, no historical, no 
moral basis, not even a strategical one. For Poland it means 
injury, for Russia it means an unnecessary burden of false 
imperialism. History administered justice to Russia by her 
terrible defeat, and gave her warning for the future. Only 
an independent Poland can solve easily the strategical diffi- 
culty of the Vistula. 

The independence of Poland has not only a historical 
foundation, but also a strategical one. The partition of 
Poland renders the Russian offensive westward impossible. 



— 130 — 

In the present condition of Poland, the road to Vienna or 
Berlin does not lead through Warsaw; on the contrary, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany dominate the Russian line of 
fortresses of Warsaw, Deblin* and Modlin,f as long as they 
possess the Mazurian Lakes and the Carpathian Mountains, 
while the road toward the east is open for them. This is the 
fundamental contrast in the strategical interests of Germany 
and Austria on one side, and Russia on the other. This 
contrast can only be removed by the independence of Poland. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Poland will be 
restored after the present war. In the future war of retalia- 
tion, Poland by the power of her existence only will defend 
Russia against an out-flanking movement from the side of 
the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. Poland 
remaining neutral, the territory about the middle of the 
Vistula cannot be made the field of military operations. It 
is hardly conceivable, however, that Poland could stay neu- 
tral in such a war. It will be the war for the possession of 
the Vistula line! If we assume that Poland would turn 
against Russia, then the line of conflict will be formed by 
the rivers Niemen, Bug and Dniester. In other words, Rus- 
sia will be free from danger of flank attacks upon her wings 
and will have the possibility of the frontal attack in the 
westerly direction. In case Poland would turn against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, Warsaw would be in danger 
of a flanking attack from the side of the Mazurian Lakes 
and Carpathian Mountains, which fact equalizes in favor of 
Germany and Austria the numerical superiority of Russia. 
The new partition of Poland between Austria and Germany 
will deprive them of the possibility of the flanking move- 
ment, since it will not restore Poland but only remove Russia 

* Ivangorod. 

f Novo-Georgievsk. 



— 131 — 

from Warsaw. This will only be favorable for Russia, 
since it will facilitate her eventual frontal attack on the 
whole line, leaving her flanks secure in a good strategical 
position. Only the neutrality of independent Poland may 
be a factor for insuring a permanent peace, since it will 
render difficult the Russian offensive toward the west, as 
well as that of Austria and Germany toward the east. Be- 
sides this, a line of Polish fortresses on the Niemen, Bug 
and Dniester would also materially assist in guaranteeing 
peace. 

There is a difference in power a free nation can display 
from that of an enslaved nation. The free and independent 
Poland will soon become the center of Slavic creative power 
in harmony with the interests of Western Europe, and with- 
out political Russophilism. Poland even now neutralizes 
the Russian influence in the Slavic world, since she is an 
older historical unit than Russia. The Balkan states are 
free, but their civilization is inferior to that of Russia and 
that is why the Balkans are such favorable soil for Russian 
political propaganda. The equilibrium of Europe can only 
be maintained by the division of the Slavic world. In War- 
saw, the Roman cross and the traditions of Rome; in Mos- 
cow, and on the Dnieper, the cross and the traditions of 
Constantinople. This does not mean the separation of two 
religious systems only. Two different cultures, sympathies, 
arts, and finally, two different forms of political law should 
be separated from each other. Constantinople was the 
breeding place of the Caesarian despotism; Rome, on the 
other side, due to the strife between the Papacy and the 
Roman emperors, was the source of the emancipation of 
states and nations and in the last instance of the citizen. All 
these factors constitute the boundary line between the civil- 
ization of Western Europe and that of Russia. Poland al- 



— 132 — 

ways was the vanguard of the west. Poland was the father- 
land of Copernicus, "who stopped the sun in its course." 
The investigation of Birkenmajer in the archives of Stock- 
holm settled finally the nationality of Copernicus in favor 
of Poland.* The system of Copernicus forms the basis of 
the modern conception of the universe. If it had not been 
for Copernicus, Newton could not have accomplished his 
work or he would have to be Copernicus first. The physics 
of Gallileo is also the echo of the work of Copernicus. Po- 
land had no freedom for the last hundred years. Oppres- 
sion restrained the Polish schools and made it very difficult 
for the Polish nation to participate in the great work of 
civilization. Illiteracy and misery are set loose in Poland 
and have all the prospects of unlimited development which 
is denied to science and enterprise. Poland is not permitted 
to study and work. Such is the curse of life in slavery! 
The Polish creative genius could not, however, be sup- 
pressed. Chopin's music and Mickiewicz's poetry already 
after the downfall of Poland became the common spiritual 
good of the whole world. Sienkiewicz and Curie-Skfodowski 
won Nobel prizes. In the scientific circles of the world 
are known the names of Smoluchowski, Raciborski, March- 
lewski, Godlewski, Morozewicz, Romer, Abramowski, Roz- 
wadowski, Zaremba, Olszewski, Kostanecki, Ochorowicz, 
and numerous others. That is the achievement of a nation 
of 20,000,000 people and possessing but two universities, 
one in Cracow and one in Lemberg. As soon as the Russian 
army occupied Lemberg, one of the first steps taken was the 
closing of the Polish University. Warsaw, a Western Euro- 
pean city in the real sense of the word, in tradition and cul- 
ture, a city numbering about 1,000,000 inhabitants, the 
capital city of 20,000,000 people, having a glorious and great 
* Expedition of Cracow's Academy of Sciences. 



— 133 — 

history, did not possess a university ! This was a fact which 
humiliated western civilization, and for this civilization in 
general has to be thankful to Russia, which proclaimed in 
this way the "Slavic Brotherhood" on the Vistula. Liberty 
will stimulate the Polish genius and this will enrich the world 
with new elements, and the Polish nation will regain the 
power to "play the part in Europe to which it is entitled by 
its numbers, its culture, and its genius."* 

The Congress of Vienna recognized and based its work 
upon the principle of legitimism. It was the conservative idea 
contrary to all the achievements of the Napoleonic era. 
Legitimism did not recognize the will of the nation; it sup- 
ported legitimate authority, especially monarchy, on the 
grounds of hereditary rights. Belgium was returned to the 
Netherlands, the principality of Warsaw was annihilated, 
and Italy redivided. This cast the seeds for the revolution 
in Belgium, and the still more sanguine uprising in Poland. 
Italy had to have her Garibaldi. May the future peace con- 
gress not repeat the mistakes of the Congress in Vienna! 
Russia still to-day does not recognize the rights of nations 
in practice, placing the race above the rights of a nation, a 
principle very much inferior to the principle of legitimism. 
To Poland Russia promises autonomy in internal adminis- 
tration. This is less than the Congress of Vienna did, and 
which transformed the principality of Warsaw into a state 
within a state and did not only make an autonomic province 
of it. Poland hopes that if ever a future congress should 
not make it a sovereign state, it will at least deal with her 
according to the Vienna treaties, and will not allow ap- 
proaching the Polish problem on the basis of the manifesto 
of Duke Nikolas. The Congress of Vienna, although taking 

* "The Manchester Guardian," 19, 12, 1915. — 'The New Poland," 
by Bruce Boswell, of Liverpool University. 



— 134 — 

the principle of legitimism as the point of issue, granted 
Poland the character of a state within a state; a separate 
diet, an army, it obliged the Russian Czar to crown himself 
Polish King in Warsaw. Will the future congress, which 
will assemble under the banner of freedom for nations, have 
the courage to step below this principle when dealing with 
the Polish question? 

The attitude of Poles as a nation devoid of political liberty 
was determined by real facts and not by sympathies : 

I. — Administrative and legislative autonomy existed in 
Galicia while Russian and German Poland did not 
enjoy these advantages. 
II. — Private military schools could only be established 
in Galicia. Consequently, Polish youths from 
Russian and Prussian-Poland went to Galicia 
since in the former two provinces any military 
work had to be secretly carried on, and, conse- 
quently, not very effectively. The beginning of 
this political system dates back to the years 1876-8, 
when with the unofficial aid of England an up- 
rising against Russia, in alliance with Austro- 
Hungary, was organized. 
III. — Only in Russian-Poland, on the left bank of the 
Vistula, were there enough recruits for the Polish 
military representation in the case of European 
war, since Russia had, for strategical reasons, to 
evacuate the western governments of Russian 
Poland with the outbreak of the war, and this 
prevented the Russian authorities to mobilize in 
the mining and industrial districts of Russian- 
Poland. 
IV. — During the Congress of Vienna, one hundred 
years ago, England entered into a secret treaty 



— 135 — 

with France and Austria against Russia, in spite 
of the fact that Russia was a faithful ally of Eng- 
land in her war against Napoleon. 
V. — At the Congress in Vienna, England supported the 
Polish interests against Russia, although the Pol- 
ish regiments were fighting with Napoleon against 
England. 
VI. — Poland wanted and could form a military repre- 
sentation only against Russia and in alliance with 
Austria-Hungary. That it was practicable was 
proven by the development of the Polish legions 
in Cracow and an absolute failure of Russian en- 
deavors in Warsaw to form a competitory legion. 
VII. — Russia occupies 80 per cent, of the historical 
Polish territory, and Warsaw is the capital city 
of Poland. Under these conditions the war of 
Austria with Prussia in 1866 could not, and did 
not revive the Polish question, but the possibility 
of war between Austria and Russia was always 
and must always be associated with the prepara- 
tion of the Polish uprising against Russia and 
in alliance with Austria-Hungary. 
VIII. — The military interests in the present war do not 
coincide with the political interests, consequently 
the formation of the Polish legions against Rus- 
sia, and in alliance with Austria-Hungary, does 
not free any one from the obligation of supporting 
the Polish independence. 
Poland went along the way of her ratio status and of 
practical possibilities. She could not forget for a moment 
that Warsaw is not Antwerp, and that Warsaw is not located 
in front of London on the other side of the Channel. Eng- 
land must fight in order to support Belgium, but England 



— 136 — 

may limit the support of the Polish question to the war on 
paper. The Polish uprising in 1830 broke out when Czar 
Nikolas I, in the name of the reactionary principle of legit- 
imism, wanted to send the Polish army to Belgium in order 
to crush her struggle for independence. That did not in- 
fluence England in the following year to save Warsaw from 
the Russian superior forces, although it was Warsaw which 
saved Belgium. The blood of the Polish heroes of the upris- 
ing of 1863 created nothing more than sympathy in Western 
Europe. The Congress of Vienna obliged not only Russia 
but also Prussia to respect the rights of the Polish nation. 
Prussia at the time of Bismarck adopted the anti-Polish 
policy in the Province of Posen. Bismarck did not like the 
sea, so England preferred to keep quiet and to forget diplo- 
matically the treaty of Vienna. On November 9, 1896, a 
Prussian order was issued, changing the Polish flag cf the 
Province of Posen and substituting it with the Prussian 
colors. On February 10, 1897, Minister Von der Recke 
made a brutal speech in the Prussian diet defending the 
above order. England remained silent; still worse, she 
preferred to terrorize France in her Fashoda dispute, instead 
of claiming of Berlin the observance of the treaties of 
Vienna concerning the Polish rights. England did not for- 
get her treaties with Belgium, but alas, how soon she did 
forget those concerning the Polish cause. Nobody enters 
war for someone else's pleasure ; nobody sheds the blood of 
his nation for the other people's interests only. Such is the 
logic and truth of history. Poland understands it, but she 
wants also other nations to understand her position. If 
those, who in the present war proclaimed the watchword of 
the independence of nations, are sincere, Poland hopes that 
the future peace congress will adopt one of two alternatives : 



— 137 — 

I. — Either absolute independence of Poland, or 
II. — Restoration of Poland as a state within another 
state. 

Both alternatives prohibit the submittance of Polish ter- 
ritory to another dismemberment. 

The union of the Polish provinces under the sceptre of 
the Czar, and on the basis of the manifesto of the Grand 
Duke Nikolas, will be, in spite of all appearances, only an 
injustice to Poland. A Polish state within a federation of 
German states would be an anomaly. A Polish state in 
union with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a triple union 
would be a favorable solution of the problem. But happi- 
ness and full justice can only be brought about by absolute 
independence, since this form of political existence was lost 
by Poland due to the "crime" of the partition.* 

The hurricane of war which at present envelops Warsaw 
with the cloud of smoke rising from the battlefields, and 
with rivers of blood spilled in the greatest war of the ages 
will give birth to Poland's future. And above this blood- 
soaked soil of Poland the Polish legions unfurled their ban- 
ner of Red and White, and await the help of all nations 
having the good will to help. 



* Clemenceau. 



Chapter V 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



141 



Chapter V. — The Causes of the War 

The war which is waged now is the war of giants : it is a 
struggle in which both sides do not shrink from anything in 
order to win. No such recklessness was seen since Napo- 
leon's time when the English fleet bombarded Copenhagen 
in order to force Denmark to break her neutrality. 

No feelings of sympathy nor any diplomatical sophisms 
can possibly conceal the fact that through Belgium leads 
a road as well to Paris as to Essen, of Krupp fame, or in 
other words, to Berlin. Essen is situated about fifty miles 
from the Belgian frontier. Dire necessity is the law of the 
war of giants : the determination to win is nothing else but 
the desire to avoid death. It is the hurricane which destroys, 
annihilates and undermines every law and has no respect 
for anything else but for force guiding toward victory. 
Such a hurricane threatened Belgium from two sides. What 
choice did Belgium have? To ally herself with Germany 
and to open a road to Paris meant a war with France and 
England, while, on the other hand, to ally herself with 
France and England necessarily meant a war with Germany ; 
in both cases devastation of the country and forfeiting of 
liberty was to be expected. 

Belgium therefore had to choose between the two evils. 
Under such conditions only the calculation of probability, 
who is going to be the victor, can serve as a guide. Such 
calculation is the method of the materialistic policy. Lon- 
don has always excelled in this method and has calculated 
with perfect calm, long before the outbreak of this war, that 



— 142 — 

in order to subdue Germany it was necessary to combine a 
huge superiority of forces. Diplomatic mines were ex- 
ploded quietly and under ground. Russia, with her elemen- 
tary power of half of Asia and Europe, the rich and heroic 
France, the distant Japan on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, 
and finally Servia, Montenegro and Italy, and possibly other 
allies and brothers in arms became the war apparatus of 
England, and that was intended for replacing the army that 
England was lacking on large scale. The war between Eng- 
land and Germany was brewing in Europe ever since 1900, 
in which year Germany had amazed the world by her power- 
ful naval program. There cannot be two masters of the seas, 
and there is only room for one, for master of all, or none if 
there are but equal rights for all. Therefore London pre- 
pared for this war everything, because even the English 
child was perfectly aware of the fact that the war that was 
to come would be a war for life or death. 

Finally the hour of the struggle came. 

Nobody entertained any doubt in the first few months of 
the war as to the fact that Germany is bound to lose. In- 
spired telegrams made this propaganda quite successful. 
Newspapers exaggerated small encounters and insignificant 
battles were given the importance of another . . . Waterloo. 
The world read this news and became convinced that the 
end of the war will come soon and that victory will be with 
England. The same news were also read by the English who 
expected to join the fray with full force in the spring of 
1915 in order to throw their army into the balance for the 
benefit of France. The English press campaign, however, 
proved to be a complete strategical failure, because the Eng- 
lish were thus taught to underestimate the danger: reading 
continuously about the crushing of Germany and the victori- 
ous march (of the press) on Berlin, Vienna or Budapest, 



— 143 — 

they began to think that there is no need for them on the 
battlefields of Europe. Why to go there when Germany 
is already crushed by the Russian "steam-roller," and 
may at any time ask for mercy of Sir Edward Grey? The 
still worse feature of the thing was that this boasting of 
England was read by the Germans. The haughty answer 
given in the fall of 1914 by Lord Kitchener, to the question 
as to the probable end of the war: "I do not know when 
the war is going to end but all I know is that it is only going 
to start in May of the next year," was a great victory for . . . 
Germany. Berlin listened, kept silent and worked full blast. 
Factories were running day and night, and reserves were 
drilling without undue haste of being sent to the front. 
Every German was becoming more and more convinced of 
the necessity of sacrificing his life for the cause of his coun- 
try, while every Englishman at the same time was taught by 
degrees to underestimate the danger. Finally the much 
heralded month of May came around : it was the month of 
an enormous triumph for Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey. The Russian armies were smashed to pieces in 
Galicia, and on the western front came a shortage of . . . am- 
munition. In the Dardanelles the Turkish military glory 
became once more firmly established after the defeats sus- 
tained in the Balkan war. The war, in fact, began in May 
but it took a turn which was entirely different from the one 
predicted by the press. 

The world continues, however, to believe that the defeat 
of Germany is a foregone conclusion. This fact explains 
the situation of Belgium before the war. Belgium knew that 
there was a hurricane coming from two sides and, therefore, 
the Belgian Government calculated the probability of vic- 
tory. The calculation showed that Germany cannot win, and 
even to-day, after the war has lasted a year, and in spite of 



— 144 — 

the immense victory of Germany, the calculation of material 
forces rather justifies the expectations of England than those 
of Berlin. Belgium has decided not to permit the Germans 
to go across the Belgian territories and has thus sided with 
those who had expectations to win. There is no doubt and 
could not have been at any moment that the war shall violate 
the frontiers of Belgium, either in the direction of Paris 
or in the direction of Essen. The line of the Meuse was too 
strongly fortified for Germany to venture a crossing, but the 
German line of the Rhine is not any easier to break for a 
French offensive movement. 

English war publications frankly admit that the German 
offer to Belgium was advantageous for the latter even in case 
Belgium had to be incorporated into the German Federation 
on the same basis as Bavaria or Saxony.* These were 
"alluring prospects," because they could have put Belgium 
into the world market and double her national wealth. In 
spite of that Belgium refused the Germans the privilege of 
passing through her territory but admitted the English to 
Antwerp. The "world" has passed the sentence of death 
upon Germany, and Belgium could not therefore accept any 
offer from an outlaw. The war began and an ocean of 
blood has separated the nations. Great deeds of heroism 
became the monuments of mutual hatred: Belgium by her 
gallantry gained the sympathy and the respect of the entire 
world and not only of the "world" of the "condottieri" of 
the press. This, however, does not alter the fact that the 
road to success led through Belgium, both for Germany and 
for France as well. It was a dire necessity which nothing 
could avert. 

The attitude of England in the case of Belgium is quite 



*"What Europe Owes to Belgium," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, 
page 13. 



— 145 — 

clear. Antwerp in the hands of Germany means another 
London, but a German London within a few decades. Ant- 
werp lies nearer to the great seas than Hamburg, and once 
more there is no room for two capitals like London, particu- 
larly not enough room on the Channel. It doesn't injure Eng- 
land's reputation at all that her "ratio status" compels Eng- 
land to defend Belgium, because by doing so she defends 
London at the same time. The fact that England has an 
interest in defending Belgium does not interfere with the 
principle of nationalism for which Belgium is fighting nowa- 
days and gallantly spilling her blood. In the battle of Water- 
loo England, in alliance with Prussia, defended Belgium 
from France, and in the battle of the Marne she defended 
Belgium, in alliance with France, against Germany. It has 
been since the times of Pitt a doctrine of the English policy 
not to permit any of the European great nations to get a 
hold of Antwerp. It isn't, therefore, sufficient nowadays 
to say that the struggle in Western Europe is conducted 
simply for the protection of "weak" Belgium. This is true 
to a certain extent, at least apparently, but going to the 
roots of the matter it can be seen quite easily that the 
defence of Belgium is the result of other reasons. The 
actual causes of the war in the west of Europe are entirely 
different and are just as deep and just as far reaching as in 
the east: these causes are older and deeper than the mere 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany or the 
attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia. 

Generally speaking the colonial imperialism of Germany 
is passing as the main cause of the war. There is a great 
amount of truth in this statement, because Germany is in her 
evolution which can inspire fear. Germany as a nation 
counts about 70,000,000 of people in the German Empire 
alone, whereby the Germans of Austria-Hungary are not 



— 146 — 

counted at all. The German emigration dropped to a. 
paltry figure of 15,000 of emigrants per year while the yearly 
increase in population amounts to 800,000. Commerce and 
industry are developing with unprecedented rapidity. In 
the years 1902-1907 or, in other words, within five years 
the exportation and importation increased more than from 
1881 to 1902, or, in other words, during twenty years. The 
amount of German traffic in 1902 amounted to two and 
three-quarter billions of dollars, while in 1907 it increased to 
four and one-quarter billions. The annual increase ex- 
ceeded one-quarter of a billion. In 1912 the total of the 
export trade of Germany exceeded the huge sum of five 
billion dollars. Before the outbreak of the war the propor- 
tion of German trade and the English trade was 21 :27, while 
as late as 1890 the entire commerce of Germany amounted 
to less than the importation to England.* The country is 
half agricultural and half industrial, or in other words it is a 
world in itself, and is able to provide alone for its needs. 
Besides the spirit of the nation is highly developed and the 
Germans can work like ants and fight like lions when their 
God, that means Germany, requires the sacrifices of the 
individual. All these characteristic features form the mate- 
rial and moral basis for an expansion on a large scale. The 
more intensive the life of a nation is, the more territory it 
requires ; this is an old biological law applying both to indi- 
viduals and to nations. The instinct of the German na- 
tion could not possibly help to be influenced by this law, and 
expressed this by making huge naval armaments intended 
for the purpose of protecting by them the colonial im- 
perialism of Germany. 

Germany, which thus far has kept aloof from the sea, soon 
entered into a keen competition with England ; in this respect 

* P. Rohrbach : "Germany's Isolation," Chicago, 1915. 



— 147 — 

Germany has made great strides forward in spite of the fact 
that she lacked the great traditions of a sea-faring people. 
In 1890 German diplomacy succeeded in getting Heligoland 
from England. London did not anticipate that this small 
island in the North Sea shall some day become the operating 
basis for the German Navy. Ten years after acquiring Heli- 
goland the first German Naval program was made public 
and astonished the world by its extent, its accuracy and its 
ambitions. Then England, getting nervous, made another 
mistake which was worse than the selling of Heligoland 
to Germany, and this mistake consisted of devising a new 
type of battleships which were the pinnacle of engineering 
skill. These were the dreadnoughts which are nothing else 
but floating fortresses. Apparently this step meant a prog- 
ress for England but in reality it was not progress but retro- 
gression. German engineering proved to be equal to that of 
England. At the London Exposition of 1851, Alfred Krupp 
made a successful debut by exhibiting a steel block weighing 
2,000 kilgorams alongside of an English steel block weigh- 
ing 1,000 pounds. Every year thereafter increased the tech- 
nical capacity of Germany as far as steel industry is con- 
cerned, which permitted Germany to outdistance everybody 
else in land armaments and partly in naval armaments also. 
German dreadnoughts were soon ploughing the seas just 
as the English did. Thus Germany has acquired the chance 
of being a competitor of England because the type of older 
ships of which England had a large supply could not possibly 
come into account against the modern dreadnoughts. As 
far as the number of ships is concerned England is still the 
leading power ; as far as the quality is concerned the dread- 
nought types gave Germany a chance of entering into com- 
petition with England. Germany had very few ships of the 
old times, but the dreadnoughts have helped them materially, 



— 148 — 

inasmuch as the older types of ships had to be put back into 
the second battle line. When the war broke out the propor- 
tion of the English navy to the German navy was ten to 
sixteen as far as the first-class fighting units were concerned. 
This is the arithmetical way of expressing a mistake made 
by England in building dreadnoughts. Germany has thus 
come closer to the shores of England because she changed 
in their own favor the proportion of the respective naval 
forces of England and Germany. With regard to sub- 
marines Germany has outdistanced the entire world and has 
even created a menace for England, the danger of a block- 
ade. 

A blockade of England ? 

The history of many centuries is shown in this question. 
A new competitor began to knock at the gates to all seas 
which gates were in times gone by hermetically closed by 
England. The Germans began to look for new territories for 
their commerce and their industry. Their economical pros- 
perity became the basis for their colonial imperialism which 
was nothing else but a form of this economical prosperity. 
Statistics showed every year that as far as commercial and 
industrial expansion as well as the expansion of naval arma- 
ments is concerned Germany was speedily catching up with 
England. The British supremacy on the seas began to feel 
the German competition and there can be no two masters of 
the seas, but only one or none, or all should have the equal 
rights which in turn means nothing else but freedom of the 
seas. Thus the war became imminent because Germany 
could not stop her economical evolution and England could 
not without struggle give up the inheritance of a long series 
of generations and could not yield the supremacy on the seas 
for which they spilled streams of blood. Germany could not 
stop her progress nor could England betray her historical 



— 149 — 

tradition. This is nobody's fault, but there are reasons 
which are far stronger than the desire for peace, and the 
fault for these conditions should be equally charged to all 
humanity because the latter's war technique is so much 
superior to the technique of the peace. 

The English supremacy on the seas was based on the 
inaccessibility of the British shores and the superiority in 
war vessels. The first pillar of British supremacy was great 
Britain's "splendid isolation," the second one her naval 
power. The present war already has, in the first year, 
shaken the first of both pillars. Above the seas the air fleet 
made its appearance, while under the sea the submarines 
began their deadly work of destruction. The system of naval 
warfare has been considerably changed, and the inaccessi- 
bility of the British shores is a thing of the past. The 
dreadnoughts are peacefully moored in various bays while 
the war service is done by submarines and scouting aero- 
planes : the air fleet on the one hand and the submarines on 
the other hand made the men-of-war an anachronism. The 
aeroplane, the dirigible balloon and the submarine accom- 
plished a thing which a year ago still seemed to be a fantastic 
dream: they made England a part of the European conti- 
nent. Since February 18, 1915, the date on which Germany 
began a blockade of the English coasts, by means of sub- 
marines, England forms part of the European Continent. 
The importance of this date was still increased by the fact 
that on June 1, 1915, a dirigible balloon appeared above 
London for the first time and dared to throw ninety bombs 
on the metropolis of one-half of the world. The "splendid 
isolation" of Great Britain became an empty phrase. This 
fact is a marking stone of a new epoch in the history of the 
world. Even the greatest defeat of .Germany cannot in any 
way alter this fact: a new epoch was thus started on the 



— 150 — 

seas, but it is still an open question who is going to be the 
author of the first chapter of the new book of the future. 

The submarine in the hands of Germany became the same 
thing that the boats of the Norman Vikings used to be in 
the Middle Ages. Since the time of the Norman Conquest 
the British shores did not see any other conqueror. Does 
not history show at times a tendency to repeat itself ? 

England became so used to her supremacy on the seas that 
she cannot give this supremacy up without any struggle. 
The opportunistic policy shall continue to uphold this con- 
servative attitude of England but England must henceforth 
take the two following facts into account : 

I — The change in the technique of naval warfare exposes 
England to the danger of a compulsory loss of the supremacy 
on the seas. 

II — The principal colonies of England became already 
politically ripe, and the abolishing of English supremacy 
on the seas does not necessarily involve, as it could have been 
in former times, the loss of these colonies. 

Canada, Egypt, South Africa, India and Australia are 
states within a state and not ordinary colonies. In the pres- 
ent war they demonstrated so much conscious loyalty and 
spirit of sacrifice for the mother-country that England may 
remain calm and can look with pride upon the fruits of her 
colonial policy. Not England defending her colonies but the 
colonies are defending England in the present war. This 
may be a paradox but it permits us to see more clearly an- 
other real and new fact and that is that the English colonies 
can and undoubtedly will protect themselves at any time. 
This is a fact which did not exist actually in international 
politics although it has existed potentially. The present war 
is a powerful incentive for a political evolution of the Eng- 
lish colonial dominions and creates at the same time guaran- 



— 151 — 

tees for the safety of England in the future. The supremacy 
on the seas ceases to be for England a question of life or 
death. The historical mission of England, based on the 
supremacy on the seas is, practically speaking, ended with 
glory and with honor. The colonies ceased to be for Eng- 
land a dead block, a market of slaves, and they became 
conscious political organisms ; these colonies are states within 
a state, well prepared for purposes of self-defence, and very 
well able to increase the armaments should such emergency 
arise. The sacrifice of the supremacy on the seas for the 
prize of strengthening of the English colonial dominions 
would solve the question of the seas without injury to Eng- 
land and for the benefit of the world and of permanent 
peace. 

No phrase nor any sentimental feeling can possibly dis- 
guise the fact that the seas are under the control of England, 
nor can the fact be concealed that neutral countries and par- 
ticularly the United States are thus exposed to a great loss. 
The English supremacy grew out of force and was based on 
force and it is lawful in so far as law is a form of power. 
The formula of Bismarck is the formula of English su- 
premacy of the seas. The German submarines, however, 
are directing their attacks on this condition of things and 
the German system of blockading England is an answer 
to the English blockade of Germany. Tooth for tooth and 
eye for eye, and while this goes on the losses of the neutral 
countries are increasing every day. All sympathies and all 
grievances should be left aside because the interests of the 
future generations require that this war should put an end 
not only to the supremacy on land but also to the supremacy 
on the seas. The close follower of every privilege, and 
particularly of a privilege based on power, is jealousy. The 
German submarines which were specially trained for pur- 



— 152 — 

poses of blockading England originated on account of the 
British supremacy on the seas. Improvement of the sub- 
marines will bring about the liquidation of the English 
supremacy on the seas sooner or later, and even a victory of 
England over Germany in the present war cannot possibly 
avert this future from England. A naval blockade in the 
old sense of the word begins to be too expensive since the 
German submarines have attacked the English privileges 
on the seas. England, with her great political talent, begins 
to feel it already and shall not fail to comply with the 
changed condition of things. Germany also understands 
the new conditions and advocates the freedom of the seas : 
Germany feels very well that it can defeat England on the 
seas only at the price of an expedient which at the same 
time jeopardizes German ambitions for a supremacy on the 
seas. The question of a blockade ceases to be what it was 
in the time of Napoleon and during all the wars of the 
nineteenth century. Nowadays, the question of the blockade 
according to the provisions of the English supremacy on the 
seas brings about disastrous consequences owing to the 
counter-blockade by the submarines. This is a reducing of 
the question to an absurdum, but a bloody absurdum after 
all. The tragedy of the Lusitania is not only a monument to 
German inconsiderateness but also a tombstone to the Eng- 
lish system of English blockading. For England it was a 
political Trafalgar, although from a military point of view 
it was nothing but a mere trifle. The question of feeling 
towards Germany should in no way obscure the issue and 
hatred, or sympathy shall under no circumstances serve as 
the only guide for shaping the fate or the happiness of na- 
tions. Regardless of sympathy for England or for Germany 
the program of the freedom of the seas should become the 



— 153 — 

program of neutral countries. The idea of the freedom of 
the seas is the idea of the progress of the world. 

The system of blockading which intends to starve out the 
civilian population of a country is incompatible with the 
requirements of modern progress. Germany replied with 
the tragedy of the Lusitania. This is the curse of every 
evil that it generates still greater evils and the good name of 
humanity has to pay the bill for these extravagant acts. It 
is high time to finish these atrocities for the sake of dignity 
of humanity and of permanent peace. The idea of the free- 
dom of the seas with the exception of artificial canals such 
as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal or the Kiel Canal, is 
becoming a historical necessity and it should not be tolerated 
that this great idea be reduced to an empty phrase. It is, 
furthermore, contrary to the interests of neutral countries, 
and particularly to the interests of the United States, that 
the idea of the freedom of the seas should become a political 
monopoly of Germany. The freedom of the seas should 
become a real program of neutral countries and not a 
temporary expedient of diplomatic intrigues. The appear- 
ing of submarines increases the actuality of the question. 
Because of a new fact coming into existence, a new legal 
formula must be found. The old formulas are not sufficient 
for the new situation. 

Let us hope that the coming peace congress shall not be 
as late on the question of the seas as the Congress of 
Vienna hundred years ago was late on the question of land. 

According to a well-established version German mili- 
tarism is together with Germany's colonial imperialism, 
another cause of the war. This statement is half true and 
half false. Militarism as a system of universal military 
service must in the first place be distinguished from the 
question of military preparedness. As far as militarism 



— 154 — 

is concerned France was and is the leader because her rate 
of growth of the population is constantly on the decrease. 
The return to the three years' term of military service in 
France was the top notch of militarism in Europe because 
it has increased in an unprecedented way the accuracy of 
recruiting. The German system was less accurate because 
the increase of the population in Germany shows an up- 
ward movement. Russia is a giant both as to her territory 
and her population, and owing to these two factors the 
militarism in Russia can be less intense than in Germany 
which is smaller than Russia, or than in France which is 
losing constantly in population. These few facts already 
are sufficient to show that the question of militarism should 
not be confused with the question of military preparedness. 

From the statistical point of view the conditions were 
highly interesting before the outbreak of war. The peace 
footing of the French army was increased owing to the 
three years' term of military service to 768,300 men while 
the peace footing of the German army showed a total of 
619,000 officers and men. Germany replied by a new mili- 
tary law and increased the numerical strength of her army 
on peace footing to 751,000 in total. Russia has at the 
same time increased her fighting strength from year to year 
and maintained all the time an army superior in strength 
to the armies of France and Germany combined. In the 
winter of 1913-1914 the peace footing of the Russian army in 
Asia and in Europe numbered 1,870,000 men. In the win- 
ter 1915-1916 the peace footing of the Russian army was 
expected to reach the huge figure of 1,900,000 men in total. 
All these figures apply to the peace footing of the army 
and do not include the reserves to be drafted into service 
in case of a general mobilization or of war. 

From the economical point of view the three years' term 



— 155 — 

of service meant a great burden for France because it 
deprived the industry of too much labor. The keeping of 
the huge army in times of peace and equipping this army 
with up-to-date war material meant a financial burden for 
Russia far above the country's financial strength. Russia 
has for many years already contracted enormous loans in 
Paris in order to save herself from bankruptcy. France has 
invested in Russia four billions of dollars ; the war was there- 
fore for Russia the only way of saving the finances of the 
country from disaster by winning a victory over Germany. 
Without a war Russia was confronted by the phantom of 
bankruptcy while a victorious war opened up prospects of 
saving the country from financial disaster. Germany did 
not have to fear bankruptcy because she had enough money 
of her own and besides her system of armaments did not 
undermine Germany's economical possibilities inasmuch as 
the increase of population permitted an expansion of pro- 
duction as well as an expansion of armaments. France had 
money and a high political culture, but she did not have 
enough men. Russia on the other hand, did not have 
either money or culture equal to the culture of the western 
European nations but she had a surplus of men. Germany 
alone combined all the elements such as the sufficient sup- 
ply of money, of men and of political culture. These fea- 
tures show why the danger of German armaments was 
greater than the danger of armaments of France or Rus- 
sia, in spite of the fact that the armaments of Germany 
were on a smaller scale than the armaments of the two 
other countries. France was the most militaristic coun- 
try of Europe and Russia had the largest army while Ger- 
many stuck to the middle golden road and consequently the 
greatest military efficiency. This is the secret of German 
successes. 



— 156 — 

Since the times of Sedan and particularly since the 
alliance between Russia and France was formed, the ques- 
tion of armaments became the question of life and death 
of Germany. The alliance between France and Russia pro- 
voked already in the first year of its existence the Fashoda 
incident and the danger of a war between France and 
England, but Germany which was just engaged in building 
her fleet had to expect necessarily that the traditional friend- 
ship between England and Germany will soon change into 
a traditional hostility. Bryce has estimated justly the situ- 
ation of Germany in the centre of Europe with her frontiers 
open to the west and to the east and explained the unity of 
Germany by the "external pressure which the presence of 
two neighboring powers, France and Russia has applied. An 
immense and highly disciplined army has been deemed a 
necessity."* It isn't the fault of France that she re-estab- 
lished the three years' term of military service in order to 
have an army on peace footing exceeding the one of Ger- 
many. Nor is it the fault of Russia that for French money 
she kept in times of peace an army stronger than that of 
France and Germany combined. It isn't the fault of Ger- 
many, either, that she has brought her army on peace foot- 
ing to the same strength as France and that Germany had 
more money than Russia at her disposal. The method of 
mutual accusations and vilifications only leads astray and 
does not bring anybody nearer to the truth. 

The signal for starting the war came from Vienna where 
the war against Servia had been decided upon. The logical 
consequences of alliances and military considerations have 
at once started a general conflagration. This does not 
mean by any means that the entire guilt for starting the 



* J. Bryce, 1. c, page 493. 



— 157 — 

war should be charged to Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
The Central European powers have selected the moment of 
the explosion as well as the place of starting the hostility, 
but the question of peace or war was not entirely depending 
on their decision. The superiority of material forces was 
from the beginning on the side of England, France, Russia, 
Japan, Italy, Belgium, Servia and Montenegro. The cal- 
culation pointed to a disadvantage on the side of Berlin 
and Vienna, and the weaker side therefore selected the time 
and the place of the outbreak of the war in order to counter- 
balance thus the inferiority of their material forces. 

In the fall of 1913 France called the recruits of two 
consecutive years to the colors. This move was dictated by 
requirements of military nature resulting from the re- 
establishment of the three years' term of military service. 
Only one year of older soldiers has been retained under 
arms because the soldiers who have served full two years 
in accordance with the law hitherto in force have been dis- 
charged. Thus the remaining soldiers had to drill the 
recruits for two years at once. From the professional mili- 
tary point of view it was unfavorable because it rendered 
any possible mobilization very difficult and hindered the 
first strategical moves in case war should break out. The 
calling of two years of recruits to the colors could be done 
only by lowering the age limit for enlistment. Thus the 
age limit was reduced from twenty-one years of life to 
twenty years. Consequently in the fall of 1914 France 
had to call to the colors recruits, 20 years of age, and at the 
same time, by virtue of the new law, had to retain for the 
third year of service those who trained the first two cate- 
gories of recruits. France expected to have in 1915 four 
years of soldiers under arms at the same time and not 
three as it should be: such a condition greatly facilitated 



— 158 — 

the mobilization and increased the power of the first attack. 
In the same year, 1915, the effective strength of the Rus- 
sian army was expected to reach the figure of 1,900,000 
men, which figure by the way meant the strength of the 
Russian army on peace footing. The fall of 1915 would 
thus bring to Austria-Hungary and to Germany a disad- 
vantage with regard to the proportion of strength for the 
first attack. The summer of 1914 on the other hand, pre- 
sented a favorable term because then the chances for a 
speedy mobilization of the French army were rather poor. 
In fact the war hung in the air for a long time already, 
and all the expedients of peace have been exhausted at the 
conference of the ambassadors in London during the Balkan 
wars. Already then a number of questions were left un- 
settled and over Europe hung the moment of calm which 
generally precedes a storm. The shots in Sarajevo which 
killed the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary were the 
spark which ignited the mine laid long ago. Austria-Hun- 
gary and Germany seized the opportunity of selecting time 
and place in the conflict which was inevitable for quite a 
few years already. The code of honor has been lived up 
to because the weaker side selected the time and the place 
of the struggle. Humanity, however, had to suffer and 
wade again through an ocean of blood. 

The average public opinion charges the full responsi- 
bility for the war to the Central European powers. This 
judgment, however, is very one sided and therefore unjust. 
Strictly speaking Russia has to bear the brunt of the bur- 
den of responsibility. Russian imperialism has since the 
time of Peter the Great, under the disguise of a religious 
propaganda, endeavored to crush Turkey in order to trans- 
fer the capital of the Czars to Constantinople and fly the 
Russian flag on the Mediterranean. The Russian imperial- 



— 159 — 

ism has also wielded the arms of Pan-Slavism, of racial 
affiliation and of uniting the Slavs for the interest of Pan- 
Russianism, against Austria-Hungary. These methods of 
Russian imperialism are old, and stood the test in several 
wars and innumerous intrigues. The entire world has to 
pay the bill for these Russian methods in the present war. 
Russia, bent on the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
has forced the latter, soon after the Congress at Berlin, 
into an alliance with Germany, although the memories of 
the Austrian defeat by Prussia on the battlefield of Sadowa 
were still alive. Intending to destroy Turkey Russia has 
recently alienated the latter from England and pushed Tur- 
key into an alliance with Berlin. The continental imperial- 
ism of Russia which did not end after the Congress of 
Berlin permitted Germany to increase her power owing to 
Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and subse- 
quently with Turkey. This condition was the main basis 
for Germany's colonial ambitions which were developed 
after the retirement from office of Prince Bismarck. Ger- 
many felt safe in Central Europe and this prompted her 
naval ambitions of later years. Finally the Balkan war 
broke out in which Russia made the false promise to Bul- 
garia with regard to Roumanian neutrality only in order 
to prompt Bulgaria into a war against Servia, Montenegro 
and Greece. As soon as the second Balkan war broke out 
the promises of Russia proved to be utterly false and Bul- 
garia suffered a terrible defeat. Russia was always against 
any increase of Bulgaria's power because the latter showed 
herself always more independent from Petrograd than Servia 
who willingly played the part of Russia's tool. The defeat 
of Bulgaria at Bregalnitza decided Bulgaria's sympathy 
for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus the imperial- 
ism of Russian Pan-Slavism opened a road leading directly 



— 160 — 

from Berlin through Vienna and Sophia to Constantinople, 
which fact made the attack of the Allies on the Dardanelles 
extremely difficult in the present war. Thus Izwolskij the 
Russian Ambassador in Paris was quite justified in his 
alleged saying that the present war is "his war." It mat- 
ters little whether Izwolskij actually said this or not: it 
remains a fact that the continental imperialism of Russia 
formed the basis for the colonial imperialism of Germany 
because it pushed Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria 
into the sphere of influence of Berlin. The actual facts 
put the blame rather on Russia than on the Central Euro- 
pean powers. It would be a political shortsightedness to 
claim that only a defeat of Germany can solve the question 
of armaments in a way which would be advantageous to a 
permanent peace. Petrograd was for many years past 
by no means a smaller source of a danger of war. Further- 
more, who is going to compel Russia to abandon her con- 
tinental imperialism after she has entered Constantinople 
and has penetrated into Western Asia over the Armenian 
Mountains ? 

The mistake lies deeper. 

The responsibility for the war should be charged entirely 
to the anarchy of armaments and not to militarism. If 
an individual wants to rule on the basis of the theory "sic 
volo sic iubeo," humanity calls it anarchy. Nations are 
also liable to fall into anarchy the moment they adopt the 
principle "sic volo sic iubeo." The will of a country with 
regard to military armaments is a dogma which is respected 
by international law. Humanity defines independence as 
the principle of free-hand of the nations or as the principle 
of anarchy of armaments. The extent of armaments is not 
subject to any control from the outside but depends upon 
the determination and desire of every individual nation. 



— 161 — 

This being the case no permanent peace can be preserved 
nor can those who apply the aforesaid principle be blamed 
for doing so. The present war is nothing else but the 
result of this traditional formula and the armaments of 
France, Germany and Russia were based on nothing else. 
It isn't Germany's fault that her population is increasing 
nor that there is an increase of her national wealth and 
power which rendered their armaments more efficient and 
more dangerous than the armaments of other countries. 
The condemning of Germany and the sparing of Russia 
or France obscures the issue, although it has many appear- 
ances of correctness. The centre of gravity lies in the 
anarchy of armaments, and the future peace congress will 
have above all to settle first the question of armaments 
before attacking those who may, against the will of the 
world, insist upon sticking to the traditional theory of 
armies and armaments. The present international law rec- 
ognizes the principle of the anarchy of armaments, but the 
future international law must under all circumstances dis- 
continue to acknowledge this principle. This is a program 
for creating honest, real and genuine bases for a perma- 
nent peace, and in compliance with this program the future 
peace congress will have to take away from the nations 
the liberty of making armaments, and will have to entrust 
the making of changes in the rate of armaments to a peace 
tribunal which will be based on a special international 
agreement. The future peace congress will have to solve 
not only the question of naval armaments but also the 
question of armaments on land; and not only to regulate 
the danger of supremacy on the seas but also the danger 
of supremacy on land. These are the two parts of the 
same question; regulating the one at the expense of the 
other one will leave humanity in the same plight as hitherto. 



— 162 — 

Onesidedness generates always the feeling of an injury, 
and the consequence of such a feeling is the desire for 
revenge. 

Humanity has mastered the technique of the war but was 
hitherto unable to master the technique of peace. Owing 
to this, arise certain problems which are beyond the power 
of humanity and which cannot be solved without blood- 
shed. Among these problems were also the causes of the 
present war or, in other words, the continental imperialism 
of Russia, the colonial imperialism of Germany and English 
supremacy on the seas. The weight of these complicated 
questions, burdened besides by the tradition of centuries 
has broken the dam and caused a flood of disasters. Mil- 
lions are perishing on the battlefields, famine penetrates 
the dwellings of the families and hatred has poisoned the 
hearts of nations. Mothers weep not only in France but 
also in Germany because the tragedy of war is just in 
distributing the share of grief. The question is whether 
humanity will succeed to be just in distributing the share 
of happiness when the foundations for the peace, let us 
hope a permanent one, are going to be laid. 

This is possible in principle. 

The idea of independence does not necessarily require 
the anarchy of armaments. A nation can be free without 
having a free hand as to armaments. The future peace 
congress must not only revise the frontiers but must also 
revise the international law. 

The latter task is the more important one. 



Chapter VI 
THE PEACE TRIBUNAL 



— 165 



Chapter VI. — The Peace Tribunal 

One hundred years ago the Napoleonic period came to an 
end at the Congress of Vienna which attempted to save the 
old order of things in the name of the principle of legitimism. 
History did not permit of retrogression. Napoleon fell as 
the god of war, but his armies had crossed Europe from one 
end to the other, and disseminated everywhere the seeds of 
the ideas which were originated by the French Revolution. 
Wherever the armies of Napoleon came, there originated the 
idea of civic freedom, and national consciousness was 
awakened. Some nations awoke for the purpose of co- 
operating with Napoleon, others for the purpose of com- 
bating him. This, however, will not alter the fact that Napo- 
elon was after all the one who spread the ideas of French 
Revolution all over the world. The militarism of Napoleon 
was defeated, but his democratic ideas and his ideas of na- 
tionalism have won an overwhelming victory. 

There will come finally a time when the present European 
war will come to its end. Then humanity will lay down 
arms and peace, calm and justice will reign once more. 
Looking at the things from a broader historical point of 
view, we can perceive already now that German militarism 
is completing at present the work begun by Napoleon. One 
hundred years ago the militarism of France was spreading 
the ideas of nationalism and democracy. German militarism 
to-day is bringing in the harvest. The burden of the results 
exceeds the causes and the burden of human deeds grows 
over the heads of their perpetrators. German militarism 



— 166 — 

unconsciously forms the prompting element of progress al- 
though its purpose is to reach more concrete and selfish re- 
sults. Napoleon's campaigns also were not always aware 
of what elements they were bringing into history. 

Militarism means universal compulsory military service. 
This is in other words a return to former times when every 
member of a community of men was compelled to take up 
arms for the defense of the community within which he 
lived. General mobilization nowadays calls to the colors 
everybody and anybody — poor and rich, educated and un- 
educated — in other words, all citizens without distinction as 
to the station of life. Wealth and educational level must 
come and serve the cause of their country. Militarism made 
the army a democratic and a national institution. The sword 
ceased to be the privilege of certain classes oi society. The 
idea of duty towards the country has made all men equal by 
force of the executive power of the state. The present war 
is still more completely finishing the task. In the trenches, 
men of all strata of society meet and a common duty and 
common sufferings establish between them a tradition of 
brotherhood. Man is meeting man in close contact on the 
background of this war, which after all is the war of militar- 
ism. 

The ways of history are strange. 

Militarism accelerates democracy although it « does not try 
to accomplish it consciously and directly. Nothing becomes 
lost in the chaos of life. The individual does not perceive 
the subsequent results of his actions, but these results are 
noticed by history. What becomes lost in the apperception 
of the individual becomes recorded by the apperception of 
history. This is the feature of the creative power of his- 
tory, or, in other words, the feature of progress. The logic 
of progress is rational, owing to the efforts of an individual, 



— 167 — 

and irrational, owing to the masses. A pearl can be found 
even in a heap of mud; while proceeding rationally — pearls 
have to be looked for at the bottom of the sea. Militarism is 
not an organization for a purpose of a political propaganda, 
but in spite of that, militarism does more for democracy 
than many political parties. The genius of Napoleon was 
in too many instances looking only for the blind triumph of 
the brutal material force, but in just as many and in more 
instances it has brought about the triumph of nationalism 
and democracy, although not directly bent on doing so. In 
the battle of Waterloo, the militarism of Napoleon was 
crushed for the price of a national regeneration of Germany. 
The casualism of the epoch of Napoleon apparently 
triumphed over causality. The present war follows the 
same road. The results will exceed the causes, casualism 
shall triumph over causality, and irrationalism over rational- 
ism. New lights will shine on the horizon of humanity al- 
though the work of wholesale murder on the battlefields is 
blind. While the flames of the present war are raging, 
foundations are laid for the twentieth century and possibly 
even for a longer period of history. Someone may have a 
hatred for Germany, just as England had a hatred for 
Napoleon, or the Old World for Rome, but still the armies 
of Rome carried the sparks of Greek genius from the bound- 
aries of India as far as the Ultima Thule. The figure of 
Napoleon becomes more and more identified with the history 
of nationalism and of democracy. When the clouds of 
smoke obscuring the present battlefields will be dispersed, 
then real progress will appear from under the iron mask of 
German militarism. 

Militarism as a system of military duties is both dem- 
ocratic and national, consequently progressive. The evil 
lies not in the universal military duty, but in the anarchy of 



— 168 — 

armaments, which forces the nations to make too large ex- 
penditures for the sake of military preparedness in the time 
of peace. From this point of view it is not paradoxical to 
assume, that militarism will be more firmly established in 
Europe after this war, and that it will even invade England. 
England became to-day a part of the continent, when the 
submarine and the aeroplane removed the "splendid isola- 
tion." Militarism will cross the Channel and invade Eng- 
land. The system of recruiting will pass into oblivion just 
as the mercenary armies did. It is delusion to look for the 
end of militarism after this war. The danger for permanent 
peace does not lie in militarism, only in the anarchy of 
armaments. The abolition of militarism and return to the 
system of mercenaries will not prevent the anarchy of arma- 
ments. It will facilitate it. The latter is not the result of 
militarism — because it is older than militarism. The only 
way out of it is to form an international law regulating the 
armaments. A general treaty should oblige all the civilized 
states not to change the system of armaments or the army 
on peace footing without the permission of the peace court. 
This would mean a definite change in the practice up to the 
present day — a practice which is as old as human misery. 

An individual is not an angel — still less a community. As 
long as criminal acts are committed among the individuals, 
so long will such acts be committed among the states. It 
does not mean that the question of peace cannot be regulated 
by law. The fact of war does not exclude international law, 
just as the fact of murder does not exclude criminal law. The 
fact that international law might be violated does not under- 
mine its authority. Even civil law is being violated by the 
wicked or powerful, but the transgressor is punished while 
the law remains intact. It is a mistake to minimize the im- 
portance and authority of international law by pointing at 



— 169 — 

its violation. General education is here at fault. The 
idea that international law is worthless is not true, although 
it is popular. 

Law knows physical persons and legal entities without, 
however, specifying them; the definition of a person ac- 
cepted by the civil or the criminal law is of a general nature. 
In international law on the other hand, the conception of a 
legal entity is specified as : Germany, France, England, etc. 
This conception refers to the legal entities vested with 
sovereign authority or in other words to political organisms, 
alias states, strictly defined as to time and geographical 
limits. Under such circumstances the international law nec- 
essarily must be a code of treaties concluded between and 
binding those aforesaid sovereign legal entities. Any other 
conception of international law is absurd from the point of 
view of logic. 

International law, as any other law, is based upon the 
general character of culture, morals, science, and social 
economy. These all constitute premises of the international 
law. A certain order of international law becomes binding, 
as soon as the treaties of both parties concerned are ratified 
by both of them. It is not the formula of the treaty, but the 
signature of the interested state, that makes a law out of 
the treaty. International law imitates civil law regulating 
the mutual relations between the states. The executive power 
is principally invested, as in any other company, in the hands 
of other partners, or here in those states in relation to which 
any state did not live up to the treaty or infringed upon the 
law. England is the executor of her treaty with Belgium in 
the present war. The future peace court must be based upon 
similar principles of executive power if it is to limit the 
anarchy of armaments and inclinations to war. Although 
the idea of a perpetual peace is an abstract one, the idea of 



— 170 — 

a lasting peace is within practical possibilities. The plan of 
a peace court is to-day only a pium desiderium. It has not 
the signature of all the parties concerned, consequently it is 
not and has not the validity of law. Let us assume that the 
horrors of the present war will force Europe to take up this 
question and realize it. The future peace congress realizing 
the idea of a peace court will have to define its competency 
or to give it the form of a law. In other words, to insure 
executive power, the treaties must be ratified. In order to 
be on a really working basis, the peace court must, in the 
interests of peace, make it certain that the system of ar- 
maments or the army on peace footing must be approved by 
and cannot be changed without the permission of the peace 
court. The peace court can regulate the use of the sword, 
just as a civil court regulates the use of money. As the civil 
courts do not eradicate thefts or larceny, so the peace court 
cannot be expected to remove forever the danger of war. 
An enormous achievement will however be left ; that is the 
limitation of the anarchy of the sword guarded by the sanc- 
tity of the law. 

Nations are not immortal but form only transitory forms 
of existence in the history of human progress. Perhaps there 
will come a time when nations will resolve themselves in a 
higher unit of their life. In the dawn of history, chieftains 
of peoples called states to life. The states became the cradles 
of nations. Perhaps the nations will create in the future a 
new form of existence: "mankind," which still is only in the 
realm of moral and religious dreamland, but not in a con- 
crete, practical and political form. 

In the dawn of history, man was the property of the 
sovereign. As the development went on, he became the 
property of the state. The state made him a member of the 
nation, which is a historical brotherhood, founded upon the 
community of historical traditions and language. 



— 171 — 

What is the next step ? 

A permanent peace and cultural penetration will bring 
nearer the epoch of brotherhood in the name of civilization 
of all free nations. This will be a new and higher form of 
political consciousness but as yet it scarcely buds on the tree 
of history. The nations will join hands in work toward com- 
mon good and duty. The day will come when the truth of 
God — "Treuga Dei" — will reign among the nations, as it 
does among the individuals. This is an old and sacred dream, 
as old and sacred as is human suffering. The pagan Plato 
worked for it, and so did St. Augustine. Are we, the con- 
temporary generation, now bathed in the blood of the present 
war, capable of bringing nearer the day of triumph for 
mankind ? 

In the agony of the present war the answer to this ques- 
tion is being born. There must be victors and there must be 
the victims in this war, but there should be no wronged 
ones, if the future peace is to heal the bleeding wounds. 

The coming peace should for the sake of justice accept 
for a basis the following five principles : 

I. — Settlement of the divergent interests of England, 
France, and Germany by the means of colonial 
possessions, particularly in Africa, so as to pre- 
vent violation of the principle of liberty of na- 
tions by territorial changes on a greater scale in 
Western Europe. 

II. — Enforcement of the principle of liberty of nations 
in the eastern theater of war by reconstructing 
Poland in the first place, thus preventing Pan- 
Slavism which, if established, would inevitably 
bring forth as a reaction a Pan-Germanism or 
Pan-Romanism. 



— 172 — 

III. — Re-establishment of the freedom of the seas. 

IV. — Submitting the question of land and naval ar- 
maments, or, in other words, the question of 
changing the peace-footing of the army and navy, 
to the control of the special peace tribunal, the 
legal authority and executive power of which 
should be based on a specially ratified, interna- 
tional treaty. 

V. — Sparing the vanquished from utter destruction by 
abstaining from exacting excessive war-contribu- 
tions. 
May the conscience of nations awake ! 

Cleveland, Ohio, July, i9 I 5- 



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